in mystic order: such as might be expected from devotees to
the sacred theory of numbers.

Finally, that the conjoint symbol was a figure, connected with,
and perhaps represented and explained in, the mysteries, is cor-
robobated by another representation.

There is a plate in Denon where, surrounded by a circle, and
placed upon a sceptre, it forms the terminating point of a flight
of fourteen steps (a mystic number) to which a procession of as
many priests is directing its approach. It is placed exactly as
if to imply, that it is the grand object of the procession: and the
figure of the Hierophant Hermes, known by his Ibis head,
waiting its arrival, indicates beyond dispute an Initiation.

That connected with this indication and with the sceptre and
globe, it may possess another meaning than that which I have
assigned, I shall not dispute. New combinations of figure pro-
duced, without doubt, a different interpretation. Besides, the
signs themselves were cabalistical; that is, they involved variety
of meaning, according as the analysis was theological, philoso-
phical, or physical.

I shall not therefore object to those, who may discover the
Egyptian trinity in the object of this initiation, referring the
helm-surmounted eye, to the governing mind, the tongue to wis-
dom or the Logos, and the volute to the universal soul or Binah
of the Jews.

Should these remarks correspond with the general tenor of
your Classical miscellany, I will enter more fully on that inter-
esting, but hitherto unproductive, field of speculation, the Hiero-
glyphical Language.

CLERONOMUS.

PLATONIC DEMONSTRATION OF THE
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

PART 1.

Plato has demonstrated the immortality of the rational soul
in three of his dialogues, viz. in the Phædo,¹ in the 10th book

¹ There are five arguments in the Phædo for the immortality of the
soul, the fifth of which properly and fully demonstrates it from the
essence of the soul. See the notes to my translation of that dialogue.
of his Republic, and in the Phædrus. But though the arguments employed by him in each of these dialogues, in proof of this most important truth, will be found to possess, by those that understand them, incontrovertible evidence; yet, it appears to me that this is peculiarly the case with the reasoning in the Phædrus, which is not only, in the language of Plato, accompanied by geometrical necessities, but is at once admirably subtle and singularly sublime.

As this reasoning is most perspicuously developed by the Platonic Hermæas in his Scholæ on the Phædrus, I shall give a translation of his elucidations, and also of the text of Plato, on which these elucidations are a comment. The words of Plato are as follow:

"Every soul is immortal: for that which is always moved is immortal. But that which moves another thing, and is moved by another, in consequence of having a cessation of motion, has also a cessation of life. Hence that alone which moves itself, because it does not desert itself, never ceases to be moved; but this is also the fountain and principle of motion, to such other things as are moved. But principle is unbegotten. For it is necessary that every thing which is generated, should be generated from a principle, but that the principle itself should not be generated from any one thing. For if it were generated from a certain thing, it would not be generated from principle. Since, therefore, it is unbegotten, it is also necessary that it should be incorruptible. For the principle being destroyed, it could neither itself be generated from another thing, nor another thing be generated from it, since it is necessary that all things should be generated from principle. Hence, the principle of motion is that which moves itself: and this can neither be destroyed, nor generated. For otherwise, all heaven and all generation falling together must stop, and would never again have any thing, from whence being moved, they would be generated. Since then it appears, that the nature which is moved by itself is immortal, he who asserts that this is the essence and definition of soul, will have no occasion to blush. For every body, to which motion externally accedes, is inanimate. But that to which motion is inherent from itself, is animated; as if this were the very nature of soul. If this however be the case, and there is nothing else which moves itself, except soul, it necessarily follows that soul is unbegotten and immortal."

The following are the elucidations of Hermæas:

"In the first place, it must be inquired about what kind of soul Plato is speaking. For some, among which is the Stoic Po-
sidonius, are of opinion that it is alone about the soul of the world, because it is said πασα, and it is added a little after, 'all heaven and all generation falling together must stop.' But others say, that is simply concerning every soul, so as to include the soul of an ant, and a fly. And this was the opinion of Harpo- 
cration. For he understands the word πασα, as pertaining to every soul. If however, it be requisite neither to restrict the problem, nor to extend it simply to all animals, we must assume from Plato himself, what kind of soul it is, of which he is now speaking. He says therefore, that it is necessary in the first place to speak about the nature of soul both the divine and the human, i.e. about every rational soul; so that the present discourse is concerning the rational soul. To which we may add, that the ancients are accustomed to call the rational soul, that which is properly soul. For they call that which is above it, intellect, and that which is beneath it, not simply soul, but the irrational life, or the animation of the spirit, the life which is distributed about bodies, and the like. But they denominated the rational part that which is properly soul. For Plato also calls the rational soul, that which is properly man. He previously, however, enunciates the conclusion, since he is about to make the demon- 
strations, from things which are essentially inherent in the soul, and which pertain to it, so far as it is soul. On this account therefore, he first enunciates the conclusion, indicating by so doing that the δοτι, or the why, is contractedly comprehended in the στι, or the that. For the soul possesses the immortal from its essence. Hence, prior to the evolved, divided, and expanded demonstration, he gives the contracted and that which contains the why together with the that. But there are here, two de- 
monstrative syllogisms, through which the immortality of the soul is demonstrated, and which directly prove that it is so; and there is also another syllogism which demonstrates this, through a deduction to an impossibility. Why, however, is there this number of syllogisms? For the intention of Plato, was not simply to adduce a multitude of arguments, since in this case he would have employed many others, as he does in the Phædo; but he employs such as are adapted to each subject of dis- 
cussion. For now, as we have already observed, he adds arguments derived from the essence of the soul, and from things which are essentially inherent in it. In answer to this it must be said, that since it is proposed to demonstrate that the soul is

1 For την στι here, it is necessary to read την οτι.
2 The same reading as the above, must also be adopted here.
immortal, if we see how many modes there are of corruption, and show that the soul is not corrupted according to any one of these, we shall then have demonstrated that it is incorruptible and indestructible, and it will also be evident that it is immortal. For every thing that is corrupted, is corrupted in a twofold respect. For either it is itself corrupted by itself, through the matter which it contains, or it is corrupted externally. Thus for instance wood, by alone lying on the ground, is corrupted through the putrefaction which is in itself: for it contains in itself the cause of its corruption; as Plato also says in the Republic, that every thing which is corrupted, is corrupted by its own appropriate evil. But it may also be corrupted externally, by being burnt, and cut. Since, therefore, there are two modes of corruption, on this account Plato adduces two syllogisms. For one of these demonstrates, that the soul is not corrupted by itself, which he shows through its being selfMoved and perpetually moved; but the other syllogism demonstrates that neither is the soul corrupted by any thing else, which he shows through its being the principle of motion.

Shall we say, therefore, that each of these syllogisms is imperfect, but that the demonstration derives perfection from both? Or shall we say, that in either of them the other is comprehended, but that the peculiarity of each, previously presents itself to the view? For that which is not corrupted by itself, cannot be corrupted by another thing. For having itself in itself, the cause of preserving itself, and always being present with itself, how can it be corrupted by any thing else? For that which is self-motive is a thing of this kind, as will be demonstrated. And how can that which is not corrupted by another thing, but is the principle and cause of other things being preserved, be corrupted by itself? For the principle of motion will be demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. For neither will it be corrupted by the things which are above it, since it is preserved by them, nor by the things posterior to itself, since it is the cause of their being and life. If, therefore, it cannot be corrupted by any thing, how, since it is the fountain of life, can it be corrupted by itself? Hence, as we have said, each of the arguments is of itself perfect, and comprehends in itself the other. But one of them shows, and is characterized by this, that the soul is not corrupted by itself; and the other by this, that the soul is not corrupted by any other thing. Let us however, in the first place, arrange the prepositions of the syllogisms, and afterwards consider the development of them.

The first syllogism therefore, is as follows: The soul is self-moved. That which is self-moved is perpetually moved.
That which is perpetually moved is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. Hence this reasoning shows us that the soul is not corrupted by itself. But the second syllogism is, the soul is self-moved. That which is selfmoved is the principle of motion. The principle of motion is unbegotten. The unbegotten is incorruptible. The incorruptible is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. And this reasoning demonstrates to us that the soul is not corrupted by a certain other thing. The truth of the assumptions, therefore, we shall accurately discuss in what follows. But now considering the first and common proposition of the two syllogisms by itself, that the soul’s self-moved, and which Plato arranges in the last place of the whole reasoning, let us survey how that which is self-moved is the first of things that are moved, especially since no casual man doubts concerning the existence of the self-motive essence. And perhaps it will be found that the philosophers do not dissent from each other. For Aristotle indeed takes away all corporeal motions from the soul, which we also say is most true. But Plato clearly shows that the motions of the soul are different from all the corporeal motions. For he says in the 10th book of the Laws, “that soul conducts every thing in the heavens, the earth, and the sea, by its motions, the names of which are to will, to consider, to attend providentially to other things, to consult, to opine rightly and falsely, together with rejoicing, grieving, daring, fearing, hating and loving.” That there is, therefore, a certain principle of motion, and that it is that which is self-moved, will be from hence evident. For as it is manifest that there is that which is alter-motive, this will either be moved by another alter-motive nature, and that by another, and so on to infinity; or alter-motive natures will move each other in a circle, so that the first will again be moved by the last; or, if it is not possible that either of these modes can take place, it is necessary that the self-motive nature must have the precedence. It is evident, therefore, that motive natures cannot proceed to infinity: for neither is there the infinite in essence, nor is there any science of infinities. But neither is it possible for motive natures to be in a circle. For the order of beings would be subverted, and the same thing would be both cause and effect; so that it is necessary there should be a certain principle of motion, and that motion should neither be to infinity, nor in a circle. This principle of motion, however, which, according to both the philosophers, is soul, Plato says is self-moved, but Aristotle immovable.
But that it is necessary this principle of motion should be demonstrated to be self-moved, even from the dogmas of Aristotle, you may learn from hence. In all beings nature does not proceed without a medium from a contrary to a contrary, as, for instance, from winter to summer; but it is entirely requisite that a medium should precede, at one time spring, and at another time autumn; and the like takes place in all bodies and incorporeal essences. Here, likewise, as there is the alter-motive and the immovable nature, it is necessary there should be a medium which is the self-moved essence, being one and the same in number, and in subject. For that which Aristotle calls the self-moved nature, as, for instance, the animal, is not that which is now proposed for investigation. For the animal, according to him, being composed of the immovable and the alter-motive, he says that the whole is self moved. So that, as there is that which is entirely immovable, such, for instance, as the principle of all things, and as there is that which is alter-motive, such as bodies, there will be between them the self-moved nature, which will be nothing else than soul. For that which we see moved by it, this we say is animated, so that this is the very nature of soul, itself to move itself. There are, therefore, these three things according to Aristotle, viz. intellect, life, and being; and in the first place, that we may speak of being, as there is something which is generated from another thing and which receives existence from another, there is also that which imparts existence to itself, such as the heaven and intellects, which he says always exist unbegotten by any other cause. For, according to him they are neither generated by a cause, as neither are they generated in time, but they are always unbegotten, and the causes of existence to themselves. And again, in life there is that which receives life from other things, for man generates man; and there are also things which have life from themselves, such as again, the heaven and intellect. For they have not an adscititious, but a connascent life. Farther still, as there are things which receive from others the power of intellectual perception, and become through them intellective, as the intellect which is in capacity, according to Aristotle, there is also intellect which is in energy, which possesses from itself intellectual perception, and intellectually perceives itself. 1 Hence from all this it follows, that as there is

1 And this intellect in energy is the medium between the intelligible, properly so called, which is superior to intellect, and the intellect which is in capacity.
that which is moved by another thing, there is also necessarily that which is the cause to itself of being moved, and imparts self-motion to itself. For, otherwise, it would be absurd to pass entirely from the alter-motive to the immovable without assuming that which is self-moving as the medium, in the same manner as it is absurd to pass from that which is generated, and which only sometimes exists, to that which is super-essential non-being, without assuming being as the medium. For it will be immaterial what kind of non-being we assume, whether that which is inferior to a generated nature, or that which is superior to it, unless we assume the intermediate nature, which is eternal being. Thus, likewise, in motion, it will be immaterial, what kind of the immovable we assume, whether that which is subordinate, or that which is superior to the alter-motive nature, unless the self-moved is assumed as a medium. And the like takes place in life, intellect, and other things.

This self-motive motion, therefore, is demonstrated by the philosopher in the Laws, to be the first principle of all other motions, and the cause of them according to all the significations of cause. For it is the effective, the paradigmatic, and the final cause of them, which are alone properly causes. For the formal cause is in the effect, and is the effect itself. And the material cause is much more remote from being properly cause; since it has the relation of things without which others are not effected. Hence, that the self-moving nature is the effective cause of other motions is evident, as Plato demonstrates in the Laws. "For if all things, says he, should stand still, what would that be which would be first moved?" Is it not evident that it must be the self-moving nature? For if that which accedes to the motive cause is moved, and all other beings are alter-motive, but that which is self-motive possesses in itself a motive power, and does not merely approximate to it, but is united to it, or rather, has motion for its essence, it is evident that this, being first moved, will move other things. For as, if the sun did not set and rise, but was immovable, we should be dubious what is the cause of so great a light, and if he were invisible to the things which he illuminates, we should be still more dubious; thus also, with respect to the soul, since being incorporeal it is the cause of all motions, it occasions us to doubt how this is effected. As, therefore, the sun who illuminates all

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1 Because it is that from which or in which, other things are effected.
2 This is on the supposition that all things stand still.
things, much more makes himself luminous, thus, likewise, the soul, which moves all things by a much greater priority, moves itself. For every cause begins its energy from itself; and you will find that the motions of the soul are the paradigms of corporeal motions.

Let us then assume the corporeal motions; but these are eight in number, being rather passive than effective; viz. generation, corruption, increase, diminution, lation, circulation, mixture, and separation. In the soul, therefore, there is increase, when giving itself to more excellent natures it multiplies its intellects. But there is then corruption in it; when departing from thence it becomes more imbecile, and more sluggish in its intellectual perceptions. Again, generation takes place in it when it ascends from this terrene abode. But the corruption of it is its last lapse from the intelligible. And mixture, indeed, in it, is collected intelligence, and at the same time the contemplation of forms. But separation in it may be said to be a more partial intelligence, and the contemplation of one form only. Again, lation in the soul is the motion of it according to a right line, and into the realms of generation. But circulation in it is its periodic revolution about forms, its evolution, and its restitution to the same condition. Circulation, therefore, may be more appropriately assigned to divine souls, but lation to ours. You may also perceive in divine souls both these motions. For the Demiurgus, says Plato in the Timæus, taking two right lines, bent them into a circle. Hence it is evident that the circular inflection and intelligence of souls is not without the right line. For it pertains to intellect alone to be purely moved in a circle. But the ninth motion, which is that of incorporeal natures about bodies, such as calefactions, or refrigerations, or animations, has a paradigmatic cause in the soul, so far as the soul gives life to bodies.

And thus we have sufficiently shown that there are motions of souls, which are the paradigms of corporeal motions. It remains, therefore, to demonstrate that the motions of the soul are the final causes of other motions. For immortality is not pre-

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1 For this is, as it were, a new birth of the soul.

2 The demonstration of this is wanting in the original. For in the original after ἀπεισάδ, ὁ οὕτως καὶ πρακτικός, there immediately follows οἰκίζεται τε εἰς καὶ πλήθες αὐταῖς ἀπεισάδε, which evidently implies that something preceding is wanting. And it is obvious from the translation of what follows, that there is no demonstration of the motions of the soul being the final causes of other mo-
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dicated of the soul, as a certain other thing, but is co-essentialised in the very essence of it, and unically comprehends the whole demonstration. For immortality is a certain life in the same manner as self-motion. Plato, therefore, afterwards ad
duces an evolved and expanded demonstration, when he says, "for that which is always moved is immortal," &c. omitting to say that the soul is self-moving, as being common to the two syllogisms, and intending to introduce it as the last of the four arguments, where also we may more accurately investigate it. Now, however, prior to the discussion of the parts of the first arguments, let us logically adapt the words themselves of Plato to the propositions.

All the propositions, therefore, of the syllogisms are three. The soul is self-moving: the self-moving is always moved: that which is always moved is immortal. But as we have said, the first and smallest of all the propositions, which says the soul is self-moving, is ranked as the last. For the third and greatest of all of them is placed first, as being connective of the whole reasoning; and this is that in which Plato says, "for that which is always moved is immortal." But the proposition posterior to this, which says, that which is self-moving is always moved, is introduced through the contrary, the alter-motive, together with demonstration. For Plato here says: "But that which moves another thing, and is moved by another," i.e. the alter-motive nature, "in consequence of having a cessation of motion," i.e. not being always moved, "has also a cessation of life," i.e. is not immortal. If, therefore, that which is moved by another, in con
csequence of not being always moved, is not immortal, that which is self-moving, being always moved, is immortal. All the propositions, however, are assumed essentially, and so far as each of them is that which it is. For from that which is moved by ano
er, it is not only demonstrated that the self-moving is always moved, but also that the always-moving is self-moving; so that they convert, as for instance, the self-moving is always moved, and the always-moving is self-moving. For if that which is moved by another has a cessation of motion, i.e. if the alter-
motive is not always-moving, it will be evident that the always-
meoving is self-moving. For this is collected by the second hypothetic syllogism. For if the alter-motive is not always-moving,

tions. It may, however, be summarily shown as follows, that the motion of the soul are the final causes of other motion. The motions of the soul are, as has been demonstrated, the effective causes of other motions. Every thing desires good. Good is proximately imparted.
it is evident that the always-moving is not alter-motive. But that which is not alter-motive is self-motive. And from the words, "because it does not desert itself," it is collected, that every thing which is always-moving is self-moving. For if the alter-motive is likewise always-moving, it is in consequence of subsisting in conjunction with the motive cause. Much more, therefore, will that which is self-moving be always-moving, because it is not only always present with itself, but is united to itself.

T.

ON THE ORIGIN OF THE DRAMA.

The Origin of the Drama has been assigned to various periods and various causes; but, as it would seem, without such definite precision of inference and such force of evidence, as are necessary to make it no longer a question. In tracing the drama to the mysteries, I should perhaps be wrong to presume on any striking originality, but, I may venture to say that, although this mode of accounting for the origin of the stage may have been previously broached as a surmise, it has hitherto never assumed the mature form of a regular hypothesis.

We have very few glimmerings of light to direct our search for the origin of the drama in Greece. All that we collect with any certainty is, that it was introduced originally to the public under a very inartificial and inelegant form, and that a perambulating stage, in no degree better than similar contrivances of our tumblers and mountebanks, was the humble cradle in which Melpomene and Thalia first made their appearance before the Grecian world.

Nevertheless there is reason for pronouncing, on a slight examination of their features, however disguised by so unworthy a garb, that the same superstition which fabricated the Pagan mythology was their parent, and that the Pagan Hierarchy was the Lucina who presided at their birth. It appears, indeed, that the abuses of the original comedy, or rather farce (for in its original state it resembled more what we have since designated by that name), were of a very undignified complexion. The gestures and actions of the bye-standers were mimicked with the grossest caricature, and their lives and characters laid open to the lash of scorn with the most unsparing scurrility. Now it is well known that the particular branch of Poetry called
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PART II. [Concluded from No. XLII. p. 230.]

RESUMING, however, the consideration of the propositions, let us endeavor to render them as perspicuous as possible. "The soul is self-moved." By motion here, we must understand the life of the soul. The soul therefore is self-vital, containing in itself the principle and fountain of life. For if nature had intended that bodies should be self-moving, she would have inserted in them the principle and fountain of motion. But now, since it is necessary that they should rank as alternative natures, she generated bodies receiving the principle of motion from other things. The soul likewise, is seen deliberately choosing many things, and performing many, according to its own proper deliberate choice. But this would not be the case if it were not self-moving. At the same time also, if you look to the nature of the thing, you will find, on account of its clearness, a great abundance of arguments in proof of this. Plato, however, exciting our recollection from clear evidence, and from the last of things, says, that when we see a body incapable of being moved by itself, we immediately say that it is inanimate; but when we perceive a body which can move itself, we immediately say that it is animated, in consequence of spontaneously inferring that self-motion is the form and definition of the soul. But from that which is in our power, you may especially demonstrate the self-motive nature of the soul. For if well-being is more excellent and perfect than being, but the soul perfects itself, it is manifest, that as it imparts to itself that which is more excellent, viz. well-being, and excites and perfects itself, it will much more impart to itself that which is less excellent, viz. being or existence. The being of the soul, however, is nothing else than life. But life is motion. It is evident therefore, that the soul will impart to itself motion. Hence it is self-moving. But that which imparts life to other things will much more impart life to itself. For that which vivifies other things will in a much greater degree impart vivification to itself; so that the soul by imparting life to itself, will vivify and elevate itself. But life is motion. The soul therefore, will im-
part motion to itself. And hence it is self-moving. For divine natures, and those that first impart any thing, begin their energies from themselves; just as the sun that illuminates all things, is light itself, and the fountain of light. Soul therefore, which imparts life and self-motion to other things—for animals, according to Aristotle, are self-moving—is much more self-moving, and life, and the fountain of psychical life.

But that which is self-moving, is demonstrated to be always moved, by showing that the self-moving is alone always-moving, and is alone immortal, from assuming the former propositions by themselves, and so far as they are essentially what they are. Plato therefore demonstrates from the alter-motive, that the self-moving is always-moving. For it is evident that the alter-motive has not its motion from itself; and on this account it is called alter-motive. Hence, receiving this temporally from something else, it also loses it in time. But that which imparts motion to itself essentially, as being always present with itself, and the giver and receiver being one and the same, will be always moved. Plato, however, manifests that he assumes motion in life. "For having," says he, "a cessation of motion, it has also a cessation of life."

But that the alter-motive has a cessation of motion, i.e. is not always-moving, is evident from hence. For as there are these two things, the mover and that which is moved, it is necessary, either that the mover should accede to that which is moved, and thus should move it, just as we do when we move a stone; or that the thing moved should accede to the mover, and thus should be moved, just as the soul betaking itself to intellect, is moved by it, and surveys the forms which it contains; or it is necessary that both should accede to each other; in the same manner as the master and the disciple; for the disciple gives himself to be excited by the master, and the master hastens to excite the disciple, and in short is converted to him. These things therefore, thus subsisting, that which is alter-motive is not able of itself to accede to the mover; for its very existence consists in being moved by something else. Hence in order that what is moved by another may be always moved, it is necessary that the motive cause should be converted to it. In wholes, however, and eternal natures, it is not lawful for things which are more excellent to be converted to natures subordinate to themselves. For more excellent natures would subsist for the
sake of others, and subordinate natures would be things for the sake of which others subsist, which is most absurd. That which is alter-motive therefore will not be always moved in this way, i.e. through the conversion of eternal natures to it. But if it is to be moved at a certain time, it is necessary that it should be led by something else to the motive cause, not merely locally, but also according to aptitude. If therefore, another thing conjoins it to the motive cause, from a certain time, it will again in a certain time be separated from this cause. For universally, all things which are generated by causes that are mutable, are generated and corrupted in time; but things which are generated by immutable causes, are generated perpetually in a manner invariably the same.

Some one, however, may say, how is the sublunary region always moved, since it is alter-motive? May it not be said, that it is never always the same, nor remains the same according to number, except in form; so that if it is not the same according to its subject, how will it be always-moved? For being corrupted according to its parts it always remains in the same form. But if neither generation is able to accede of itself to the heavens, nor the heavens are converted to generation, in consequence of it not being proper that more excellent should be converted to less excellent natures, whence does generation receive its aptitude? May it not be replied, that the motion of the heavens being efficacious, acts on sublunary natures, celestial natures not being converted to them, just as the sun illuminates, not by being converted to the illuminated substances, but by sympathy? But how is the heaven not alter-motive, but self-moved, since it is a body? And if it is alter-motive, how will it be always-moved? May it not be said, that the heaven is neither alter-motive, nor simply body, but an immaterial body? We also say, that the self-moved is twofold, the one being simple and impartible, which is properly self-moved, but the other having now proceeded into interval, is not simply impartible. For so far as it is distended with bulk, so far it is changed from that which is properly self-moved; but so far as it participates of a connascent life in its essence, so that it is not possible, even in definition, to separate that body from the life of it, so far it has also self-motion in its proper essence. For self-motion is the peculiarity of soul and life. As therefore, it is impossible for a material body to be uncolored and unfigured, thus also it is still more impossible for a celestial body to be lifeless and inanimate. And thus you may see the coalition of it with soul. The summits, likewise, of secondary natures, are
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always conjoined to the extremities of first natures; in order that there may be a certain continuity, and that no vacuum may intervene; since again, another nature would be requisite, which may fill up that which is between. Since, therefore, an ethereal body is the first of bodies, but soul is the last of intelligibles; these ought to be conjoined to each other, and possess a mutual similitude; so that a celestial body is soul amplified into bulk; and life extended into triple dimension. Hence the life which is in it is connascent, and nature in it is mingled with life. There are also in it many other forms of animals.

But it may be said, let the soul, so far as it is soul, be self-moved, and always-moved, yet nothing hinders it from being corrupted. To this we reply, that either the energy of it, i.e. its self-motion, must first cease, but the existence of it be afterwards corrupted; or the existence of it first, but the self-motion of it afterwards; or both these must cease at once. For besides these, there are no other cases. If the essence therefore, of it is corrupted, it is not possible to devise how the energy of it can be saved. But neither vice versa, is it possible in the hypothesis before us, that the energy being corrupted, the essence of the soul can be saved; for to assert this, would be to forget the hypothesis which says, that the soul, as far as it is soul, will be self-moved. So that it is not possible for self-motion to be corrupted, but the soul to remain. For as the hypothesis says, as far as it is soul, it will be self-moved. If therefore, everything which is corrupted, first loses its energy, but the soul, according to the hypothesis, so far as it is soul, does not lose its energy, being self-moved, it is also incorruptible.

Let, however, the third case be supposed, that the soul may be corrupted at one and the same time with its energies. We ask, therefore, whether it will be corrupted by itself, or by some external cause? But it will not, indeed, be corrupted by itself, because it preserves itself by moving itself. And it will not be corrupted by external causes, because it would thus be alter-motive, instead of self-motive. Hence it will not be corrupted together with its energies. Besides, by what external cause could it be corrupted? Shall we say, by natures more excellent than itself? But these are rather the saviours, than the destroyers of it. Can it, therefore, be corrupted by natures inferior to it? Over these, however, it possesses a despotic power, and is the fountain of their motions. For as there are ten motions, the motion of the soul alone is generative of all the others. But the soul being self-moved, you may also more concisely infer that it is always-moved, as
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follows, as we have already observed respecting self-motion. That which perfects itself, likewise produces itself. For that which perfects imparts good to itself. But that which simply produces any thing, imparts existence to it. Well-being, however, is more excellent than being. Since, therefore, the soul perfects itself, it will also produce itself. But the essence of it is life, which it also imparts to other things. Hence it will impart life and existence to itself. That, however, which is always present with that which imparts existence, always is. But the soul is always present with itself. Hence the soul always is, so that it is always self-moved, and always-moved. For in reality, an injury would be done to any thing in the universe which should be deprived of that which it imparted to itself. For it would not be injured in being deprived of that which it received from another; but it is injured, if that is taken away from it which it imparts to itself.

The last proposition, however, is not attended with any ambiguity, viz. that what is always-moved is immortal. For if, according to hypothesis, it were mortal and corruptible, it would no longer be always moved. So that all the propositions are not only true, but they are so essentially so as to be equal in power and convertible. What then, some one may say, is soul alone immortal, but is intellect not immortal? Or is there no absurdity in saying that intellect is not immortal? For it is above the immortal. But if you are willing to say that it is immortal, you must assume another form of self-motion, and another form of immortality; and in a similar manner in the successive lives, an immortality must be assumed adapted to each. For there is a great extent of things which exist in eternity; of those which exist in the whole of time; and of those whose duration is only in a part of time. For some beings live for one day, others for a year, others for ten years, and others for a hundred, or a thousand years. But how is it possible that the partial nature¹ likewise should not be immortal, since it is self-moved? In answer to this, in the first place, it must be observed, that the divine Iamblichus, and the philosopher Porphyry, do not admit that the partial nature is self-moved, but assert, that being the instrument of the soul, it is moved indeed by it, but moves the things which are saved by it. And this they say, is the ninth motion. It is evident, however, that though this partial nature should have a certain

¹ i.e. The life distributed about the body, the peculiarities of which are, generation, nutrition, and increase.
self-mobility, yet it has this after the manner of an image, and as an instrument.

But if it be requisite to say something in opposition to certain philosophers, nature is not in all respects superior to bodies, but there is something in it which is inferior to them. For so far as it is a certain incorporeal essence, and so far as it fashions and adorns bodies, it is superior to them; but so far as it is in them as in subjects, and has its existence in them, it is inferior to them. Just as the resemblance in a mirror, in security, beauty, and accuracy of form, surpasses the mirror; but in hypostasis is inferior to it. For the mirror, indeed, is more essential, but the representation has its subsistence as an image from the mirror, is whatever it is for the sake of it, and on this account will have a more obscure being. After this manner therefore, the partial nature subsists with reference to the body. For the nature which is divine has self-motion secondarily, as we have before observed, and connascent with a divine body. From this syllogism, therefore, it is demonstrated, that the soul is not corrupted by itself. In the soul, likewise, one part of it does not alone move, and another part is alone moved, but whatever part of it may be assumed, moves and is moved according to the same.

Some one, however, may still desire to learn more clearly what the motion is which subsists in the soul. It is evident, therefore, that it is not any one of the corporeal motions, not even the ninth [which pertains to the partial nature]. For these are not self-motive. But neither do all the peculiar motions of the soul manifest the motion which is now investigated, such as will, opinion, anger, and desire: for the soul is not always moved according to these; but we now inquire what that motion is, which is always inherent in it. This motion, therefore, is the life which is connascent with the soul, which it imparts to itself, and according to which it is moved. And these motions indeed, I mean will, opinion, and the like, are the lives and the motions of the soul, yet they are not always inherent in it, but only sometimes, becoming, as it were, renewed. But from the soul perfecting itself, you may especially assume that it is self-moved, and by this you may separate the rational soul from the irrational, and from nature. For it belongs to the rational soul to perfect and excite itself, and to be converted to itself, no one of which pertains to the others. Hence, this ex-

1 Instead of not of if androadsnt in this place, I read not of whenever.
position is adapted to the divine and human soul, i.e. to every rational soul, and not to the irrational soul and nature. "To such other things also as are moved, this is the fountain and principle of motion. But principle is unbegotten, &c."

The second syllogism, which shows that the soul is immortal, is as follows: The soul is self-moving. That which is self-moving is the principle of motion. The principle of motion is unbegotten. The unbegotten is incorruptible. The incorruptible is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. The propositions here are five. The first of the syllogisms, therefore, shows that the soul is sufficient to itself. But this second syllogism demonstrates its extension to other things, just as all divine natures are sufficient to themselves, and the sources of good to others. For the extended here signifies, that which imparts to others what it possesses itself. For it is characteristic of a beneficent and unenvying nature, and of super-plenitude of power. The intention, therefore, of the reasoning, is to manifest in the soul the extension of it to other things. And the proposition, indeed, which says, "that which is self-moving is the principle of motion," is sufficiently demonstrated by Plato in the Laws, when he says, that if all things should stand still, self-motive natures would be the first things that would be moved. The order of things, likewise, is as follows. That which is immovable is the first. That which is self-moving is the second. And that which is alter-motive is the third. But the principle, says Plato, is unbegotten: i.e. the principle of motion. For this was the thing proposed. Making, however, the proposition to be more universal, he extends it to every principle; because every principle, so far as it is a principle, is unbegotten.

But here, many of the more ancient interpreters are disturbed about the meaning of Plato, when he says, "that the principle is unbegotten." For if he asserts this of the principle of all things, viz. of the first God, the assertion is true; but it is not now proposed to speak of this principle. And if he simply speaks of every principle, how is this assertion true? For Peleus is the principle of Achilles, yet Peleus is not unbegotten. We must consider, therefore, what the principle is, of which he is speaking. We say, therefore, that principle, properly so called, is that which primarily produces the whole form. Thus, for instance, the equal itself, is that which produces all-various equals; and man itself, is that which everywhere produces men. Thus, therefore, since the soul is the principle of motion, it will be able to produce all the forms or species of motion, so
that so far as motion, it will not be generated. Hence, if as essence, or as intellectual, it is generated from being and intellect, yet, so far as it is motion, it is not generated. For this is the principle of the motion of all things. For material forms also, are unbegotten; such, for instance, as the form of man, the form of horse, of the equal, and of motion, and consequently much more must the cause of form be unbegotten. Hence, since the form of motion is unbegotten, much more will the cause itself of motion, but this is that which is self-moved. Plato likewise, properly calls it the fountain of motion. For it is the peculiarity of a fountain to impart, as it were, what belongs to itself spontaneously, to things which are different from itself. But it is the peculiarity of a principle to preside, as it were, and despotically rule over things which subsist through it. For a cause is a principle, as being co-ordinated with the things of which it is the principle; but it is a fountain, as exempt, and subsisting in intellect, both which are inherent in the soul. Plato, therefore, would have been liberated from any further discussion, by concisely saying the principle of motion is unbegotten: for generation is motion, but the principle of motion will not be moved by any thing else, lest we should proceed to infinity. But he thought fit to give a more ample extent to the theory.

The unbegotten nature, therefore, of principle, must be understood as follows: the principle is not any one of the things of which it is the principle. Thus, for instance, the sun is the principle of light; it is not, therefore, illuminated by any thing else. Intellect also, being the principle of intellect, and being itself intellectual, does not derive from any thing else intellectual perception. And being, which is the cause of existence to other things, does not possess its subsistence as being from any other source. Hence the soul, which is the cause of other things being animated, and possessing life, has not itself a life extrinsically derived; so that if it is the first motion, it will be the cause of other things being moved, and will not be moved by any thing else. Hence, every principle is unbegotten. What then, if some one should say, do not all things derive their existence from the first cause? To this it may be replied, in the first place, that in assuming the principle of a certain thing, we ought not to consider any one of the principles above it. And in the next place, it may be said, that principle is, after another manner, a thing of such a kind as its productions. For the equal itself generates other secondary equals; and the motion of the soul generates other forms or species of motion. But
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The first cause is not after another manner such as the things which proceed from it; for it is above principle, and above cause. Intellect, therefore, is primarily from itself intellectual; but it is being from something else [i.e. from being itself]. But that which is just primarily derives its subsistence from justice itself. And justice itself does not become just through any thing else. For so far as it is justice, and so far as it directs other things, it originates from itself. Nothing, however, prevents it so far as it is something else, such, for instance, as being or intellect, or a certain God, from deriving its subsistence from the principle of all things. But Plato summarily demonstrates as follows: that, if principle were generated, it would be generated from that which is not principle, through the hypothesis that it is principle. Nothing generated is the first. But every thing generated is generated from something else. No principle, therefore, is generated; for if every thing which is generated is generated from a certain principle, principle also, if it were generated, would be generated from a certain principle; so that principle would be in want of principle to its generation, and this would be the case to infinity. Again, every thing generated is generated from that which is not such as itself is. Thus an animal is generated from that which is not an animal, [i.e. from seed,] and a house from that which is not a house; so that principle also, if it were generated, would be generated from that which is not principle. Hence, at one and the same time, as being generated, it would be generated from a principle, and as a principle it would be generated from that which is not a principle, which is impossible. Every thing, therefore, which is primarily a certain thing, i.e. every principle, is unbegotten. These things, therefore, are sufficient to the demonstration of the incorruptibility of principles.

But Plato also adds another demonstration, through a deduction to an impossibility. "For the principle," says he, "being destroyed, it could neither itself be generated from another thing, nor another thing be generated from it." For because every thing generated is generated from a principle, nothing else could be generated from it: for the principle (from the hypothesis) is destroyed. But neither could it be generated again, because that which is generated must again be generated from a certain principle. The principle, however, is destroyed. For as when a root is cut off, no germination can take place; thus also, Plato says, "that the principle of generation being destroyed, all heaven and generation falling together must stop,
The next proposition, which says that the unbegotten is incorruptible, Aristotle also strenuously demonstrates; which may concisely be demonstrated as follows: If that which is unbegotten were corrupted, either all things would come to an end, being corrupted, or they would again be restored [i.e. be again generated]; and from corruptible natures we should arrive at the unbegotten. And thus that which is generated will be unbegotten. For if that which is unbegotten were corruptible, but the corruptible is generated, the unbegotten is generated, which is impossible. Plato, however, in his demonstration, comprehends both these in one. For if the principle were generated or corrupted, it is necessary that all things should fall together with it, and thus neither heaven nor generation would exist, nor even that which is unbegotten.

Thusfar, therefore, Plato collects through two syllogisms, that the self-moved is immortal, without making any mention of the soul, except when he pre-announces the conclusion at the beginning; so that he has demonstrated concerning that which is self-moved, that it is immortal. Now, however, he assumes the first and smallest proposition, that the soul is self-moved, when he says, "Since then it appears that the nature which is moved by itself is immortal, he who asserts that this is the essence and definition of soul, will have no occasion to blush, &c." But he syllogises as follows: Every [rational] soul, is alone the principle of motion to bodies. That which imparts the principle of motion to bodies, is self-moved. The soul therefore is self-moved. He reminds us, however, of this from the last of things, and from what is apparent. For if the animated differs from the inanimate body, in being moved by itself and inwardly, (for that which we see moved by itself, we denominate animated) it is evident that the soul, since it moves itself, and desires to move the animal, will thus much more cause it to be moved. But we must not be disturbed, lest we should be forced to admit, that those souls of animals are immortal, which we are accustomed to call animations alone and entelecheias [or forms], such as the souls of worms and gnats. For either the soul itself is inserted in bodies as the principle of motion, being itself present with them, as in us, or it imparts a certain resemblance of itself.

How, therefore, it may be said, do we see the inanimate body moved by itself to corruption? Does not fire also tend upward of itself, and a clod of earth downward? For either the body
which proceeds to corruption, is in reality perfectly inanimate, and the soul is not the cause of all motion; or it is animated, and the soul will be the cause of this, which imparts life and existence to other things. To this we reply, that what is called an inanimate body, is so called with reference to a partial soul, because it has not a peculiar soul, but is animated by the soul of the universe. For every body considered as existing in the animated world, is in a certain respect animated; just as the excrements which are in us participate, so far as they are in us, of a certain vital heat, but when they proceed out of the body, are deprived of this animating warmth. Body, therefore, so far as it is in the world, has a vestige of soul, which moves it, and causes it to be that which it is. Through this also, fire tends upward, and a clod of earth downward, as being moved by the soul of the universe. For nature, by which they are moved, is a resemblance of soul. But we denominate them inanimate, in consequence of comparing them with a partial soul. It is not proper, however, to wonder, if the soul becomes the cause of corruption; for we have before observed, that it produces motions, as looking to its own advantage, and the good of the universe. In the human species also, we see that the worthy man destroys his body by famine, when by so doing it is beneficial to him. Thus, therefore, the soul of the universe, when a partial soul leaves the body, analyses the body, and restores it to the elements whence it was derived. For its further existence in a composite state, is no longer advantageous to the universe; just as the nature which is in us, compounds some of the juices, but dissolves others, extending itself to what is useful to the whole of our body.

Of the two before-mentioned syllogisms, therefore, each indeed demonstrates, both that the soul is neither corrupted from itself, nor by anything external to it; nevertheless, the first in a greater degree demonstrates the former, and the second the latter. Hence Plato assumes the proposition which is common to both the syllogisms, and which says that the soul is self-moved. And he does this, not simply for the sake of dialectic argument; but since self-motion itself is the essence of the soul, this is the cause of the soul not being corrupted, and of other things living and being connected by it. Both the argu-

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1 For ἐφώσσω here, it is necessary to read ἐφώσσω.
2 This vestige of soul in body, is the cause of the gravitation of bodies.
3 For αὐτοκινήσια here, it is necessary to read αὐτοκινήσια.
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ments, therefore, are demonstrative. For they are assumed from the definition of the soul, and all the definitions are essential, so far as the soul is what it is. Hence also they reciprocate with each other, or are convertible. And here, it is especially requisite to admire the philosopher, for employing in his reasoning that which is most peculiar to, and characteristic of the soul, omitting such particulars as are common to it with other things. For the soul is an incorporeal, self-moved essence, gnostic of beings. You see, therefore, that according to all the rest, it communicates with many things, but is especially characterised by self-motion. That also which appears principally to pertain to it, viz, to be gnostic of beings, this no less pertains likewise to sense. For sense is gnostic of things co-ordinate to its nature.”

THOMAS TAYLOR.

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1 Instead of ἀληθια in this place, it is requisite to read ἀλεθια.