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About Google Book Search Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at |http: //books .google .com/I ftOPl^TY Of Mckigm Jwaries, /. *^ / ^Si7 ARTES SC^ENTIA VERITAS THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH 1897-1898 t W1M.1AH LucKHART, G.C.B., K.C.S.I. « of ihe Tirah ExiJcdilkmary Force. THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH 1897-1898 AN ACCOUNT OF THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE ORAKZAIS AND AFRIDIS UNDER GENERAL SIR WILLIAM LOCKHART, G.C.B., K.C.S.I. BASED (BY PERMISSION) ON LETTERS CONTRIBUTED TO 'THE TIMES' COLONEL Hl^'by HUTCHINSON OIRECTOK OP MILITARY BDUCATION IN INDIA AUTMOK OF 'TKB STOKV OF WATSSLOO,' 'THE STORY OP l8xa,' 'THB STORY OP CORUNNA,' 'MILITARY SKETCHING MADE EASY,' ETC., ETC. WITH MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1898 A/i right t rturvtd 5 3) H51 /i^/6S^(>f DEDICATED BY PERMISSION TO GENERAL SIR WILLIAM S. A. LOCKHART, Q.C.B.y iC.C.S.I. COMMANDER OF THE TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. PREFACE I BELIEVE this narrative of the Tirah Expedition gives an accurate account of the operations, and I hope it will also be found a readable account. Its interest will certainly be enhanced by the reliable maps and plans which accompany it, and by the excellent illustrations, for which I am indebted to my friends Colonel More - Molyneux, Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelligence, Lieutenant- Colonel C. Pulley, commanding the 3rd Gurkha Rifles, and others. These officers served with distinction in the expedition, and their pictures portray scenes in which they were themselves actors. It has not been part of my plan to make any reference to the frontier policy of the Government of India. It is a policy of which it may be said, ** Quot homines^ tot sententue'' Nothing, indeed, could be more striking than the fact that on this viii THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 great Imperial question, men whose knowledge of the subject, and experience, are equal, hold opinions absolutely opposed. It is, however, outside my province, or my purpose, even to approach the discussion which has recently attracted so much public attention. I have only, in my introductory chapters, following my usual practice when I write the story of a campaign, endeavoured to state so much of facts which are notorious as may enable the general reader to form his own conclusions as to the cause of the war, and '* what they killed each other for." H. D. HUTCHINSON, Colonel. London, \st September 1898. CONTENTS CHAPTER I PAGE Introductory ...... i CHAPTER II The Afridis and their Grievances .16 CHAPTER III Preparations, and the Plan of Campaign .22 CHAPTER IV Waiting to Begin . -43 CHAPTER V The Actions at Dargai .57 CHAPTER VI In the KhAnki Valley .76 X THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 CHAPTER VII PAGE The Capture of the Sampagha Pass . 85 CHAPTER VIII The Capture of the Arhanga Pass, and the Occupation of Tirah -95 CHAPTER IX Life in Tirah — The Affair of the qth November . 112 CHAPTER X Still in Tirah — The Terms to the Orakzais — The Affair of the i6th November . .128 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X The Correspondence of the Mullahs. 151 CHAPTER XI The Move to Bagh — Terms to the Afridis — The Reconnaissance to Dwatoi . .158 CHAPTER XII The 1ST Brigade in Mastura — The Punishment OF THE CHAMKANIS — PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE Tirah 173 CONTENTS xi CHAPTER XIII PAGE Through the Dwatoi Defile again, and down THE Bara Valley . .186 CHAPTER XIV The Bazar Valley Expedition and Reoccupation OF the Khyber — The Affair at Shin Kamar — The End of the Campaign 207 CHAPTER XV Tactical Lessons and Concluding Notes .224 APPENDIX Officers Killed and Wounded 247 MAPS AND PLANS General Map to Illustrate the Operations At end of book Plan of the Actions at Dargai, i8th and 2oth October 1897 ... To face page 62 OuTUNE Sketch of the Dargai Heights Plan of the Action at the Sampagha Pass Plan of the Action at the Arhanga Pass Plan of the Picquets on the Arhanga Pass Plan of the Action at Shin Kamar 71 89 100 114 217 ILLUSTRATIONS General Sir William Lockhart, G.C.B., K.C.S. I. Frontispiece Brig.-Gen. Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B. . To face page 28 The Camp at Shinauri • • • ,» 49 *'The brave little Gurkhas streamed across the deadly space. . . . The Scottish Borderers followed close." — Dargai^ \2>th October 1897 „ 61 **A wretched mule falls down, and the road is blocked at once " >, 78 " On this particular evening the casualties were numerous" . . . „ 82 ''Sir William Lockhart . . . examined the ap- proaches to the pass " . „ 88 The Mastura Valley. • • « 93 The Mastura Valley — looking North „ 98 " Strings of mules go out every day, with sufficient escorts, and return in the evening laden up with forage" ,,109 Saran Sar — ^th November \Z<^l „ 119 "The men, however, rallied bravely round their officers" „ 121 xvi THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 " A search party found the bodies the next day" . To face p. 123 ** Sir William Lockhart received them in camp to- day " ,,129 " Every house in this valley ... is a little fortress" „ 161 The Dwatoi Defile ,,167 " A company of the Queen's, led by Lieut. Engledue, went for them in dashing style'' . ,,178 **The mountain guns again . . . were of the greatest service" ,,192 ** On the 1 3th the march was resumed " . » I99 Gurkhas — the Raw Material Between pages 238, 239 Gurkhas — the Finished Article } CHAPTER I ^ INTRODUCTORY " Now tell us all about ths war^ And what they killed each other for f " " Why, that I cannot tell,'' said he, " But 'twas a famous victory I " I HAVE been through this campaign in Tirah myself; I have talked about it a great deal with friends; and I have read much that has been written about it in newspapers, books, and des- patches. But I am quite sure that, even now that it is all over, if you button-hole ten intelligent men, and ask them ''all about the war, and what they killed each other for?" you will get a different answer from each, and no two will agree in essential particulars ! This may seem an amazing assertion to make, but I am convinced it is not far outside the truth. We all know that the general object of the expedi- tion launched by us against the Afridis and Orakzais was to exact reparation for their unprovoked aggres- 7/ B 2 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. sion on the Peshawar - Kohat border, for their attacks on our frontier posts, and for the damage to life and property inflicted by these raids on British territory and British subjects. But that is only our view of the matter. We want to get behind this, and ascertain the Afridi view. Why did they^ who had faithfully kept their agreements with us for sixteen long years, why did they rise against us, and commit these outrages } Were they altogether ** unprovoked," as we so confidently assert ? Besides, the Afridis and Orakzais were not the only tribes in arms against us in this momentous year. The Waziris, the Swatis, the Boners, the Mohmands, the Bajauris, and others, have all been on the war-path in 1897-98, in deadly earnest; and undoubtedly something more than a fanaticism fanned by frenzied Mullahs has been the cause of a conflagration so widely spread, so fierce, and so dangerous. Before, then, I plunge in ntedias res, and recount the incidents of a campaign which took us into a wild and difficult and unknown country, and intro- duced our troops to a warfare more serious than anything they have been engaged in since the Mutiny, it will be interesting to discuss the events which preceded the expedition, and rendered it necessary, and to arrive, if we can, at some definite conclusion as to the " why " and the " wherefore" of it all It will be understood, of course, that any opinions which I may express in the course of this narrative I INTRODUCTORY 3 are my own, that I profess to possess no special acquaintance with facts, and that I merely endeavour to place them before the reader in the light in which they have appeared to one on the spot, who has had ordinary opportunities to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest them. To go, then, at once to the root of the matter, I venture to submit that for xhe,fons et origo malt, we must hark back to the year 1893, when Sir Mortimer Durand returned from Cabul with the Boundary Agreement signed by the Amir of Afghanistan in his hand, and that that document was the outward and visible sign of all our sub- sequent troubles on the North-West Frontier. Our idea in proposing that a definite boundary should be demarcated between Afghanistan and India was a most just and reasonable one. We wished that it should be made clear, once for all, under whose influence and control the tribes on the border should remain. Wild, turbulent freebooters, loving frays and forays, fiercely jealous of their inde- pendence, acknowledging the authority of no one but their own immediate Maliks and Mullahs, they had for years past been a veritable thorn in the flesh of successive Governments ; and the difficulty of restraining them within limits, and of dealing out punishment to them when patience and the expedients of diplomacy were exhausted by some more - than - usually - lawless outrage, was accentuated by the fact that it was in many in- 4 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, x897-98 chap. Stances impossible to say, or at least a delicate matter to decide, whether the offenders were subjects of the Amir or fairly inside the pale of our own influence. For this principal reason, it was deemed necessary to come to a definite 'agreement with the Amir regarding a boundary. Once a line was agreed to, and demarcated, between Afghanistan and India, there could be no question when raids and outrages were committed as to the responsibility of the Power concerned, or as to the right of that Power to intervene, restrain, and punish. But it is an open secret that the idea of a boundary was distasteful to the Amir. The negotiations for a friendly commission to visit Cabul to arrange the details of it, more than once very nearly fell through, and there can be no doubt that it required all the patience, and tact, and diplomatic skill that Sir Mortimer Durand could command, to get the Agreement signed by His Highness, and to carry the affair to a successful conclusion. For the Amir and his people were quite satisfied with the existing regime. What useful purpose could a boundary serve for them } The tribes seldom troubled them, and the English, on the other hand, had always been well able to take care of themselves when their borders were harried. What was the need then of a boundary ? One certain effect of it would be to lop off", and place I INTRODUCTORY 5 definitely under the influence of the British Govern- ment, certain tribes and sections, which hitherto had, at least nominally and outwardly, acknowledged the Amir as their Suzerain. By so much at all events he would be disadvantaged. North of the Khyber, particularly, the new boundary would run through districts — the Mohmand country, Bajaur, and Asmar — in which he was extremely sensitive of interference, and though he was persuaded at last into a reluctant acquiescence, we may be sure it was with many an arriire pens^e, and much mental reserve, that he appended his signature to the fateful document ; and that, astute and shrewd as he is, he foresaw then the storm that would blow when actual demarcation should be attempted. But the irritation caused by the actual boundary question, with the interference and misappropriation (from his point of view) which it threatened, was comparatively insignificant. It was a deeper anxiety which troubled the Amir, and made the whole arrangement repugnant to him. He was not a student of European history, and knew nothing of Napoleon, and his wars of aggression and conquest ; and yet, even as the Czar Alexander, after the overthrow of Frederick William at Jena and Auer- stadt in 1806, protested against the total dismember- ment of Prussia,^ not from friendship to Prussia, ^ After Jena, '*the Czar objected to Napoleon absorbing Silesia, not because it would be unjust to Prussia, but because he feared Napoleon as a 6 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. but because he deemed it wise to keep such a powerful neighbour as the French Emperor at arm's length ; so did the Amir instinctively feel that the longer the tribes could be maintained in their original independence as a buffer between India and Afghanistan, the longer would his own country be secluded and safe. Of any injustice or hardship to the tribes, or of what fate might befall them through coming under British influence and control, or even of their own wishes and feelings in the matter, he was supremely careless. Such considerations would not affect him, any more than similar sentiments in similar circumstances swayed Alexander when the fate of Prussia was discussed with Napoleon at Tilsit. But the Amir well understood what a wonderful power of absorption the British possess. Where they go they stay, fy suis, fy reste, appears to be their motto ; and being convinced that once a boundary was fixed tkey would live up to it, he was filled with alarm for what might happen next. We, of course, on our side, have always re- pudiated any idea of advance or annexation, or of interference with tribal customs and independence ; but circumstances have often been in the past, and will be no doubt in the future, too strong for us. We find it necessary to push forward military posts, neighbour." . . . *< Napoleon certainly would have made an end of Prussia at once, had he not feared thereby to lose the friendship of the Russian Czar. That Czar cared little for Frederick William, but he had a keen distrust of Napoleon, and insisted that Prussia should remain between them as a buffer." — Poulteny Bigelow, History of the German Struggle for Liberty, I INTRODUCTORY 7 to make roads to them, to raise tribal levies, to establish police arrangements, to interfere in tribal quarrels, and so forth ; and however judiciously these steps are taken, however they may be forced upon us, by whatever name we may describe them, the result is the same : we advance, we absorb, we dominate, we destroy independence, and we practically assume the administrative control of the country occupied. Such would, at all events, rightly or wrongly, be the Amir s line of thought and argument, and with such convictions in his mind it is easy to understand why he should intensely dislike the boundary proposals ; for when agreed to, and carried out, they would mean that in the course of years the wild mountain barrier at present shutting off India from Afghanistan would disappear, because it would be penetrated at so many points by our military roads ; the fierce and warlike tribes who hitherto had inter- posed their strength between the Afghans and the English would be tamed, and disarmed, and domi- nated ; and in their place he would have his powerful neighbour living right up against his own ring-fence, overlooking him, and possibly threaten- ing next his own independence. However, he signed the Agreement. Sir Morti- mer Durand returned to India with honour, his mission accomplished, in November 1893, ^^^ ^^e next step in the proceedings, the actual demarcation of the boundary agreed to, was forthwith under- 8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. taken by the Indian Government, to whom, how- ever, it was patent, from many indications, that the work would not be carried out unmolested. A strong escort, some 3000 men and 6 guns, was accordingly sent with the Delimitation Commission, vid the Gomal Valley, into Southern Waziristan, where it was intended to commence the task, and the immediate consequence was — Wana. In the early morning of the 3rd November 1894, ^^^ camp at that place was fiercely attacked by the tribesmen, who thus rudely and emphatically made their pro- test against our presence, and against our work. They were, of course, beaten off (after a severe and costly engagement), and a regular expedition sent against them after this, under Sir William Lockhart, traversed their country from end to end, inflicted severe loss upon them, drove off their flocks and herds, and destroyed their village defences and towers. In the end they sued for peace, accepted our terms, paid up the fines demanded, and allowed the boundary from the Gomal in the south to the Tochi and the Kurram in the north to be demar- cated without further interruption. I have only referred to this Wana affair to illustrate the spirit in which the tribes regard our arrangements about a boundary, and to show the Amirs acumen and judgment were correct when he foresaw the storm that would burst whenever we might attempt to demarcate the line agreed to. And how can one blame these people, simple. I INTRODUCTORY 9 savage, and unsophisticated as they are ? We may explain to them as much as we like, and protest as loudly as we can, but when they see the long line of boundary pillars going up ; when they are told that henceforth all inside that line practically belongs to the British Raj, and that from this time their allegi- ance must be to us ; and when, finally, they note our surveyors at work, mapping their country and measuring their fields, their reflection is, " Methinks you do protest too much ! " And they are irresist- ibly driven to the conclusion that their country is annexed, and their independence gone ; a conclusion which it is not easy to dispel when we follow on with military posts on their borders, or in their midst, as, for instance, those now established at Wana, and at points in the Gomal, Tochi, and Kurram valleys, and more especially on the Samana range. The next section of the boundary which we pro- posed to demarcate was that north of the Khyber, where the line would run through Mohmand, Bajaur, and Asmar. Here, as I have previously indicated, we were, literally, on very delicate ground indeed, and although the Mission worked with the full con- currence of the Amir, and travelled indeed as his guests, and under the escort of his troops, yet hitches and difficulties constantly arose, and such frequent references to their respective Governments by Afghan and English officials were necessary, that little or no progress had been made with the work lo THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. when, in the spring of 1895, the Chitral affair oc- curred, and a military expedition to that country diverted attention for a while to matters more grave than boundary commissions. In the autumn of 1895 Sir Robert Low and his troops returned to India, their task brilliantly completed. But we stayed in Chitral ; we built a fort there ; we made a good road to it from India, and placed it in the keeping of tribal levies in our pay ; and we estab- lished strong posts on the Malakhand and Chakdara. In the meantime, matters had come to an absolute dead-lock on the Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar border, and our Commission was withdrawn, the boundary unmarked. This brings us to a point where we may pause for a moment, not to consider the wisdom or expediency of our policy on the Frontier (which it is no part either of my plan or my business to discuss) but to consider its effects. In view of the facts which I have stated it will probably be con- ceded as reasonable inferences — (a) That the boundary agreement was most distasteful to the Amir ; and a fortiori to his subjects. [b) That the tribes on the border were thoroughly alarmed by the demarcation of the boundary, that their fears were accentu- ated by our establishment of military posts in Wana, in the Tochi and Kurram valleys, in Chitral, on the Malakhand, and on the I INTRODUCTORY il Samana range, and that in spite of our assurances they trembled for their in- dependence. (c) That the Amir's subjects and officials all along the border, particularly Gholam Hyder Khan, the Sipah Salar, or Com- mander-in-Chief, would be, and were, thoroughly imbued with the Amir's own views and spirit in the matter of the boundary agreement. I would lay particular stress upon this last point, because while the Sipah Salar has been universally charged with hostility to the Indian Government ; and while it has been laid at his door that he has corresponded (to our hurt) with the leading Mullahs on the border, e.g. Sayid Akbar of the Aka Khels, the " Mad Fakir " in Swat, and the Hadda Mulla at Jarobi in the Mohmand country ; that he has instigated risings against us, and helped the tribes- men with arms, ammunition, and even men ; strenuous efforts have been made to prove that he has acted throughout on his own initiative and responsibility, and in direct opposition to the wishes of the Amir, whom, it is asserted, having the Afghan troops and tribesmen of the Jellalabad district at his back, he was strong enough to defy. Well, perhaps he was not in touch or corre- spondence with his master, but there are certainly some who think otherwise, and when, on the loth June 1897, ^^^ Maizar outrage (in the Tochi 12 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^8 chap. valley) occurred, — a regular bolt from the blue, for it was a time of profound peace and quiet on the border : and when this ominous occurrence was followed by the attacks on the Malakhand in the end of July, by the rising of the Mohmands and Bajauris in early August, and finally by the revolt of the Afridis and Orakzais in the latter part of the same month, then undoubtedly the universal senti- ment was that the Amir himself was at least in sympathy with an outbreak which had set the whole border in a blaze from the Malakhand to the Kurram. And most certainly there were substantial reasons for connecting the Amir with these risings. It was notorious that for some years past "he had been devoting himself with much persistency to the religious nature of the sovereignty which he wields over the followers of the prophet in north-west I ndia, and beyond ; and the means employed to solidify his supreme headship as the light of religion were such as to be considered antagonistic to the preservation of harmonious relations between the tribesmen and the Indian Government. There was the book Takwim-ud-din, inspired by the Amir himself, and written to his command, which im- pressed upon true Muhammadans the essential and all-important character of the jehad — that war of religious fanaticism laid down by the Koran as the duty of every follower of Islam to wage against the infidel. The book was certainly a remarkable INTRODUCTORY 13 production, and even assuming that the greater part of it was merely a rehearsal and exposition of doctrines laid down in the Muhammadan gospels, it was none the less singular that Abdur Rahman should feel the necessity to propagate afresh its doctrines, and give them his own imperial impress at such a time. Fanatical Mussulmans realise only too completely at present that the jehad is, under given circumstances, a part of their creed, and it was with reason argued that to have its meaning newly interpreted in times of peace by a Muhammadan ruler was in itself more or less of an incitement to spread out the green flag of Islam, and to smite the infidel wherever found." ^ It was further noted that the Amir had recently assumed the title of Zia-ul-Millat wa ud-Din, i.e. the Light of Union and Faith, and referred to him- self significantly in correspondence as the " King of Islam." Also, it was well-known that a Turkish visitor had been received with honour in Cabul in May 1897, and that all Mullahs had been summoned to that city for an interview shortly afterwards. It may be that the Turk was a nobody, travelling on his own account, unaccredited by the Sultan s Government : and it may be that the gathering of the Mullahs had no political importance whatever. But the significance of incidents like these must depend upon the connection in which they are 1 MUU, Tki PathoH RtvoU in North- IVeH India. lo THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. when, in the spring of 1895, the Chitral affair oc- curred, and a military expedition to that country diverted attention for a while to matters more grave than boundary commissions. In the autumn of 1895 Sir Robert Low and his troops returned to India, their task brilliantly completed. But we stayed in Chitral ; we built a fort there ; we made a good road to it from India, and placed it in the keeping of tribal levies in our pay ; and we estab- lished strong posts on the Malakhand and Chakdara. In the meantime, matters had come to an absolute dead-lock on the Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar border, and our Commission was withdrawn, the boundary unmarked. This brings us to a point where we may pause for a moment, not to consider the wisdom or expediency of our policy on the Frontier (which it is no part either of my plan or my business to discuss) but to consider its effects. In view of the facts which I have stated it will probably be con- ceded as reasonable inferences — (a) That the boundary agreement was most distasteful to the Amir ; and a fortiori to his subjects. (^) That the tribes on the border were thoroughly alarmed by the demarcation of the boundary, that their fears were accentu- ated by our establishment of military posts in Wana, in the Tochi and Kurram valleys, in Chitral, on the Malakhand, and on the I INTRODUCTORY 15 out in public durbar the Viceroy's letter to himself, and the draft of his own reply, and at the same solemnly asserted his sincere friendship for the British, and his determination to maintain his agree- ments with them unbroken, he was fully rehabilitated in the good opinion of Government ; and it may be said here that, from this time, and throughout the operations which ensued, he adhered honourably to the friendly attitude assumed. CHAPTER II THE AFRIDIS AND THEIR GRIEVANCES The Afridis alleged their reasons for quarrelling with the British to be — 1. Encroachment upon their country. 2. Enhancement of the salt tax. 3. Interference with tribal customs, in that we refused to give up to them such of their women as had taken refuge in British territory. Probably the first of these reasons, the facts being considered in the light of what I have written in the preceding chapter, was the real teterritna causa belli: and, in the audacious demand now made by their leaders that we should abandon our posts on the Samana, and withdraw altogether from the Swat Valley, they doubtless reckoned on the countenance and support of the Amir. At the conclusion of the Afghan war of 1878-80 the Government of India, with the concurrence of the Amir, entered into an agreement with the Afridis to keep open the Khyber Pass. For cen- CHAP. II THE AFRIDIS AND THEIR GRIEVANCES 17 turies past the route via the Khyber has been the great historic highway connecting Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India. All other avenues of approach sink into insignificance by comparison with it : and it is of the first importance in the interests of peace and trade and civilisation that it should be steadily kept open, and safeguarded against the marauding bands who in the past have made it their happy hunting-ground, and have levied tolls of blood and money from all who have ventured to use it. The Government of India determined, therefore, to place the Pass arrangements permanently on a sound basis, and it was agreed, in February 1881, that the Afridis should cease their raiding from this time, receiving from Government in lieu of the plunder collected from caravans and travellers an annual payment of 87,000 rupees. It was further decided that forts should be built by us in the Khyber, and garrisoned by levies fur- nished by the Afridis, but paid by us. This put another 87,000 rupees annually into their hungry pockets. These arrangements were fully assented to by the Afridis, and cordially concurred in by the Amir, to whom it is a matter of much moment that the Pass should be kept open uninterruptedly for traffic, for he derives a large revenue from the tolls paid by caravans which traverse it, as they enter or leave his territory. Forts were built by us at Ali i8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. Musjid, and at Landi Kotal, and at one or two intermediate points ; the levies were raised and armed ; and under the command of men like Mr. Hastings (who was their first CO.) and after- wards Colonel Warburton (whose name is a house- hold word among these border clans), and still later under Captain Barton of the Guides, they discharged their duties punctually and faithfully, and peace and order reigned along the perilous route. But this was to end now. The preposterous demand of the Afridis that we should withdraw from the Samana and the Swat Valley could not, of course, be entertained for a moment. They decided, there- fore, urged on by their Mullahs, to break the faith they had kept with us for sixteen years, to sack the forts, and to close the Khyber. They persuaded the Orakzais to join them in this declaration of war, and almost before we had realised that such a stroke could fall, they had assembled their lashkars, and attacked and captured forts Ali Musjid, Maude, and Landi Kotal. A few days later, the Orakzais rose in revolt on the Kohat border, and fiercely assailed the Samana forts, of which one, Saragheri, small and isolated, fell, after a heroic defence by the hand- ful of 36th Sikhs, who constituted its garrison, and died to a man before the enemy finally got posses- sion. In the meantime the Afridis, realising the gravity of the situation they had themselves created, 11 THE AFRIDIS AND THEIR GRIEVANXES 19 turaed now to the Amir for aid in the coming struggle. In a petition sent to Cabul by a deputa- tion of their Maliks and Elders, they wrote — Tike British Gacemment has been firom aidem times gradmaify emcroiuhing up . J. r* I ^ J' r Brevet-Colonel J. E. Broadbent, R.E. Brigadier- General, Commanding I . ., , *' , ^«. ,. Royal Engineers | (jnthAe temporary rank of Bng.d.er- Brigade-Major, Royal Engineers . Captain S. L. Craster, R.E. Orderly Officer, Royal Engineers . Lieutenant H. Biddulph, R.E. e • ^ J ^ A CO* IV f Major G. J. N. Logan-Home, ist Bed- Supermtendent, Army Signallmg . < ^ , , . ^ . L fordshire Regiment. Headquarter Commandant /Captain R. E. Grimston, 6th Bengal ^ I Cavalry. A*-**Tj *j */-. I f Captain F. J. S. Lowry, 29th Bombay Assistant Judge Advocate-General < f, -' /» ^ / "^ ^ I Infantry. Principal Provost Marshal . ( Lieutenant -Colonel E. Balfe. Deputy I Judge Advocate-General. r^ . • » T* -* r\ai ( Captain G. W. Palin, Assistant Com- Commissariat Transport Officer * < '^ . ^ , t missary-General. Staff-Surgeon (from the Force). Inspecting Veterinuy Officer ./Veterinary Lieutenant- Colonel B. L. I Glover. ( Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Le G. Ander- \ son, Military Accounts Department, r Captain P. G. Shevirell, Military \ Accounts Department, r Brevet -Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich, ^ iCC.I. £. , CB., R.E. Rev. A. S. Dyer, M.A. Controller of Military Accounts Field Paymaster . Chief Survey Officer Principal Chaplain MAIN COLUMN First Division Commanding (with the local "nkj Brigadier-General W. P. Symon^ CB. of Major-General) J Aide-de-Camp . . . Captain A G. Dallas, 1 6th Lancers. Orderly Officer . . . Lieutenant J. M. Wikely, 17th B.C. Orderly Officer . . . Lieutenant G. H. Badcock, 7th B.C. AssUUnt Adjutant-General . | Lie-tenant-Colonel C. W. Muir, CLE., I 17th Bengal Cavalry. 30 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 CHAP. A . . r^ -^ ^ r^ if Major E. A. G. Gosset, 2nd Derbyshire Assistant Quartermaster-General . i i . ' I Regiment. Deputy Assbtant Quartermaster- T Captain A. NichoUs, 2nd Punjab General \ Infimtry. ▼n. , J T . 11- r\tc ( Lieutenant C. E. E F. K. Macquoid, ist Field Intelligence Officer . -It tj^ u j i- .• * I Lancers, Hjrderabad Contingent Prindpal Medical Officer. • ( ^"ff^"-?^°"^ ^ Townsend, Army i Medical Staff. Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding ( Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Duthy, Royal Royal Artillery \ Artillery. Adjutant, Royal Artillery . Captain W. K. Macleod, Royal Artillery. Divisional Ordnance Officer Captain A. R. Braid, Royal Artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Hart, R.E. r Captain O. M. R Thackwell, Royal \ Engineers. r Major J. A. Ferrier, D.S.O., Royal * \ Engineers. / Lieutenant J. F. N. Carmichael, Royal 'l Engineers. ( Lieutenant W. H. Bunbury, Royal * \ Engineers. Assistant Superintendent, Army f Captain H. T. Kenny, 2nd Bombay Signalling \ Lancers. Provost Marshal . /Captain H. W. G. Graham, D.S.O.. Sth I Lancers. r Colonel L. W. Christopher, Commis- \ sariat Department r Captain H. S. G. Hall, Commissariat \ Department. ( Major Mansfield, Commissariat Depart- \ ment. Commanding Royal Engineers Adjutant, Royal Engineers Field Engineer . Assistant Field Engineer . Assistant Field Engineer . Commissary-General Assbtant to Commissary-General Chief Transport Officer . Assistant to Divisional Commis sariat Officer Divisional Transport Officer Assistant to Chief Transport 1 ^^ . . o^ tt c •»u ^*u t> ^ ^^ ^ >Captam T. H. Smith, 12th B.C. Utncer . . .J Divisional Commissariat Officer . / **"J°' ^- ^- Yielding, CLE., D.S.O., t Commissariat Department {Lieutenant C. H. Corbctt, i8th Hussars. {Captain F. C. W. Rideout, Commissariat Department. Assistant to Divisional Transport T Captain A. W. V. Plunkett, 2nd Bat- Officer \ talion. The Manchester Regiment. Survey Officer . . . Major W. T. Bythell, RE. Chaplain, Church of England . Rev. R. M. Kirwan, M. A. Wesleyan Chaplain Rev. J. Findlater. Roman Catholic Chaplain . Rev. Father N. J. Winkley. Ill PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 31 First Brigade : First Division Commanding . . / Brigadier-General R. C Hart. V.C. t. C*B. Orderly OflScer . . . ( Lieutenant A. H. S. Hart, East Surrey I Regiment. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generall^P^^^, ^' «• K^"^^*"' ''' ^^^^"^ ^ ' "' I 5th Gurkhas. Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- f Captain H. R. B. Donne, ist Norfolk General \ Regiment Brigade Commissariat Officer . ( ^*P'"" ^ M""*'y> ^^^^ AssisXaM y. Commissary-General. Assistant to Brigade Commissariat ( Lieutenant H. I. Nicholl, 1st Bedford- Officer . . . \ shire Regiment. Brigade Transport Officer . | ^P'"" ^- <^« V. Wintle. isth Bengal L Lancers. Veterinary Officer . Veterinary Captain H. T. W. Mann. Second Brigade : First Diznsion Commanding . . /A.D.C. Brigadier-General A. Gaselee, Orderly Officer . . f Lieutenant A N. D. Fagan, ist Lancers, I Hyderabad Contingent. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General P'^j"' W- AWworlh, D.S.O.. 1st Bed- I fordshire Regiment. Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- ( Major A. A. Barrett, 2nd Battalion 5th General \ Gurkhas. Brigade Commissariat Officer . | Lieutenant C. S. D. Leslie, Deputy t Assistant Commissary-General. Assistant to Brigade Commissariat r Captain H. de la P. Gough, i6th Officer 1 Lancers. Brigade Transport Officer Lieutenant H. Macandrew, 5th B.C. Veterinary Officer . . Veterinary Lieutenant W. F. Shore. Second Division . . . ^ , ^ ,. ( Major-General A. G. Yeatman-Bigcs, Major-General Commanding • 1 ^ t> t C.B. . . . , P ( Captain E. St. A. Wake, loth Bengal ' \ Lancers. I' Captain R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars. Hon. Lieutenant - Colonel H. H. v/rucxiy v/mccn . Maharajah Sir Nripendra Narayun, Bahadur, of Cooch Behar, G.CI.£.» 6th B.C. 32 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. A •* * A J- * 4^ 1 r Lieutenant -Colonel R. K. Ridgeway, Assistant Adjutant-General ' i v r -& ^ » Assistant Quartermaster-General . Major C. P. Triscott, D.S.O., RA. Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- J Major R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley, General for Intelligence \ King's Royal Rifle Corps. Field InteUigence Officer. ./Captain H. F. Walter,, 24th (Mu- i chistan) Regiment of Bombay In&ntry. Principal Medical Officer . . | Surgeon-Colonel G M'B. Davis. D.S.O., t Indian Medical Service. Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding / Lieutenant-Colonel R. Purdy, Royal Royal Artillery \ Artillery. Adjutant, Royal Artillery . Captain H. D. Grier, Royal Artillery. Divisional Ordnance Officer . Captain H. F. Head, Royal Artillery. Commanding Royal Engineer . Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Wilkieson, RE. Adjutant, Royal Engineers . Captain T. Fraser, R.E Field Engineer . . . Captain F. H. Kelly, RE Assistant Field Engineer . Lieutenant W. A. Stokes, R.E. Assistant Field Engineer . . Lieutenant C B. L. Greenstreet, R.E. Assistant Superintendent, Army /Captain G. C. Rigby, 1st Wiltshire Signalling \ Regiment. Provost Marshal . . /Captain W. C. Knight, 4* Bengal I Cavalry. Field Treasure Chest Officer . | Li«.tenant W. M. Grimley. 30th (Pnnjab) t Bengal Infantry. Chaplain, Church of England . Rev. H. W. Nelson, M. A. Roman Catholic Chaplain . Rev. Father A. Vanden Deyssel. Divisional Commissariat Officer /Lieutenant-Colonel B. L P. ReiUy, t Commissariat Department Assistant to Divisional Commis- T Lieutenant A. D. Macpherson, 2nd sariat Officer . . . \ P.C. Divisional Transport Officer ./Major H. L. Hutchins, Commissariat i Department Assistant to Divisional Transport ( Major H. R. W. Lumsden, 3rd Bengal Officer \ Infantry. Survey Officer . . . Mr. E A. Wainwright, Survey of India. Assistant Survey Officer . . Lieutenant G. A. J. Leslie, R.E. Third Brigade : Second Division Commanduig (with the temporary r Colonel F. J. Kempster, D.S.O., rank of Brigadier-General) \ A.D.C. Orderly Officer . . . / Lieutenant G. D. Crocker, 2nd Royal I Munster Fusiliers. Deputy AssUtantAdjntant-General I *'*j*" "• S«- Leger Wood, ist Dorset- I shire Regiment. HI PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 33 Dtfotj Awttant QiuitenuMtei- / Major H. S. Mu*;, t9th Bengal Geoeral \ Lancert. Brig«le Commi^ariat Officer . / Li*«t=°«t D. H. Drake- Brock man, \ D.A.C.G. AHiftanl to Brigade CommJMariat / lieutenant F. W. Bircb, 39th Punjab Officer I Infantiy. Brittle Tranaport Officer . / Li«««»»» ^ *. N. T>tler. i.t Gordon Veterinary Officer Orderly Officer Brigade Commi Brigade Traniport Officer Veterinary Officer Highlander: Veterinarjr lieutenant C Rok. Fanrti BrigatU 1 Seemd Dinuim {Brigadier-General R. Wettmacatt, C.B., D.S.O. f Lieutenant R. C. Welletley, Royal ' \ HorM Artillery. DepaiyAwislant Adjutant-Generall^P^i^- ^- ^'°°^' "' ^'^ ^'^ {Captain F. J. M. Edwardi, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry. /Captain E. V. Wation, Commiuaiiat Aiuttant to Br^ade CoomiitMiial / Lieutenant N. G. Frawr, 4tb Boint«y Officer - /Captain W. H. Armstrong, itt £ai I Votkihire RegimenL Veterinary Uentenant F. W, Wilion. LiNS OF COUUUNICATIONS General Officer Commanding {liealenant-General Sir A P. Palmer, K.C.B. Aide-de-camp . . . Lieutenant F. C. Galloway, R.A Orderly Omcei . . Lieutenant H. O. Pan, yth B. I. AssistBjit Adjutant and Qnartei- / Caplajn (temporary Major) J. W. G. miuter-Genetal \ Toltoch, 34th Bombay Inrantry. Deputy Auistact Adjutant and /Captain I. Philippi, t*t Battalion, 5th Quart ermasler-GeDeral l Gurlfbai. Lolonel) J Senior Ordnance Officer . . Captain Watkina, Royal Artillery. Section Commandant . . { ^^^ °- ^ S. F. Shore. iSih Bengal /Captain St. G. L. Steel, ind Bengal Section Commandant 34 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 CHAP. Section G)mmandant Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding, Royal Engineers Adjutant, Royal Engineers Field Engineer . Assistant Field Engineer . Assistant Field Engineer . Assistant Field Engineer . Provost Marshal . Chief Commissariat Officer Chief Transport Officer, L. of C. Assistant to Chief Transport Officer Veterinary Inspector {Captain F. de B. Young, 6th Bengal Cavalry, r Lieutenant - Colonel J. W. Thurbum, \ Royal Engineers. Captain H. V. Biggs, Royal Engineers. Captain C. H. Cowie, Rojral Engineers. /Lieutenant H. S. Rogers, Royal En- \ gineers. ( Lieutenant R. P. T. Hawksley, Royal I Engineers. Lieutenant A. E. Turner, Rojral Engineers. Major L. S. Peyton, 14th Bengal Lancers. ( Brevet Colonel C. M. Keighley, D.S.O., I Commissariat Department. ( Major C. V. Williamson, Commissariat \ Department r Captain T. H. Smith, 12th Bengal \ Cavalry. Veterinary Captain F. W. Forsdyke. Staff at the Base Base Commandant Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General Commandant, British Troops Dep6t Adjutant and Quartermaster, British Troops Dep6t Commandant, Native Troops Dep6t Base Ordnance Officer Officer in charge of Engineer Field Park Base Commissariat Officer Departmental Assistants to Base Commissariat Officer /Colonel W. J. Vousden, V.C., Indian I Staff Corps. ( Major A. J. W. Allen, 1st East Kent \ Regiment. {Major A. de B. V. Paget, Durham Light Infjemtry. {Captain A. F. Bundock, 2nd Battalion South Lancashire Regiment /Captain S. M. Edwardes, D.S.O., 2nd \ Bombay Infantry (Grenadiers). / Captain M. W. S. Pasley, Royal Artil- l Icry. I Captain U. W. Evans, R.E. / Major H. R. Marrett, Assistant Com- \ missary-General. ^Captain W. H. D. Rich, Assistant Com- missary-General. Lieutenant F. W. H. Forteath, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. Lieutenant L. H. Marriott, Deputy Assist- ant Commissary-General. Lieutenant H. G. P. Beville, Deputy- Assistant Commissary-General. Ill PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 35 Departmental AssUtant (for Trans- ^ ^ .^ ^ j^ ^^^.^^^^ j^^p^^ ^j^^. port) to the Base Commissariat V ^^^ Commissary-General. Officer J Captain W. P. M. Pollock, i8th Hussars. Captain H. Smyth, ist BatUlion, Cheshire Regiment. Regimental Assistants to Base I Lieutenant T. E. Bayley, 20th Hussars. Commissariat Officer Lieutenant C. G. E. Ewart, 5th Bengal Cavalry. Lieutenant E. N. Davis, 3rd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent. Controller of Military Accounts . THE PESHAWAR COLUMN ^ ,. f Brigadier -General A. G. Hammond, Commanding . . .| c.B., D.S.O.. V.C, A.D.C. ^ , , -. -. f Lieutenant H. D. Hammond, Royal Orderly Office, . .[ ^,^ Assistant Adjutant and Quarter- ( Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Gwat- master-General 1 kin, 13th Bengal Lancers. Deputy Assistant AdjuUnt and f Major C. T. Becker, 2nd King's Own Quartermaster-General \ Scottish Borderers. t:.- u T . If rsa: /Captain F. H. Hoghton, ist Bombay Field Intelligence Officer . '\ r r . ,r^ j-^ ^ t Infantry (Grenadiers). ^. . , ,, ,. , ^«. f Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel R. Pnncpal Medical Officer . .| q. Thomsett, Army Medical Staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding, ( Lieutenant -Colonel W. M. M. Smith, Royal Artillery . \ Royal Artillery. Adjutant, Royal Artillery . Captain F. R. Drake, Royal Artillery. Brigade Ordnance Officer Major T. E. Rowan, Royal Artillery. Field Engineer . . Major E C Spilsbury, R.E. Assistant Field Engineer . . Lieutenant C. B. Farwell, R.E. Assistant Superintendent, Army f Lieutenant C. E. Cobb, East Yorkshire Signalling \ Regiment Brigade Commimriat Officer . | Lieutenant H. H. Jones. Deputy Assist- I ant Commissary-General. Assistant to Brigade Commissariat ( Lieutenant V. R. Pigott, ist Battalion Officer \ Cheshire Regiment. Brigade Transport Officer .(Lieutenant C Charlton, Royal Horse ^ *^ \ Artillery. Veterinary Officer . Veterinary Lieutenant F. U. Carr. 1st 36 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN Commanding (with nmk and payjcoioncl W. HiU. Indian Staff Corps, of Colonel on the Staff) J ^ Orderly Officer . . J ^^P^° ^- ^' ^' "^°*^' ^«^«' ^^" I ment Deputy Assistant Adjutant.Genena I ^V*" ^ ^' "i ^'^^' ^■^■^•' I Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent. Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- f Captain C. P. Scudamore, D.S.O., ist General \ Royal Scots Fusiliers. r Brigade-Surgeon- Lieutenant-Colonel W. Principal Medical Officer. .< R. Murphy, D.S.O., Indian Medical I Service. Brigade Ordnance Officer . { Lij"'""" D. R. Pouher, Royal Artil- Field Engineer . . . Captain J. A. Gibbon, Royal Engineers. Assistuit Field Engineer . . | Li«»'"»°' ^ A. Tandy. Royal En- I gineers. Assistant Superintendent, Army f Lieutenant C. R. Scott - Elliott, 4th Signalling \ Madras Pioneers. Brigade Commissariat Officer ./Captain C. F T. Murray. Assistant i Commissary-General. Assistant to Brigade Commissariat J Captain P. H. Rogers, 2nd Yorkshire Officer 1 Light Infantry. Brigade Transport Officer .l^fiT "\^- ^- ^olquhoun, 24th t Madras Infantry. S rvev Offi er f Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Wahab,C. I.E., Veterinary Officer . Veterinary Lieutenant W. N. Wright. THE RAWAL PINDI RESERVE BRIGADE ^ ,. r Brigadier - General C. R. Macgregor, Commandmg . . .| ^^^ Orderly Officer . .("'' \^T^\ f ^" ^' ^^^"^y' * I 29th Punjab Infantry. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General/^^]^' ^/^.^^^J^',^^"''^"' ^^ ^'' ^ ^ "' I Royal Welsh FusUiers. Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- T Captain H. Hudson, 19th Bengal General \ Lancers. Brigade Commissariat Officer . | Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan. Commissariat l Department Assistant to Brigade Commissariat i Lieutenant A. P. Trevor, 20th Bombay Officer \ Infantry. m PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 37 Brig»ie Transport Officer . | Lieut«»nt K. E. Nangle. 3rd In&ntry. t Hyderabad Contingent Veterinary Officer . Veterinary Lientenant W. S. Anthony. The political officers with the Force were Sir Richard Udny, K.C.S.I., G>lonel Warburton, C.S.I., and Messrs. King, Hastings, Donald, and Blakeway. But in Sir William Lockhart himself was vested supreme political power, as well as supreme military control of the expedition. The approximate strength of the force detailed in the foregoing pages was loio British officers, 10,882 British troops, 491 native officers, 22,123 native troops, 197 hospital assistants, 179 clerks, 19,558 followers, 8000 horses, 18,384 mules and ponies, and 1440 hospital riding-ponies. But to these figures must be added an enormous number of camels, carts, ponies, etc., working on the long line of communication with Kohat, and gradually brought into use as needs increased and the roads were im- proved. In considering the plan of campaign it must be borne in mind that the objective of the expedition was Tirah, the summer home of the Afridis and Orakzais, which had never before been entered by a British force, or, for the matter of that, had never been visited by any European. The distribution of the force to effect the object in view has already been indicated. The chief feature of the scheme is the direct advance on Tirah of the main column in one body, under the personal command of Sir William Lockhart, "from the neighbourhood of the SamSna range." Other plans suggest themselves, and nodoubt 38 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. were discussed ; for example, the advance of one division only, with the headquarters, from the SamSna, while the other, diverging at Usterzai, shortly after leaving Kohat, might penetrate vid the valley of the Kariach river and the Landukai Pass, into Mastura, and there join hands with the main body. This would perhaps have relieved the pressure caused by an advance on a single line, but possibly there were political objections to it. A simultaneous advance up the Bara Valley, by the Peshawar column, under Brigadier-General Hammond, would have cut off the Afridis from retreat in the direction of Jellalabad and Lalpura, whither already they were sending their families. But this no doubt would have been a very hazardous undertaking. The BSra Valley, though absolutely unexplored at this time, was known to be long and difficult, and abounding in dangerous defiles. The risks involved in fighting a way up such a route, and in maintaining such a long and precarious line of communication, far outweighed any advantage to be gained by attempting a diversion of this kind, unless with a very much larger force thaii was at this time available for the purpose, and had any disaster (and such things will happen) brought the movement prematurely to a standstill. Sir William Lockhart's own advance would have been seriously embarrassed at a critical juncture. The special advantage of the line actually selected for the advance of the main column, viz. from Kohat 7nd Shinauri, Khorappa, and the Sampagha and Ill PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 39 Arhanga Passes, into Tirah, was, that up to the advanced base, Shinauri, it lay inside our own territory, while from this point, not only could a blow be struck at the very centre of the Orakzai country, cutting the defenders into two at once (an important achievement from a political point of view, for already there were waverers amongst them), but also the Tirah plateau, the objective of the expedi- tion, the hub and heart of the Afridi nation, could be reached in four or five easy marches. At the same time, when the main column had crossed the Sam£na and was assembled at Khan- garbur in the Khanki Valley, it is a question whether from this point, and before assaulting the Sampagha, one of its divisions might not with advantage have marched up the Khanki Valley and penetrated into Tirah independently, vid the Chingakh or Lozakka Pass. Here, again, the argument is that by separating the divisions, the pressure caused by moving such a mass of men and transport on a single road would be relaxed, and consequent delays avoided, and that the enemy would be alarmed by the demonstration against his flank and rear. But there were undoubtedly strong reasons for adhering to the single line of advance, and keeping the column concentrated. In the first place, the stronger the force brought to bear directly on the objective point, the less formidable and obstinate the resistance likely to be met with, while the value and importance of a quick. 40 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. decisive, knock-down blow, where Asiatics are con- cerned, are not to be over-estimated. Secondly, a considerable proportion of the trans- port was of an inferior type, and imperfectly organ- ised, while the supervising staff was limited. Had that staff been divided into two sections at the very outset of the expedition, confusion and delay would certainly have increased. Thirdly, the whole country-side up the Khanki Valley was hostile. It is, moreover, a region inter- sected by deep ravines, and commanded by numerous heights, while the existing roads and tracks through it were practically useless for military purposes. Consequently, had this double line of advance been adopted, a much larger force to guard the com- munications would have been imperative, and as no advance on either line could be made until sappers and pioneers, working incessantly, had improved the way sufficiently to admit of the passage of laden animals, the military labour available, which was strictly limited, would have taken at least twice as long as it actually did to accomplish its double task, and the delay thus caused would have been most mischievous. Even with a single line of advance it was found necessary later to reinforce the troops on the line of communication by one native infantry regiment to hold the Dargai heights, and by a pioneer regiment to strengthen the Khangarbur post, when the main column had passed on. And after the Sampagha in PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 41 Pass had been captured the whole of the First Brigade, augmented by a pioneer regiment and a battery of artillery, had to be posted permanently in the Mastura Valley to overawe the Orakzais, and maintain uninterrupted communication between Khangarbur and the headquarters in Tirah. The theoretical advantages of a double line of advance are obvious and indisputable, but, on the other hand, the practical objections to it, which I have endeavoured to make clear, are not to be denied. It may be added here that when the force was at Khangarbur nothing was known of the condition of the western passes — ^the Durbikhel, the Chingakh, or the Lozakka — by one of which the detached division, had the double line of advance been adopted, would have had to make its way into Tirah, except that native report declared them all to be extremely bad. When later, in an expedition against the Chamkanis and Massozais, an oppor- tunity was afforded to examine these passes, the first two of them being actually crossed by our troops, they were found to be so difficult as to fully justify the decision previously arrived at by Sir William Lockhart to pursue his course by a single line of advance. We may now consider the preliminaries of the campaign made fairly clear, and I proceed, with the kind permission of the proprietors of the Times, 42 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, hi with the narrative of the expedition in the form of letters contributed by me at the time, and while impressions were fresh ; but expanded now, and supplemented where necessary by notes and infor- mation which have reached me since the original letters were written. CHAPTER IV WAITING TO BEGIN KOHAT, 6th October, *' Tout vient k qui sait attendre ! " There has been waiting enough for the launch of this expedition, and even the Afridis amid the rocks and glens of Tirah, conscious that the long arm of retribution must eventually reach them, and exact a full penalty for their treacherous assaults on Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal, must wonder when we are going to begin. But if the mills of the British Raj grind slowly, their work is sure, and they grind exceeding small, once set in motion. An expedition into a difficult and unsurveyed country like that which lies between the Samana range and the Safed Koh mountains, and against such warlike and well-armed tribes as the Orakzais and the Afridis, was not to be lightly undertaken, nor without ample means and careful preparation ; and while other insurgent clans in many directions — the Waziris in the Tochi Valley to the south, and the Mohmands, the Bajauris, and the Swatis to the north — had still to be dealt with. 44 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. and absorbed some of our best regiments, together with a large proportion of the transport, the Tirah expedition had perforce to be postponed. When our authority had been re-established in these other districts, undivided attention could be paid to the formidable foe on our western border who has defied us, and whose proud boast is that no white man has hitherto invaded his stronghold. It was in the end of August, 23rd to the 25th, that, smarting under the sense of their imaginary grievances, and prompted by fanatical impulse and senseless rage, the Afridis attacked, and eventually captured and burned, our forts on the Khyber line : Landi Kotal, Ali Masjid, and Fort Maude. With minds inflamed by the preachings of their Mullahs, and excited by the treacherous success achieved by the Waziris in the Tochi Valley, by distorted reports of the murderous fighting on the Malakhand, and by the example of the Mohmands at Shabkadr, they recklessly broke a faith they had kept for sixteen years, and, throwing prudence to the winds, put to the sword their own kinsmen — the levies in our pay, who gallantly resisted their assaults — and declared war to the knife against a Government which has ever treated them in the past with forbearance and with generosity. But generosity has its limits, and the forbearance of even an Indian Government can be overstrained. The Bonerwals, that powerful tribe located between the Malakhand and the Indus, had indeed been let IV WAITING TO BEGIN 45 alone by us, though surely after the events of the 26th July and following days — the attacks on the Mala- khand — never had any Government better cause for quarrelling with them. But this last outrage was too much. Our prestige would indeed be lowered should we shrink now from inflicting chastisement, and exacting reparation for the blood shed, and the mischief done ; and therefore, almost within a week of the occurrences in the Khyber, the Viceroy's Council had come to a decision, and the fiat for the expedition to Tirah had gone forth. That was in the beginning of September, and here we are well on in chill October, and not quite ready to begin yet. But what a busy month it has been ! Not a day, not an hour of it, has been wasted. Well and loyally have those toiled who have been intrusted with the preparations which must be completed before such an expedition can be safely launched. Hereafter, no doubt, their names will be honourably mentioned with those whose more congenial task will be to lead the troops in battle against the enemy. I have before me while I write the revised scheme of the operations now on the eve of commencing, and when I note for you that it provides for the concentration of a force which in- cludes 10 ID British officers, 491 native officers, 10,882 British non-commissioned officers and men, 22,123 native non-commissioned officers and men, 8000 horses and ponies, upwards of 18,000 baggage animals (chiefly mules), and over 20,000 followers. 46 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897.98 chap. etc., and involves the collection of supplies for feeding this huge force for at least two months, then it will be conceded that the task of the past few weeks has been no light one, and that those who have borne the burden and heat of the day in connection with it will be entitled to gratitude and recognition when the time comes to consider the question of honours and rewards. Meantime their labours have borne fruit, for the force stands ready, fully equipped, and impatient to start. Yet for a few days more, a very few, patience must be exercised, the reason being, that unexpected developments on the Mohmand and Bajaur side have delayed the troops which are detailed, after their campaign is over in the North, to come down and join brigades destined for the operations in Tirah. In another four or five days, however, they will all have arrived, and then a general advance will begin. It is needless to dilate on the spirit which animates the troops on this occasion— officers and men are alike keen for the fray, and eager to start. For weeks past every one in authority, from Sir George White downwards, has been besieged by entreaties and appeals from individuals and regiments to be detailed for this expedition. To be left out of it is lamented as an irretrievable mis- fortune. The appetite of the troops has been whetted by the accounts of the severe fighting that has already taken place, and by the description of the gallant deeds already performed. So far as can IV WAITING TO BEGIN 47 be judged it is certain that the Orakzais and Afridis will combine to defend stubbornly their hitherto inviolate strongholds. They are the finest and hardiest race, physically speaking, on our frontier ; they are known to be well armed, and they can put upwards of 40,000 men into the field against us. Assuredly they will face us bravely, and, the greater the certainty of hard fighting, the keener the anxiety of every soldier of Her Majesty in India to be pre- sent, and to bear his share in it. With such a spirit prevailing amongst the men and officers, and with such a practised leader as Sir William Lockhart, whose very name is a tower of strength on this wild frontier, the issue should be sharp, short, and decisive. Camp Kohat, i 2th October, Still waiting to begin ! After all it is one thing to declare war against the Afridis ; it is another to '* let loose the dogs " and start the game. But in this instance, there are others besides the Afridis to think of, and great allowances must be made for those who have had the preparations to make for the arduous campaign ahead of us. Not only is it being undertaken on a scale greater even than that on which we started the Afghan War of 1878-80, but also every detail in connection with it has been complicated by the expedition on our hands at the same time against the Mohmands, the Waziris, the Swatis, and the Bajauris, and by the unexpected 48 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^ chap. developments which some of these " side-shows " have taken at the last moment. Thus, regiments and batteries and transport and hospitals, etc., destined for Tirah, have been unavoidably detained in other quarters, and at the eleventh hour substi- tutes have had to be found for them, and called up from distant stations in India. All this means delay, though it does not, of course, mean wasted time. What has been done in the way of preparation by the great Commissariat-Transport Department while outsiders chafe and wonder " when are they going to begin ? " must be seen to be believed. Our railway from Rawal Pindi ends at Khushalgarh, on the banks of the Indus, 32 miles from Kohat, which is to be our base of operations. For weeks past trains have been delivering at this terminus from 1 500 to 2000 tons of stores daily, and the Transport Department have been moving this immense amount of supplies, clothing, and war material to Kohat on carts, camels, mules, ponies, and bullocks, an endless stream, discharging on the stony plains round this cantonment, which have now become thickly studded in every direction with mounds of stuff destined to feed and supply man and beast for weeks to come in the distant wilds of Tirah. To the uninitiated, it looks as if chaos was supreme, but, so far from that being the case, the reception and distribution of the convoys as they arrive, proceed without a hitch. Every one has an appointed task, and everything has an appointed place, and though upwards of XV WAITING TO BEGIN 49 50,000 men and followers, and more than 20,000 animals, have to be daily provided for here, it is all done quietly and efficiently without fuss or delay : and that this should be so reflects great credit on all concerned in making and working the necessary arrangements. But for the present, remember, we are halted. It is true troops come and go every day, but the marches are short ones. They arrive from Peshawar, three marches away, and as the brigades are com- pleted, pass on to Hangu, Kai, and Shinauri, only four marches away. At these places, too, large commissariat depdts have been formed, more espe- cially at the last named, Shinauri, which for some time to come will be our most advanced base. It is situated at the foot of a spur of the Samana range only some five miles from the ridge, and from it, znd the Chagru Valley, the main advance will eventually be made. It is then that the strain will come, and that the commissariat-transport arrange- ments will be severely tested. When there is little more than a single six-foot track for troops and animals, and that winding in and out on a steep gradient, through darkling glens and gloomy defiles, the question of food and shelter, sufficient and in time, becomes a deeply interesting one! But we know the Department. They have perhaps never been tried so high as they will be on this occasion, but they have worried successfully through many a tough transport task before this, and we have little 50 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. doubt that they will overcome all difficulties in this instance too. Still it will be no promenade for them. Did not the Great Duke say of campaigning in Spain, "If you make war in that country with a large army you starve ; and if you go into it with a small one you get beaten ! " Well, the saying is in a sense appli- cable here. We certainly have guarded against defeat, for the size of the force mobilised must flatter, if it does not frighten, the Afridis, as it certainly surprises better-informed people. But on the other hand, though we do not expect to starve, we think we may sometimes have to wait a while for our dinners ! I give you here the full text of Sir William Lockhart's proclamation to the Tirah Afridis and Orakzais : — In the year 1881, the Afridis of the Khyber Pass entered into treaty engagements with the British Government, under- taking, in consideration of certain allowances, to maintain order throughout the pass, to deal with offences on the road, to furnish levies for the above purpose, and to abstain from committing outrages in British territory. Up to the month of August last these engagements have been, on the whole, faithfully observed, but during that and the succeeding month, the Afridis have broken their engagements, attacked, plundered, and burnt posts in the Klhyber Pass, which were garrisoned by levies furnished by themselves, and have joined the Orakzais in attacking British posts and villages on the Kohat border. For these offences all tribal and service allowances hitherto granted by the British Government to the Afridis and Orakzais are declared forfeit, and entirely at the disposal of the British Government to withhold or to renew, wholly or in part, as they IV WAITING TO BEGIN 51 may think fit. The British Government has also determined to despatch a force under my command to march through the country of the Orakzais and Afridis, and to announce from the heart of their country the final terms which will be imposed. This advance is made to mark the fact that these tribes took part in the attacks above mentioned, and the power of the British Government to advance if and when they choose. The Government have neither the intention nor the wish to inflict unnecessary damage on the tribes, provided they immediately make submission and reparation. The terms and conditions on which such submission will be accepted will be announced to the jirgahs of the tribes when I have arrived in Tirah ; and I am authorised to enforce fulfilment of these terms and conditions, and of any further terms and conditions which opposition by any tribe or section or individuals there may render it necessary to impose. It is therefore notified that all who wish to live in peace with the Sirkar and desire to possess their own country and to see it no more in the power and occupation of the Sirkar should assist to the utmost of their abilities in the work of enforcing compliance with my orders and with the said terms and conditions, by which means they will save the tribes from the further punishments which any opposition to the advance of the British troops will infallibly bring upon them, and the tribal country from further occupation. It is too soon to judge the effect of this proclamation, which is the usual style of announce- ment made when you are about to invade an enemy's country, with this difference. It states emphatically that until we have entered and marched through their lands, in order to demonstrate our power to assert our position as rulers, and to strike how and when we like, we will listen to no over- tures from them. Their offence has been too gross and too unprovoked for it to be now lightly pardoned or condoned. In the past these tribes have boasted 52 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. that we cannot and dare not enter their country. Now the time has come to dispel that illusion once and for all. The purdah will be lifted, the veil that has hitherto been so jealously kept down will be drawn aside, and "from the heart of their country" Sir William Lockhart will announce to the tribal jirgahs, when they come in to make their submission to him, the final terms and conditions on which the British Government will conclude a peace with them. This is of course a just and wise policy. It is true that some of the clans, amongst the Orakzais especially, and more than one chief of repute and position amongst the Afridis, have already sued for terms, and expressed contrition for their misdeeds, each of them, more suo, protesting "it wasn't me, sir, please sir, it was the other boy, sir." But very rightly they have not been listened to, or even answered, yet. A Pathan or an Afghan understands only one kind of argument, the argumentum ad baculinum, a good knock-down blow. Administer that, and he will respect you, and bear you no ill- will. But argue with him, parley or compromise with him, and you are lost. He will give you back words smoother than your own, he will promise anything you want, he will greedily accept your bribes and your subsidies, but he will despise you in his heart, and he will betray you at the first opportunity. I am not concerned here to discuss this policy or IV WAITING TO BEGIN 53 that for the management of the tribes on our frontier, or to speculate how the present series of troubles was precipitated, or how they could have been avoided, though much might be written on all these heads. But it may be safely said that, having committed ourselves to this expedition, it should be, and will be, carried through now in such com- plete and stern fashion, that hereafter Afridi and Orakzai will think twice, and hesitate long, before they break out again into such wanton outrage. In the meantime, it is fairly certain they will fight. It is not at all because we have "cornered" them, but, though there are waverers amongst them, it is because after years of proud boasting and absolute immunity from any punishment (if we except the Bazaar Valley raids in 1878-79) their reputation as the most warlike and independent tribe on the frontier would be lost for ever, and their " faces blackened " among all true Pathans, if they failed to stand up to us now. But there is no question of what they will do, and we may be sure some hard knocks will be exchanged before the heights are won leading into their hitherto inviolate stronghold, the breezy uplands known as Tirah. As a matter of fact our latest information as to their movements points to a concentration of their strength already in the upper KhSnki Valley, and occupation by them of dominating points at the western end of the Sam§na ridge, whence they can observe our preparations at Shinauri, and even 54 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. threaten an attack on that camp itself. These would be chiefly Orakzais, but behind them we hear on good authority that the Afridis are collecting on the Sampagha Pass, and it will probably be for the possession of this point that our first big fight will be fought, and the 28th or 29th inst will not improb- ably be the date of it. Before I close this letter I may refer briefly to a matter which has been much discussed lately. It is that we have some 2000 Afridis in our own ranks at the present time. They are amongst our best soldiers, and have borne themselves bravely in many a fight on the side of the Sirkar. But it is unquestionable that there is an uneasy feeling among them on the eve of this expedition against their own country. Already several have deserted, taking their rifles and accoutrements and ammunition with them, arguing no doubt that it is trying them too high to expect them to march against their own kinsmen, and assault their own villages. But this was what no one required them to do. An army order ^ has been published expressing confidence ^ Sttbjoined is the order referred to. G.O.C.C., dated 8th October 1897. The Government of India have lived at peace with the Afridi tribe and made an agreement with them, under which the British forts in the Khyber were intrusted to their care. Allowances were paid to the tribe, and arms were issued so that they might be strong in their alliance and friendship with the Government of India, and have the means of forcing turbulent persons to keep the peace. Without any provocation the Afridis, in conjunction with other tribes, have broken their alliance with the British Government, and have attacked and destroyed the forts which their tribe had engaged to guard. Further, they have waged war against our garrisons on the Samana and else- IV WAITING TO BEGIN 55 in their loyalty, and sympathy with their peculiar position, and announcing the decision of Govern- ment that under the special circumstances the Afridi companies in our service will be sent back to stations where they will carry on garrison duties only, while at the same time they are assured that so far as can be managed, their own homes in Tirah will be spared, and their people and property unmolested. This arrangement and this assurance should restore confidence to them. Yet such is the suspicious and designing nature of the Afridi, so restless and excited does he become in times of difficulty and danger, and so little trust would he repose in similar promises made by any of his own people under where, killing some of the soldiers in the British service, and causing great loss of property. The British Government, confident in its power, cannot sit down quietly under such defiance and outrages, and has been forced by the wanton acts of the Afridis themselves to inflict punbhment on them in their own country, and to send a force into Tirah to exact reparation for what has lately taken place. The Afridi soldiers in the service of the Government have given proofs of their loyalty, devotion, and courage on many a hard -fought field, and the value of their services has been fiiUy appreciated by the Government of India. After the most carefiil consideration of the circumstances connected with the Tirah expedition, the Government of India have decided to show consideration to those Afridi soldiers who wish to keep their engagements, and to excuse them from service in the campaign which the Government have been forced to wage against their fellow-tribesmen. On these grounds alone it has been determined that Afiridi soldiers who are serving in the regiments detailed for service on the Peshawar - Kohat border, are not to be employed near the Tirah frontier at the present time, but their services vdll be utilised elsewhere. The necessary orders to this effect will at once issue. As far as possible care will be taken that the property of those who have not taken part in the raids on British territory is neither confiscated nor destroyed during the time that our troops are engaged in the Orakzai or Afridi territory. This order is to be read and carefully explained to all Afridi soldiers belonging to regiments detailed for service on the Peshawar-Kohat border. 56 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, iv similar circumstances, that it is doubtful if the just and humane order of the Commander-in-Chief will entirely quiet their fears, though it is obvious that it was the most considerate action His Excellency could have possibly taken. CHAPTER V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI Headquarters Camp, near Khangarbur, 22 nd October, Long ere this arrives my telegrams will have in- formed you that the curtain has been rung up and the play has begun. I had hardly posted my last letter to you when collision with the enemy occurred, and his skill in choosing a strong position, his resolu- tion in defending it, the numbers he can bring into the field against us, and the efficiency of his equip- ment and fire, as testified by the severe losses we have already incurred, all are proof, if proof were wanted, of the arduous task ahead — a task which makes us rejoice that we have such a tried and capable leader as General Sir William Lockhart, and which fully warrants the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief, and the decision of the Government of India, in sending such a powerful force into the field. In this letter I shall be able to give you a better idea than is possible within the limits of a telegram, of the immense difficulties of many kinds which 58 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. beset an expedition on this wild and mountainous frontier, of the desperate nature of the fighting, and of the valour of our troops. The first advance from our advanced base, Shinauri, was fixed for the 20th, but in the mean- time the enemy, aware of our intentions (for our working parties trying to improve the road up to the top of the Chagru Kotal, or ridge, and as far as possible down the other side, had sufficiently and unavoidably indicated our intended route), had skilfully occupied in strength the village of Dargai and the Narik spur, which forms the western boundary of the Chagru Valley, and completely dominates the road down it, by which we must perforce descend. It was necessary, therefore, to dislodge him from this coign of vantage as a pre- liminary measure. Sir William Lockhart accord- ingly ordered this to be done by the 2nd Division, and planned that General Westmacott's brigade should engage the enemy in front, supported by No. 5 and No. 9 Mountain Batteries, while General Kempster s brigade, accompanied by the scouts of the 5th Gurkhas, No. 8 Mountain Battery, and No. 4 Co. Madras Sappers and Miners, should make a wide detour to the west, and get round his right flank and rear. Great secrecy was observed in issuing the orders and making the necessary arrangements for the attack, as it was very much desired to find our friends "at home," but subse- quent events have assured us that they are full of V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 59 fight, and may be depended upon to accept battle whenever we choose to offer it. The conduct of the operations was intrusted to General Sir Power Palmer, as General Yeatman- Biggs was temporarily laid up by sickness. It must be remembered that he has been here since the beginning of August last, and the hard work, single-handed for a long time, and the exposure have naturally told upon him.^ Leaving Shinauri at 4 A.M., General Kempsters brigade, with which Sir Power Palmer himself elected to march, commenced its circuitous climb to turn the enemy's right flank. Westmacott started an hour later, and by 9 a.m. had reached the Chagru Kotal, on which at 9.20 his batteries came into action against the ridge at Dargai, where the enemy thickly clustered. The range was about 2500 yards, and though, of course, well within the power of the 2.5-inch gun, a very perfect weapon in its way, yet the fear was expressed that this shell fire might have the not-to-be-desired effect of dispersing the enemy too soon, and driving him away before the infantry could get at him and inflict severe punishment. No doubt this often has been done, and as often regretted, for those who ^ Thb gallant officer died in January. ** He was in a very bad state of health from the outset, but his indomitable spirit carried him through the whole of the operations, only to die at Peshawar on the 4th January 1898. I would fain have sent him back to India from the Samana, or subsequently from Khangarbur, but the responsible medical officers considered him fit to remain in the field, a decision which gratified him, though I personally could not agree with it." — Sir Wm. Lockhart*s Dispatches, 6o THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. fight and run away will live to fight another day, and an enemy frightened away by long-range shell fire may be likened to flies brushed off a pot of honey by a wave of the hand. They are not hurt, and will all settle again in the same place directly you leave them alone. Fortunately in this instance this was not the effect. The tribesmen were under such excellent cover, naturally provided by the rocks, and improved by walls, etc., built up by themselves, that all they had to do was to lie low and sit tight, and they soon found that the shells did not hurt them very much. Meantime West- macott s regfiments toiled up the steep ascent to reach their foe, the ist Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles leading, the Kings Own Scottish Borderers and the Northamptons in close support (The fourth regiment of this brigade, the gallant 36th Sikhs, ever famous for their glorious defence of Saragheri and Gulistan, was not out to-day.) It seemed in- credible that any enemy could be turned out of such a position as that occupied by the enemy now. It literally had to be climbed up to, so steep and precipitous was the mountain-side. In many places the men could move only in single file, and progress was perforce painfully slow. Sir William Lockhart, attended by Brigadier-General Nicholson, the chief of the staff, and by the rest of the headquarters personnel, was on the Samana Sukh, closely observ- ing the movement, and watches were often compared to note how the attack was getting on. But if slow. V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 6i it never flagged, and ere long the quick sharp cracks of the enemy's rifles, mingled occasionally with the louder booms of their jezails, showed that it was coming under effective fire. At last, at twelve noon exactly, a point was reached whence a rush across the open must be made and the affair finished. There was no hesitation. Gallantly led by Major Rose, Captain Bateman-Champain, and Lieutenant Beynon, the brave little Gurkhas streamed across the deadly space as fast as their legs would carry them, or the steep slope would permit. The Scottish Borderers followed close, and with loud cheers the crest of the hill was carried, and the enemy in full retreat shot down as he nimbly fled over its reverse slopes. It was a gallant action, reflecting great credit on all engaged in it, and testifying to their endurance as well as to their pluck. The really dangerous zone crossed at the run was not more than ICO yards across, but so close was the range, and so hot the fire, that many a good soldier threw up his arms and pitched heavily forward stricken to death, before he reached the other side. The Gurkhas left thirteen men killed and wounded on this stony slope ; the Borderers six. It is quite marvellous that this was all the loss. But the fact is that about this time Kempster's brigade was beginning to make the pressure of its advance felt, and the tribesmen, ever anxious when their rear is threatened, gave way probably with greater readi- ness than they otherwise would have done. 1^**"^ P^ fe,.. ^ ^^1 a/_^ *flHC|^^^Bi Si^ ■■■i'hc;br,ivr; liUlt Uutkl 62 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. To the movements of this brigade I must now advert. The route by which it advanced had been reported on only by natives, and as usual their esti- mate of its difficulties, and of the time required to reach a given point, was much too low. As a matter of fact, so extraordinarily bad was the track that Sir Power Palmer, after some five miles had with difficulty been accomplished, was compelled to send back to Shinauri No. 8 Mountain Battery, and all laden animals, under escort of the Dorsets, and two companies of the 15 th Sikhs: the mountain -side being absolutely impracticable for four-footed beasts. And, though no effort was relaxed, for the General well appreciated that it was Sir William Lockhart's design that Kempster's brigade should deal the de- cisive stroke from the rear, yet so long was the road, and so terrific the climb, that the enemy was already in retreat when at last Kempster's men appeared upon the scene. They were, however, in time to accelerate his departure with effective volleys, after which they joined Westmacott on the captured ridge. It was now past 2 p.m., and time to think about returning to camp at Shinauri, fully eight miles distant on a bad road. Westmacott's regiments accordingly filed off at once, and between 4 p.m. and 5 P.M., when the sun was rapidly sinking in the west, Kempster prepared to follow them. But, meantime, the booming of the mountain guns, resounding up and down the Khanki Valley, had spread the news that a fight was going on, and from north and east V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 63 and west the Afridis and Orakzais hastened to the scene of the strife, and General Kempster, who was preparing to withdraw vi& the Chagru Kotal — ^by the same road, that is, as Westmacott's troops — had to make dispositions to meet them, and to cover the movement in retreat. These dispositions were so ably conceived, and executed with such alacrity and spirit by the tired men, that they met with entire success. The excellent practice of the batteries on the Chagru Kotal, and the steady volleys and re- solute bearing of, the Gordons, 15th Sikhs, and two companies of the Borderers, who covered the with- drawal from the heights, were too much for the enemy, who, however, pressed their attack with characteristic dash and courage. The fight was carried on until long after darkness had set in ; but, though the tribesmen by this time numbered several thousands, they were steadily kept at bay and severe loss inflicted on them, so much so that, after passing the Chagru Kotal, the retreat was absolutely unmolested. From that point there still remained six long and weary miles to camp. General Palmer reported that all the troops, British and Native, be- haved with the greatest steadiness, but the honours of the action must be divided between the Gordon Highlanders^ and the 15th Sikhs, whose losses were respectively ten and eight killed and wounded. Amongst the former were Major Jennings-Bramly ' In this afiair, No. 2967, Private W. Rennie of the Gordon Highlanders, shot down four of the enemy at close quarters, and obtained honourable men- tion in General Palmer's Despatch. 64 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. killed, and Lieutenant Pears (attached from the Scottish Rifles) severely wounded. The towers and defences of Dargai were effect- ually destroyed before the troops retired, and the village itself was burned. The rear-guard reached camp at eleven o'clock at night, having been under arms since 4 A.M., marched between 20 and 25 miles, climbed some 3000 to 4000 feet, and fought a severe action. It was not a bad day's work, and on the following morning Sir William Lock- hart telegraphed his congratulations to Sir Power Palmer on having so successfully carried out his instructions. It was hoped that this action would drive the enemy permanently from the Dargai heights, and leave the road down the Chagru Valley open for the safe passage of our troops ; but our expectations were over-sanguine. The ardour of the tribesmen was not at all quenched by their reverse on the i8th. Reinforcements were hurried up to the enemy by the maliks from Khangarbur and Ramadan, and the evening of the 19th found them established in their old position in greater strength than ever. The question, of course, suggests itself. Why surrender the position, having once captured it .-^ It may ^be admitted at once that, had it been feasible, it would certainly have been advantageous to hold the posi- tion won, until, at least, the advance of the main column to Khangarbur had been effected. But it is a question if it was feasible. The water-supply V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 65 of Dargai was at a spot called Khand Talao, nearly three miles away to the west, and the road to it was commanded throughout by adjacent heights, so that, in the presence of an enemy, water could not have been obtained for the troops unless these heights, as well as the village of Dargai, had been held in force. Khand Talao itself was inaccessible to trans- port animals coming either from Shinauri or from Dargai. If at this stage it had been attempted to occupy Dargai, and also to hold the heights dominating the water-supply, serious delay in the advance of the force into the Khanki Valley would have been the certain consequence ; and the troops engaged in the operation would not only have been entangled in extremely difficult ground, where, until the communications had been improved, it would have been almost impossible to supply them betimes with food, water, and ammunition, but also, until we had established ourselves strongly in the Khanki Valley, they would have been exposed to serious attack from the north and west. Thus grave complications might have arisen, and attention and strength would have been diverted from the main and all-important object (which at this time was the capture of the passes leading into Tirah) into indecisive side-issues. In fact, to hold Dargai alone with a small detach- ment, as was possible laier, was impossible while the enemy were masters of the Khanki Valley. While to attempt the major operation of occupying the position in force, and the heights beyond it too. 66 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. would have been a hazardous experiment in view of the considerations stated, and a source of anxiety and weakness rather than of confidence and strength. The fact that the place was reoccupied by the enemy in greater strength than ever as soon as we with- drew from it, shows that any detachment left there on the night of the i8th would at once have been fiercely attacked. Moreover, it must be remembered that the primary object of the operations on the i8th was to drive off the comparatively small bodies of the enemy (Orakzai Alikhels) who at that time held Dargai, and who constantly annoyed our working- parties on the road below. Nothing more than this was contemplated ; nor was it anticipated that they would be strongly and immediately reinforced by the Afridis, or possibly other arrangements might have been made. But in the actual circumstances, and in view of Sir William's orders for the 20th, to which I shall refer presently, the requirements of the case did not appear to justify action which, as I have shown, would almost certainly have delayed and dislocated the whole plan of campaign.^ To continue — On the 19th October it had been the intention of Sir William Lockhart that the 2nd Division should resume work on the Chagru 1 I have written at some length on this matter, because no point in the campaign has been so adversely criticised as this £ulure to hold the Dargai heights when they had been once captured. There are always two sides to every question, but irresponsible critics, and men with theories, will often persist in seeing one only. V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 67 Kotal-Khorappa road. After the severe fighting, and the losses which the Afridis had sustained on the previous day, it was not unreasonably surmised that the presence of our men, working under the protection of strong covering -parties (which had been arranged), might deter the enemy from re- occupying Dargai. But the troops had been much fatigued on the i8th, and had an arduous task before them again on the 20th, when the march to the Khanki Valley was ordered to begin, so General Yeatman-Biggs decided to give them a rest. Sir William Lockhart on the Samana (Headquarters at this time were at Fort Lockhart) was not aware of this resolution until it was too late for further action in the matter. Otherwise, convinced of the im- portance of having the working -parties out, he would have ordered them to be covered by troops from the ist Division. We now come to the 20th, when the advance from Shinauri into the Khanki Valley must be com- menced in earnest, the 2nd Division leading. Sir William Lockhart's original instructions to the Com- mander for this advance had been to move by the direct route, via the Chagru Kotal, and the road on the west side of the Chagru defile. But, late in the evening of the 19th, General Yeatman-Biggs wired up to say that, as the Dargai heights were now occu- pied again in strength by the enemy, he proposed to march down the eastern side of the defile, via the Samana Sukh and the Talia spur. This movement 68 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. would, in his opinion, avoid the loss that would be incurred by using the other road, and engaging the enemy on the way, strongly posted as they were on such commanding vantage-ground. Sir William Lockhart could not, however, ap- prove this idea. His previous decision had been deliberately arrived at, and was based on the fact that he had reliable information that the road down the Talia spur was a mere goat-track, quite unfit for laden animals. But more than this, it was obvious that any attempt to thus evade the tribesmen posted about Dargai would not only have failed in its object, but also would have, in all probability, en- couraged them to attack us. They could easily descend from Dargai, and, crossing the defile, vigor- ously harass and oppose the difficult march down the thickly -wooded and precipitous slopes of the Talia spur; and to be caught on such ground during a tedious processional movement, encum- bered by long trains of baggage, supplies, and hospitals, in a position, in fact, in which no com- mander would willingly sustain an assault, in which reinforcement would be difficult, and from which withdrawal would be dangerous, was an experiment too full of risks to be permitted. A reply was therefore sent that night to General Yeatman- Biggs that the original plan must be ad- hered to, and the difficulty faced. It was intimated to him at the same time that two battalions of the I St Division, and one of its batteries, might be V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 69 borrowed for the day to assist in clearing the Dargai heights, and that the Northamptons, and No. 9 Mountain Battery, from Fort Lockhart, would co- operate from the Samana Sukh. It was further remarked that the enemy would in all probability evacuate the heights as soon as the advancing troops reached the point below the Kotal— only some two or three miles — where the Narik Darra joins the defile, as their rear would then be threatened. It is thus clear that Sir William Lockhart's in- tention was to engage the enemy in front with a portion of the force, while other troops pushed down the defile and threatened their rear, vid the Narik Darra — a combination which would almost certainly have expelled them from their position on the heights without such severe loss as a purely frontal attack must inevitably involve. But General Yeat- man- Biggs held that it would be dangerous to march men down the defile until the heights overhanging it had been captured, and, acting on this judgment, ordered a direct assault by the main front approach to be delivered as soon as his leading troops had reached the Kotal at 8 a.m. on the morning of the 20th ; and it only remains now to record how gallantly it was carried out. General Kempster's brigade, consisting of the Dorsets, the Gordons, the 2nd Gurkhas, and the 15th Sikhs, was charged with the task of storming the frowning heights, and it was strengthened for 70 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. the occasion by the Derbyshires and the 3rd Sikhs, lent by the ist Division, and supported by the fire of three batteries on the Kotal under Colonel Purdy, R.A., No. 8 M.B. R.A., No. i Kohat M.B., and No. 5 Bombay M.B., while on the Samana Sukh No. 9 M.B. R.A., and the Northamptons, stood ready to help if required. The tribesmen were assembled in far greater strength than on the 1 8th. Numerous contingents had joined them in the in- terim. Nineteen standards were counted, represent- ing all the principal Afridi and Orakzai clans, and it was evident they were prepared to offer a desperate resistance. In vain did the united batteries shower their deadly missiles upon them. The fire was heavy and precise, as any onlooker might see ; but on the foe, sheltered behind rocks and sangars, the guns could do but little execution, though doubtless it was cheering to the infantry struggling towards the accomplishment of their desperate task to feel that their friends the gunners were doing their best for them. By 11. 15 a.m. the fatal zone was reached by the leading troops, the scouts of the 3rd Gurkhas, under Lieutenant Tillard,^ and the ist Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, under Colonel Eaton Travers, and, rushing across it, these brave men, splendidly led by their gallant officers, reached cover on the far side. But it was a costly rush, and was met by such a hot and well-aimed fire, that all they could do was to hold on ^ Lieutenant Tillard was afterwards actually the first man on the ridge. His orderly, Hastbir, was a good second. V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 71 to the position they had reached, without being able to advance farther. Major Judge was killed on the spot by a shot through the head. Captain Robinson was mortally wounded, and many more dotted the slope, struck down by the leaden hail. In vain did others attempt to follow the splendid lead that had been given them. Their vigilance now fully roused, the enemy poured down such a murderous fire from the cliffs above that the head of each formation attempt- ing the fatal passage was swept away, and Gurkhas, Dorsets, and Derbys, suffering terribly and enduring bravely, could get no farther. At this juncture General Yeatman- Biggs ordered the Gordons and the 3rd Sikhs to the front, and General Kempster, arranging first for three minutes' concentrated fire on the sangars by the massed batteries, launched them to assault. The time had arrived for desperate action, for it was now nearly three o'clock in the afternoon, the dead and wounded were lying thick on every side, over 100 men had already fallen, and the enemy were shouting their defiance, waving their standards, and beating their drums, confident in the impregnability of their position, and certain now of success. But the Gordons had yet to be reckoned with. Rapidly forming his men and addressing them in burning words,^ Colonel Mathias dashed out at the head of his gallant regiment, and, closely backed by the 3rd Sikhs, in a moment they 1 (< Highlanders ! The General says the position must be taken at all cocu. The Gordons will take it ! " 72 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. were all across, carrying every one with them in the impetuosity of their onrush, storming the ridge with a resolution that was resistless, and beating down all opposition. It was indeed a splendid exploit, and thrilled the nerves of all who were privileged to witness it. But stay. Did I say that they were " all across" ? Well, that is wrong. Three men of the Gordons, including Lieutenant Lamont, dropped killed on the spot, and forty-one more fell, more or less severely wounded, amongst them Major Macbean,^ shot through the groin ; Lieutenant Dingwall, severely hit in four places; Lieutenant Meiklejohn, Lieu- tenant Craufurd, and Captain Uniacke, all slightly wounded ; and Colonel Mathias himself, hit in the foot, but only slightly. Many others were shot through their clothes or accoutrements, and had marvellous escapes. The other regiments all suffered heavily too. The Dorsets had nine killed and forty wounded, including Captain Arnold, whose wound was dangerous ; ^ the Derbys four killed, including Captain Smith, and eight wounded ; the Gurkhas eighteen killed and forty-nine wounded ; the scouts two killed and two wounded ; and the 3rd Sikhs three killed and twenty wounded, including Lieu- ^ Major Macbean was among the first to spring from coyer, and lead his men to the attack. He was shot almost immediately, but continued to cheer his men on while lying on the ground. ' Captain Arnold was wounded in a heroic attempt to lead his men across the deadly space before the Gordon rush occurred. « Come on, £ Com- pany !*' he shouted, and sprung to the front, but was struck down almost immediately by the deadly hail from above. V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 73 tenant White, shot through the chest. This fine corps splendidly supported the Gordons in their great charge, and their Colonel, Tonnochy, was con- spicuous in the forefront of the rush. The grand total of killed and wounded was 199. This will give some idea of the difficulty of the position, and the severity and accuracy of the fire to which the assaulting columns were exposed, and in a situation, too, whence they could not reply with much effect. The enemy's losses, too, were severe, but, as usual, they managed to carry off most of their dead and wounded, and it is impossible to estimate them accurately. They, however, acknowledge defeat, and have made no attempt since to molest the victors, or to retake the lost position, on which the brigade bivouacked for the night. The dead and wounded were carried back to Shinauri, where the former were buried with the honours which they had so gloriously earned, and the wounded were placed in the base hospitals, where there is every arrangement possible for their care and comfort. Such is the story of the fighting on the i8th and 20th of October, and, whatever criticisms may be passed on the why and the wherefore of it, it will always remain a noble monument to the valour of our troops, and to the splendid heroism of British officers as troop leaders. Before dismissing this subject, I must narrate two or three incidents connected with the Gordons' grand attack, which are worth placing on record. 74 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. The first is, that they were headed in their memorable rush by their pipers. One of these, named Findlater, blowing his loudest and best, was among the first to show the way across that deadly strip of ground above described, and when, after traversing but a few yards, he was laid low, shot through both legs, he managed to prop himself up against a boulder and continued with unabated energy to play "The Cock o' the North," ani- mating his comrades by the familiar and stirring music of his beloved pipes. This hero has been recommended for the Victoria Cross, and we all sincerely hope he will get it, for it has been grandly earned. Another is that, as the Gordons breasted the last stiff ascent, Colonel Mathias, no longer quite in his first youth, was somewhat short of breath, and said to Colour -Sergeant Mackie, alongside whom he found himself at this moment — *' Stiff climb, eh, Mackie? Not quite — so young — as I was — you know.'' '^Nevermind, sir/'' answered the gallant Sergeant, giving his CO. a hearty slap of genuine admiration on the back, which almost knocked his remaining wind out of him — ''Never mind, sir! Ye' re gaun verra strong for an auld man / " I must add, that when the ridge was captured the Gordons of their own accord lined up and gave three cheers for their gallant Colonel, and officers, British and Native, of Sikhs and Gurkhas, crowded round to shake him by the hand. V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 75 The only other incident I would mention is, that on the 22nd Sir William Lockhart had the Gordons paraded, and addressed them with reference to their dashing conduct on the 20th. " Your records," said Sir William, ** testify to many a gallant action per- formed by you, and you have now added to them another which may worthily rank beside those that have gone before. There is more hard work ahead for us all, and I am confident you will do your share of it well when the time comes to call upon you for a fresh effort." Sir William thanked Colonel Mathias personally, and the assembled officers, for their gallant leading, and the parade was then dis- missed. The men were immensely pleased by the prompt and kindly praise bestowed by the Chief CHAPTER VI IN THE KHANKI VALLEY Khangarbur, 27M October, At daybreak on the next day, the 21st, the 2nd Division commenced its advance to the Khanki Valley according to programme, Sir William Lock- hart and staff accompanying the movement, but marching independently from Fort Logkhart, down the Talia spur, with the Northamptons, the 36th Sikhs, and No. 9 Mountain Battery. The reports previously received on the state of this road were amply confirmed now. The baggage of even this small force did not reach Khangarbur until late on the 22nd, and some of it not until mid-day on the 23rd. The first intention had been to move on this day only as far as Khorappa, but that locality, situated at the junction of the Chagru defile with the Khanki river, is so commanded on every side by overhang- ing heights, that the advance was continued another two and a half miles up the valley to a spot nearly opposite the large fortified village of Khangarbur, where an extensive plateau on the north bank of CHAP. VI IN THE KHANKI VALLEY 77 the Khanki afforded the necessary space for the large force assembling, and, by its remoteness from the nearest commanding ground, promised fair security against those prowling marauders (com- monly known as snipers) whose chief amusement is to fire into your camp all night. Khangarbur was full of Afridis, who briskly opened fire upon the leading brigade — General Westmacott's — but No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.A., promptly coming into action, pitched some shells into the village, and the enemy decided not to remain. Some infantry who were pushed to the front quickened their retreat, and they were soon out of sight in the hills to the north. There were no casualties on our side, and probably very few on theirs. The march from Shinauri to this place (Khan- garbur) is a very long and trying one, fully thirteen miles up hill and down dale, along what in many places is a rough track barely a foot wide, and for the last four or five miles is merely the stony bed of a ravine. Where men, and mules, and guns, and baggage animals have to follow such a trail in single file it is easy to imagine how the column is stretched out. The tail of it is hardly clear of the old camp when the head is arriving at the new. Then supervenes darkness, with all its attendant discom- forts and dangers and risks. All calculations as to time and space are simply set at naught by con- ditions such as obtain in a country like this. A 78 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. wretched mule falls down, and the road is blocked at once. A check of this kind, occurring not once but a hundred times probably in the course of the day, multiplies in effect in geometrical progression as it passes from front to rear, and causes delays and fatigues which it is simply impossible to describe in words. The difficulties of this country must be seen to be appreciated, and it must also be remembered that it produces nothing in the way of supplies except here and there a very moderate amount of forage for the transport animals. Hence everything must be carried with us. Then consider what our numbers are. There are now assembled on this ground 6800 British ranks, 10,200 native ranks, 17,000 followers, and upwards of 25,000 animals! The daily requirements of this multitude in the way of food alone (and they have other needs) amount to 3000 maunds* weight of stuff at a moderate esti- mate (i maund = 8o lbs.). But the road from our base at Shinauri is at present so long and- winding, and narrow and steep, and so crowded with troops and traffic, that supplies can only be very gradually brought up, and are consumed here almost as soon as they arrive ; while to crown our difficulties, it is almost impossible to send back to Shinauri the unladen transport animals, because of the extreme narrowness of the track, on which two mules can hardly pass each other, except at a few points. Needless to say, sappers and pioneers have been, "A wrelchtil mukf.i VI IN THE KHANKI VALLEY 79 and are, toiling without ceasing to improve it, and every day has made it better, but their work is dreadfully interrupted by the ceaseless stream of traffic. In fact, it has been a case of stopping the traffic or stopping the work. The consequence of such extraordinary difficulties is, of course, that we have remained here longer than was anticipated to let the columns close up. But the I St and 2nd Divisions are assembled now; and as we are here within six or seven miles of the foot of the Sampagha Pass, it will, after all, be attacked on the 28th or 29th, as I advised you some days ago. I have gone into all this at some length by way of explanation of our long halt here, which no doubt is criticised and commented upon adversely in many quarters, and perhaps by some who ought to know better. But an army must be fed, and it would be more than rash to attempt hasty movements in advance, and reckless enterprises, against a hardy and daring enemy, without being assured of ample supplies for man and beast, and feeling confident that every position gained can be maintained and supported. But if we can satisfactorily account to ourselves for this long waiting, we cannot make the why and wherefore of it clear to the Afridis. They, of course, put it down to hesitation and fear, and in proportion to the timidity which we (in their estimation) display, do their own courage and 8o THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. confidence increase, and their numbers too. If happily we could have attacked the Sampagha Pass within a day or two of arrival here, we should probably have found it not a very hard task to capture it, for it would not then have been defended by more than half the men that hold it now. But our unavoidable delay has been the tribesmen's opportunity, and they have made the most of it. Our latest information is that all the Afridi clans are now fully represented on the Sampagha, and that, combined with the Orakzais, there are not less than 10,000 or 12,000 of the enemy in our immediate neighbourhood. We also know from political reports — reconnaissances and spies — that they have been busy for some time past in adding to and strengthening the defences of the pass, building walls and sangars to command all likely approaches, digging trenches and rifle pits, and erecting obstacles. Amongst them are hundreds of old pensioned soldiers, many of whom have served their time in our sapper companies, so they know the business well, and are now turning to excellent account the training they have had in our ranks. So the storming of the Sampagha Pass will be something to achieve ; but there is only one feeling among the troops in regard to it, and that is eager- ness to begin, and anxiety to be in the leading brigades. But besides these reports of the gathering of the clans, and of their preparations to defend vigorously VI IN THE KHANKI VALLEY 8i the first of the great gateways of their country, we have other evidence of their numbers, activity, and boldness : for day by day our foraging parties have been harassed by them, and night by night our camp has been surrounded and fusiladed with increasing audacity and severity. On the night of the 23rd particularly the enemy's onset amounted almost to an attack, and some of the picquets were heavily engaged from dusk until after midnight. A few star shells were fired with good effect, and the blood-stains found the next morning in many direc- tions, with a few bodies actually retrieved within only 30 or 40 yards of our lines, attested at once the boldness of our assailants, and the fact that they had not gone away unpunished. Our own casualties were insignificant. The night of the 24th passed in comparative quiet But on the 25th the foe seemed to have recovered his spirit, for all our foraging parties on that day, though strongly guarded by guns as well as by infantry, were much harassed by crowds of Afridis, who followed them up with amazing energy and intrepidity as they returned to camp, and excited general comment and admiration by the skill with which they skirmished on the mountain side, and by the accuracy and judgment with which they delivered their fire. There was more than one instance of their waiting with coolness until our infantry had to show themselves on the sky-line as they crossed the crest of some ridge, and then 82 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^8 chap. delivering a volley, at a range of 1000 yards some- times, and invariably knocking some one over. As darkness came on they closed in on the camp, and their marksmen, establishing themselves in coigns of vantage, began to make it extremely unpleasant for us. I do not know anything more uncomfortable than this whistling of bullets round one from hidden enemies. The fire cannot be replied to, nor can you escape from it, for it comes from all directions, and you are as much exposed in one spot as another. On this particular evening the casualties were numerous among men and followers and animals, some twenty odd being hit. Captain Badcock, D.S.O., 5th Gurkhas, Field Intelligence officer, was shot in the left arm just as he sat down to dinner, and Lieutenant -Colonel Hadow, 15th Sikhs, and Lieutenant Crocker, Munster Fusiliers, orderly officer to Brigadier- General Kempster, were wounded. Many other officers had very narrow escapes, bullets just miss- ing them, or going through their tents. Poor Badcock was hit by a Snider bullet, which shattered the bone so dreadfully that amputation was necessary at once. He has borne the operation well, and, we hope, will soon make a good recovery. Two distant hills from which the fire on the camp seemed to be chiefly directed, one to the east and the other to the south-west, were occupied last night by our own troops, a wing of the 3rd Gurkhas holding one, and the Nabha Infantry, with admirable spirit, volunteer- VI IN THE KHANKI VALLEY 83 ing to hold the other. The consequence was we were left in comparative peace, and slept the sleep of the just I told you by wire of the five men, Afridis, who came in on the 24th and gave themselves up to one of our picquets, saying they wished to be loyal and would not fight against us. They proved to be a subadar and a sepoy of the 26th Punjab Infantry, and three pensioned native officers of other corps, all of whom, as it was at once remarked, might very well have come in weeks ago without hindrance had they really wished to prove their loyalty. But arriving on the eve of a general engagement, and coming straight from the enemy, strongly posted within six miles of us, it does seem as if there was more in it than meets the eye. For surely the Afridis would not have let them pass over to us with the chance that they might reveal all their plans and dispositions and strength, unless they had some ulterior design in letting them go. If, how- ever, they reckoned that we should receive them with open arms, pat them on the back, and give them liberty to come and go as friends, they mis- calculated, for the five men were carefully blind- folded while being conducted into Sir William Lockhart's presence, and are detained as prisoners pending the development of events. The Queen s gracious message of approval of the valour of her troops, of sympathy, and of tender inquiry after the welfare of the wounded, has been 84 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, vi greatly appreciated by all ranks and has gladdened many hearts. The feeling that Her Majesty is watching the progress of events on this wild frontier, as attentively and anxiously as any of her subjects, animates every soldier in this force to render the best service of which he is capable. CHAPTER VII THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS Camp in the Mastura Valley, 30M October, At last we are fairly under way. It was a week of weary waiting at Khangarbur, but it was inevitable, and I have fully explained why. But the time was not wasted. Reconnaissances and foraging parties were sent out daily, good exercises for men and officers, resulting in the acquisition of useful informa- tion regarding routes, etc., and in the accumulation of a considerable quantity of fodder for the transport animals, and a limited amount of grain. Also, as there were constant skirmishes with the enemy, without serious loss on either side, and as, moreover, after each encounter we always perforce retired to our camp, he was gently encouraged, so many of us fondly hoped, to believe himself equal, if not superior, to us, and so we imagined would make a bold stand on the Sampagha, and give us a chance to beat him there handsomely. In this expectation, however, we have been deceived, as the sequel will show. Finally, during the week that we were 86 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. reconnoitring, and foraging, and skirmishing, the commissariat were busy pouring supplies into Khan- garbur, the road to which from Shinauri has now been so much improved by the strenuous exertions of the Engineers, that even camels can traverse it ; and on the 26th and 27th a convoy of 3CXX) of these animals, which carry loads of 4CX) lbs. each, came safely through to our camp. Thus, by the evening of the 27th, Sir William Lockhart was prepared to resume the advance in earnest, and to the joy of all the long-looked-for orders for the move were issued on that date. The march to Gundaki was a very short and easy one on paper, barely three and a half miles ; but it meant a good deal more than that for the troops engaged in it. From Khangarbur the route lay almost due north up a broad and undulating valley, fully one and a half miles wide at the start, but narrowing just beyond Gundaki to barely one-third of that distance. It is bounded on the east and west by low hills, which had to be cleared of the enemy and crowned by our infantry before the force could advance. On the east particularly lay some heights which had been regularly held by the Afridis, and on which, on the evening of the 2 7th, we could count five or six standards and see crowds of men. The 36th Sikhs and the Northampton Regiment were accordingly ordered to start at 5 a.m. and turn them out, and this was effected without more trouble than was involved in an arduous climb. For your VII THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS 87 Pathan is not an early riser. He will say his evening prayer with fervour, and eat his evening meal with gusto, and then, fortified in the spirit and in the flesh, he will sling his rifle on his back, stick his knife into his belt, and start out for a few hours' real enjoyment before he turns in : which means that up to about II P.M. (or later, if the sport is good) he will amuse himself by shooting into his enemy's camp, or by stalking and cutting up stray camp followers or belated convoys. But about midnight, conscious of duty thoroughly done, he will retire to his eyrie in the rocks, curl himself up, and sleep if allowed until the sun has topped the horizon, and its rays have warmed the chill morning air. Consequently, he is not infrequently caught napping, if only he be sought early enough. And so it happened on this occasion. Before the Afridis were fully aware of the manoeuvre, the column, under Colonel Chaytor, was upon them, and hastily bolting, their movements quickened by a few volleys, they abandoned their vantage ground, and the right flank of the force was made secure for the day. Similarly, the hills on the left of the road were cleared by troops (the Yorks, half- battalion 4th Gurkhas, and half- battalion 3rd Sikhs) detached from the 2nd Brigade (General Gaselee's), and by 9 A.M. the force was in full march up the valley, the First Division on the left of the line, the Second on the right, both preceded, of course, by strong advanced guards. Sir William Lockhart himself 88 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. rode at the head of the main body of the First Division. The opposition offered by the enemy to this advance was practically «z7, and there were only some ten or twelve casualties incurred in the skir- mishing on the flanks. On arriving on the ground on which it was proposed to encamp for the night, or rather bivouac (for the force is without tents), the troops were halted, and piled arms, while the baggage and rearguards closed up. In the meantime. Sir William Lockhart, from commanding ground well to the front, examined the approaches to the pass, and arranged the plan of attack for the following day. Up to the point now reached, the ground had been, as I have said, undulating and easy, and with a gentle rise towards the pass. But directly the Kandi Mishti stream was crossed, which here lay at our feet, it was roughly broken up by ravines and nullahs, between which long rugged spurs ran out from the mountain side, ending many of them in precipitous slopes, which could only be ascended in single file and at particular points. The road up the Sampagha Pass was in full view, zigzagging up one of these spurs. To the east of it (on our right, that is, as we stood facing the position), on an adjacent spur, was the village of Nazeno, which appeared to be full of armed men ; and to the west the village of Kandi Mishti was similarly held. High up on the zigzag path, sangars and walls could be seen, and everything pointed to a stout defence and a sharp p K \ ^ _ ^^^ ^'"^^]^9^F^^!^^^T ^sm %^ - "^^^^^^^^ J^l tf4I^B^^I ' -^l^sS^^^BlH vii THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS 89 fight on the following day. It was not to be, how- ever, notwithstanding that reconnaissances were fired on briskly, and that our picquets this night were sharply attacked, particularly on the left flank, inci- dents all tending to confirm the belief that the enemy meant to fight. The plan of attack was as follows, omitting details : — The honour of leading the direct attack by the main approach to the pass was intrusted to the 2nd Brigade (General Gaselee s), the Gurkha scouts of the division co-operating. This brigade was to leave its bivouac at 5 a.m., and it was reckoned would be across the Kandi Mishti stream, and established on the far side of it by daylight. By the same hour, the massed batteries of the two divisions, thirty-six guns, under Brigadier-General Spragge, and the rocket detachment, under Captain Browne, R.A., were to be in position on a flat- topped spur beyond the stream, almost opposite the centre of the position to be attacked. The 4th Brigade (Westmacott's) was to support the 2nd, particularly on its right flank, and the 3rd Brigade (Kempster's) was to follow it in reserve. The ist Brigade (General Hart's) was distributed to protect the batteries, and to co-operate with, and support the whole movement by detaching a regiment to assail the village of Nazeno on the right flank of our advance, and another to attack Kandi Mishti on the left flank. I may say here that the Devons 90 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. on one side, and on the other the 2nd battalion ist Gurkha Rifles (who, by the way, had their colonel, Sage, severely wounded in a reconnaissance the previous evening) carried out these operations very successfully. The baggage was left in camp ready for loading under suitable guards, which included the Nabha Infantry, and a squadron of the i8th Bengal Lancers, with instructions that it was to be brought on directly a helio message was sent back to it. Such were briefly Sir William Lockhart's dis- positions for the attack on the Sampagha Pass, to which every one has been so keenly looking forward for so many days past, and, notwithstanding some small delays caused in the beginning of the opera- tions, they were entirely successful. The morning of 29th October was dark and cold, but still and clear. General Hart's Brigade was the first to move off, and had occupied its allotted positions in good time to protect the batteries as they took up their ground, and to cover the general advance. But in such a difficult country, and in the dark, it is particularly easy to lose your way. The batteries of the First Division got blocked on the road, and thus were somewhat late in coming into action ; and General Gaselee's Brigade took a wrong turning in one of the ravines through which it was threading its way, and lost a little time before it recovered its right direction. But these mistakes were soon put right. By 7 A.M. the attack was fairly launched on the VII THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PAS^ 91 lines designed by Sir William, and it soon became evident that the enemy did not mean to fight very seriously, for they could be seen vacating positions in many directions, and wending their way up to the very crest of the pass, as though it was there they had determined to make their stand. At one important point, however, on the zigzag road, there was a large sangar which evidently held some determined spirits; and as the Queen's and the 4th Gurkhas, who led the advance (their General with them) in capital style, approached it, a smart fire was opened on them, and several men were knocked over. The fire of the batteries of the Second Division was, however, turned on to this sangar with such effect that, after standing about twenty minutes of it, its occupants, some hundred or so, bolted, and the shells knocked many of them over as they fled up the hill-side. After this the infantry advance was nowhere opposed by anything like an organised defence, though a sputtering fire was aimed at it from many points, and casualties occurred here and there. The Queen's had one man killed and eight wounded (including their commanding officer. Major Han- ford Flood), the Gurkhas two, the Yorkshires four, the 36th Sikhs two men killed and two wounded. No. 8 M.B., R.A., three men wounded; No. 5 Bombay M.B. lost its commanding officer. Captain De Butts, killed by a shot in the abdomen, and there were a few other casualties. I©©©] %l 92 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. But the total was insignificant in proportion to the size of the force engaged, the magnitude of the enterprise, and the great natural strength of the position held by the enemy. Had they defended it with one - quarter of the determina- tion shown by them on the Dargai heights on the 20th inst, no doubt the loss of life would have been far greater. Let us be thankful that they did not. The fact is that, on this occasion at all events, they seemed afraid to face the artillery fire. The practice made by the batteries was certainly excellent. Their shells appeared to burst with beautiful precision just where wanted, and their handling generally on this day was admirable. By 9.45 A.M. the leading troops of General Symons's division had arrived on the crest of the ridge, and the pass was captured, but it was some- what later — II. 1 5 is, I understand, the official time — when the enemy had been entirely driven off, and firing had ceased. Sir William Lockhart himself, attended by General Nicholson, Sir Richard Udny, Lord Methuen, and the rest of his staff, had by this time arrived on the summit, whence a heliogram was at once despatched announcing the news to the Commander-in-Chief, and to his Excellency the Viceroy. The troops had all acquitted themselves admirably, for the climb had been a most arduous one, and though the opposition had not been very serious, yet the attack had been carried right through from start to finish without a check. The VII THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS 93 summit of the pass is 6700 feet above sea-level, so an ascent of fully 2000 feet was included in the morning s work. The Mastura Valley now lay smiling below us. Its general level is only some 800 to 1000 feet below the crest of the pass, so the descent into it by a terribly stony, but very gently graded, road was a very simple matter. The troops were pushed on at once, the Yorks and the 3rd Sikhs remaining on the pass for the night, to protect the transport with which the road was now blocked, and Brigadier- General Hart's Brigade halting at Kandi Mishti to maintain communication with Gundaki. We have all been much struck by the appear- ance of this valley. It is wide, flat, well watered even here at its head, fairly timbered with apricot and walnut trees about the villages, which are very numerous and well-built, and evidently inhabited by an industrious and well-to-do people. A great deal of land is under cultivation, the fields are carefully terraced, and signs of plenty and comfort are abundant. But the inhabitants, of course, have all fled. With their families, their flocks and their herds, they have betaken themselves across the mountains to some remote fastnesses, or possibly across the Afghan border, until this time of tribula- tion be overpast. The last two days have been such a tax upon the transport that to-day, the 30th, Sir William has decided to halt, partly to rest the animals, and partly 94 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, vix to reconnoitre the onward road. The Arhanga Pass is now within five miles of us. It leads us into Tirah proper, the inviolate home of the Afridis. Will they defend it like men, or will they scatter and scuttle before our advance, as they, and their neighbours, the Orakzais, did yesterday ? That is the question of the moment. Another twenty-four hours should see it answered. CHAPTER VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS, AND THE OCCUPATION OF TIRAH Headquarters Camp, Maidan, Tirah, 5 /A November* Here we are in the promised land at last ! A land not exactly flowing with milk and honey, but ex- tensive, fertile, highly cultivated, and capable of much development under a settled government. But of this more presently. The past week has been an eventful and important one, and I must hark back to its commencement and take up the thread of my narrative where I last dropped it. I closed my last letter on the 30th October in the Mastura Valley, the day after that on which the Sampagha Pass was captured. Sir William Lockhart would gladly have gone on at once to the attack of the Arhanga Pass, and the troops would have cheerfully responded had he called on them for this effort, which at one time was at all events considered. But prudence dictated a halt for at least twenty -four hours. In the first place, the distance to the pass was uncertain, and its difficulties^ 96 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. based altogether on native report, a matter of con- jecture. In the next, it was absolutely necessary to let the transport close up, and give the Commissariat time to push up supplies. Many regiments, so great was the block on the Sampagha, did not get their baggage on the evening of the 29th, and spent the night d la belle itoile with only their greatcoats and the rations carried in their haversacks.^ For these reasons Sir William decided to halt one day to rest the troops and the baggage animals, to allow supplies to come on, and to reconnoitre the approaches to the Arhanga, whose heights no European had heretofore scaled. Thus, while the reconnaissance was proceeding on the 30th, the Commissariat and Transport Staff devoted their best energies to keep the stream of laden mules and ponies flowing throughout the day from Gundaki over the Sampagha into the camp at Mastura. Sappers and Miners and Pioneers toiled unceasingly to improve the road, and the whole of the I St Brigade, under General Hart's personal direction, exerted itself to press on the important work by helping to control and direct the traffic. There were some who thought it would be im- possible, so great was the block on the road, to make such arrangements by the evening as would 1 '* My great difficulty was the want of food, some corps having absolutely nothing in hand, and the steep and narrow track over the pass delaying the arrival of supplies. But by redistributing what there was, and making use of what could be collected from neighbouring villages, each man was eventually provided with two days* rations." — Sir William Loekharfs Despatcka, ▼Ill THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 97 justify a forward move on the 31st. But Colonel Christopher, the Commissary -General with the force, is a resourceful man and a masterful. His spirits, too, are never-failing, and his way of always taking a rosy view of things, and of making the best of a situation, has the effect of reassuring his sub- ordinates and making them cheerfully put their best work into the task of the moment. In Major Mansfield, too, the head of the Transport, he has a most efficient assistant; and it was enough for General Nicholson, the chief of the Staff", to intimate what were Sir William Lockhart's wishes regarding the advance on the morrow for Colonel Christopher to determine that, so far as his department was concerned, it could be arranged.^ In the meantime, Sir William Lockhart himself, attended by the principal officers of his Staff", and escorted by General Kempster's Brigade, and a battery of artillery, rode out to view the road and examine the approaches to the Arhanga Pass, and, as far as might be, the enemy's dispositions. The party was fired on soon after leaving camp, but the enemy fell back as our skirmishers advanced, and careful observations were made almost up to the foot of the pass, on which Sir William was able to plan the attack for the morrow. The whole distance from camp to the summit of the pass is only about four miles. ^ ** Thoroughly acquainted with their work, and foil of resource, these officers never raised unnecessary difficulties, and were always ready to meet military requirements." — 5t> William Lockharfs Dispatches, H 98 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. It was at once obvious that this pass was an easier one to attack than the Sampagha. The ap- proaches to it were not broken up by such frequent and deep ravines, there was more favourable ground for turning movements, and opposite the centre of the position was a low hill, which, at a range of barely 1300 yards from the crest of the pass, formed an ideal position for artillery. On the other hand, no enemy, certainly not an enemy with the reputa- tion and the rifles of the Afridis, should have allowed himself to be driven from such a position as that formed by the Arhanga heights without in- flicting terrible loss on the assailant. Behind the rocks and sangars on the crest-line, or sheltered on the reverse slopes of the mountain, they could not after all be very much hurt by shell-fire ; while from their lofty vantage-ground they could note, and, if they willed it, prepare in good time to meet, every disposition made for the attack ; while almost from the foot of the laborious ascent the troops advancing against them would be exposed to their effective rifle-fire. Thus there was certainly no balance of advantage on our side, and notwithstanding that they had not shown much spirit at the Sam- pagha, it was confidently expected that they would rally on the ramparts of the Arhanga, and defend desperately the last avenue leading to their cherished Tirah. But again we were disappointed — pleasantly dis- appointed, if you will — because no one wants to see {■'\ VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 99 a long list of casualties, which may indeed be a proof of desperate fighting, but is not necessarily evidence of good generalship. The Afridis, in our own service, and under the leadership of British officers, have often shown themselves dashing and brave soldiers. But left to themselves, they are no better than any other wild tribe, and decidedly in- ferior to some — the Waziris, for example. More- over, it is impossible not to doubt that they have been much impressed by the valour of our troops, and the splendid leading of the officers, on the Dargai heights, on the i8th and 20th October, while all reports tend to show that their own losses on those occasions were much heavier than has been generally supposed. So now, when from their eyries in the rocks they noted the General's skilful dispositions, the steady unwavering advance of the men, the numbers launched against them, and the deadly precision of our artillery fire, their hearts failed them, and they went. Let me explain now what Sir William Lockhart's dispositions for attack were, and how they were carried out. The 2nd Division was to lead, General Yeatman- Biggs commanding. The advanced guard was formed by the 4th Brigade (Brigadier-General Westmacott), supplemented by the 3rd Gurkha scouts and a company of Sappers. Its special function was to drive in any outlying picquets of the Afridis, and take possession of the low hill in the centre, previously mentioned, in order to let the loo THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^8 chap. massed batteries of the two divisions occupy it. The 3rd Brigade (Brigadier- General Kempster), also with a Sapper company, followed the 4th, and its orders were, after the artillery had come into action, to work round to the left of Westmacott's battalions, and demonstrate against the enemy's right flank. Next came Major-General Symons, commanding the ist Division, with the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier- General Gaselee, to which was assigned the important duty of turning the enemy's left flank. This brigade, too, was accompanied by a company of Sappers, and the remaining Sapper companies, with the 28th Bombay Pioneers, followed close in rear of the centre, ready to push forward and commence work on the road over the pass directly opportunity offered. The ist Brigade (Hart's) of General Symons' Division concentrated this day, the 31st, in the Mastura Valley, where it stood in reserve as a strong point cCappui between the two passes. The baggage of the advancing troops, as at the storming of the Sampagha, was stacked, and left in camp ready for loading, with orders that it was to be brought on directly a mes- sage to that effect was heliographed back. Such were Sir William Lockhart's dispositions for the attack on the Arhanga, and as the Afridis noted the quiet business-like way in which they were carried out, the numbers sent against them, the menace to their flanks, and the searching fire of the guns, they must have considered their plight a VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS} loi hopeless one from the first. By 5 a.m. the force was under arms and ready to move off from its bivouac, and by 7 o'clock the skirmishers of the advanced guard were in contact with the enemy, a few of whom had been thrown out as scouts as far as the foot of the slopes leading to the crest of the Arhanga. These were at once driven in, the low hill in the centre (called Unai, from the village on it) was occupied by the Borderers, and by 7.45 a.m. the three batteries of the 2nd Division (No. 9 British, No. 8 British, and No. 5 Bombay), under Colonel Purdy, R.A., had come into action on its summit, and were making excellent practice against the enemy, visible in groups here and there on the sky-line of the pass. The batteries of the ist Division (No. i British, No. i Derajat, and No. 2 Kohat), under Colonel Duthy, R.A., arrived very shortly afterwards and prolonged the line to the right, so that Brigadier-General Spragge by 8.15 had a well-posted line of 36 guns pouring a most deadly fire on the Afridis (the range was never out- side 1 300 yards), under cover of which the infantry now advanced to the attack. The order of the attack I have already ex- plained. It practically devolved upon Brigadier- General Gaselee's Brigade to deal the stroke that should be decisive. Accordingly, while the guns, and Westmacott's Brigade, held the enemy in the centre, and while Kempster diverted attention by demonstrating against his right, the battalions of I02 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 189798 chap. Gaselee's Brigade (with whom for the day were the 5th Gurkha scouts, some eighty in number, under Captain Lucas and Lieutenant Bruce) climbed steadily up the ravines on his left, and at ten minutes to ten exactly their leading files reached the crest of the hill. The ascent was a very steep one, though well sheltered the greater part of the way from direct fire, and there was admirable rivalry for the honour of being the first to top the summit. As nearly as possible the Yorkshire Regiment and the 5 th Gurkha scouts arrived at the same time, but the Queen's, the 3rd Sikhs, and the 4th Gurkhas were all close up, and the performance of the whole brigade was excellent. The Afridis did not wait for the full development of this flanking movement. They were already in full retreat, **over the hills and far away," by the time that it was accomplished, and firing at once ceased. By 1 1 a.m. Sir William Lockhart was him- self on the top of the pass, troops were being pushed down it into Tirah as fast as the narrow and pre- cipitous road would permit, and the good news had been flashed back direct to Fort Lockhart^ on the Samana range, for transmission to the Viceroy and to the Commander-in-Chief, that the pass was in our possession. The strength of the enemy on this occasion, or their losses, it is impossible to estimate. It was expected that they would muster in thousands for the defence of this particular pass, and that here, if VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 103 anywhere, they would make a great and gallant stand. But it may be doubted if even 1000 of them were actually in line when we attacked. The remainder were probably more concerned in remov- ing their families and flocks and herds to places of safety and refuge than in meeting us in fair fight. It may be supposed that, as they have had weeks of warning, they might have done this sooner, but procrastination is characteristic of all Orientals, and possibly they could not bring themselves to believe, until literally the eleventh hour, that after centuries of inviolate seclusion, we should dare, or should be able, to ** lift the purdah,'* and penetrate into their sacred valley. There can be no question, at all events, that they quitted in haste, for evidences of the fact abound. Their houses, for example, are full of grain and walnuts and potatoes, etc., which they might easily have removed at leisure had they thought of it ; and they will soon feel the want of these things, for wherever they have gone, they cannot live on their neighbours very long. And if their strength on the Arhanga be represented by Xy their losses may be expressed by y. They are absolutely unknown, and it is futile to guess what they may be. Blood splashes were found in many places along their line of defence, and undoubtedly some of them were killed and others wounded, chiefly by the artillery fire, but the actual numbers placed hors de combat must be a matter for con- jecture. I04 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. To turn to our side, our casualties were practi- cally nil. Captain Searle, of the 36th Sikhs, was wounded severely by a chance shot quite at the commencement of the proceedings, and there were four or five men hit — soldiers or battery drivers — during the attack. That was all. It is only to be accounted for by the reasons I have already indi- cated ; but the insignificant losses do not in any degree detract from the credit due to the General, and to the troops, for the success attending a plan skilfully designed and resolutely executed.^ From the crest of the Arhanga Pass we looked down on the promised land, Tirah, or rather on that part of it known as Maidan. The Mastura Valley, which we had just left, is also a part of Tirah, but is Orakzai Tirah ; Maidan and the next valley to the north of us, Rajgal, which no doubt we shall visit shortly, constitute Afridi Tirah proper. No Euro- pean has penetrated into these valleys hitherto, though one or two may have traversed the fringes of them, and it has been the proud boast of the Afridis from time immemorial that no enemy of whatever race or creed has ever attempted to cross the mountain barriers which shut them in, and to meddle with them in their own fastnesses. Well, we have changed all that now. The veil of their ^ <* That a more formidable resistance was not offered in the passes lead- ing respectively into Orakxai and Afridi Tirah I attribute to the lesson taught those tribes at Daigai in the actions of the i8th and 20th October. They then learnt that their strongest positions could not avail them against the valour of British and Native troops." — Sir William Lockkarfs Despatches* VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 105 temple has been rent in twain, and the mysterious interior has been rudely revealed. There was no lingering on the Arhanga when once the enemy had been driven off. Troops at once poured down the northern slopes to the fertile valley below ; sappers and pioneers were at work on the road before the last reverberations of the guns had died away among the mountains; and the baggage being " helio'd " up, the stream of it set in with such violence that, unfortunately, on this and the succeeding night, some of the trains were overtaken by darkness, and raided by the enemy, with most serious loss to ourselves in men and material, as I shall relate immediately. The place selected for encampment of the force was a locality about three miles due north of the Arhanga, near a hamlet, in about the centre of the Maidan district. There are no villages here strictly so called, nor in the Mastura Valley. But there are innumerable houses dotted all over the country. They occur every quarter of a mile or so, and are large, strong, substantial buildings, generally includ- ing a tower or keep, and capable of a strong defence so long as artillery is not brought against them. Guns would, of course, knock them to pieces at once. In each of these houses lives a family, or a group of blood relations; in one, for example, several brothers, with their wives and children, and fathers and mothers, etc. ; in another a petty chief, with his immediate following, his sisters, cousins, io6 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. and aunts, and so on. But, needless to say, they are all empty now. With one accord the people have fled before our approach, and we have the valley to ourselves. But not the surrounding hills. They are full of houseless and prowling marauders, and no party can leave camp in any direction without a skirmish, or an exchange of shots with them. Of all the Afridi clans the Zakka-khels are the most numerous, the most powerful and influential, and the most notorious for daring raids and treacherous attacks. They inhabit all Southern Maidan and important strips of country in Maidan, and in the Bara, Bazar, and Khyber Valleys. A glance at these places on the map will show that they hold a geographical posi- tion in Afridiland which gives them superiority and pre-eminent consideration in all Afridi councils. At present they are our immediate neighbours to the south, and, in fact, our line of communications with the Mastura Valley, ind the Arhanga Pass, lies through Zakka-khel territory. This fact was rudely brought to our recollection by the occurrences of the nights of 31st October and I St November, which I will now describe. I have said that immediately the pass was captured on the 31st, the baggage was helio'd for from the rear, and, most unfortunately, on two days running, such a crowd was allowed to stream over the pass that it could not be cleared out of the dangerous defile on this side before darkness had set in. This was the VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 107 Zakka-khels' opportunity. Swooping down from the crags, on which all day they had kept patient watch, they rushed the weary trains and tired escorts at various points, and were only too suc- cessful in their raids on both occasions. The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment) lost on the second night three men killed and four wounded, ten boxes of Lee-Metford ammunition (iioo rounds in a box), three rifles, and some 350 kits, together with 71 baggage ponies, which were carrying them, and which stampeded in the darkness as soon as the firing and shouting began. On the first night nine drivers were killed and wounded, and 188 kits belonging to the 15th Sikhs were carried off. These were very unfortunate events. Not only were the losses serious, but the moral effect of them was bad. They ought not to have occurred. But the confusion attendant on a rapid advance after a successful action is unavoidably great, and the strict control necessary at points in rear, which must often cause a commander and his staff more anxiety than the enemy in front, is frequently lacking for the first day or two. However, the strictest measures have since been taken to prevent convoys and baggage from being benighted, and we must hope that some early opportunity may be afforded of getting even with the Zakka-khels. In the meantime the force has settled down and is enjoying a few days* well-earned rest pending the next development of the situation. This will io8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. probably take the form of some discussion with the tribes. In Sir William Lockhart's original procla- mation to them he said that from the heart of their country he would announce to them the final terms of the British Government. The heart of their country is now reached, and as soon as the political officers can get into touch with their maliks these terms will be announced. The usual way of pub- lishing announcements in similar circumstances is to send out copies by hand to the various clans and sections ; but they are an ignorant, illiterate people, and the documents thus distributed must then be read and interpreted to them by their Mullahs, who can, of course, and do, explain, suppress, add to, or distort their contents, as they please, and to suit their own purposes. For these reasons, the occa- sion being an important one, instead of sending out proclamations by messengers, the tribes have been summoned to send in their jirgahs, in order that they may be plainly told by ourselves what are the terms imposed. The jirgahs of the Samil Orakzais (who from the first have been ready to treat with us), and of at least three of the Afridi clans — the Malikdin-khels, the Khambar-khels, and the Kuki- khels — may be expected to arrive almost im- mediately; but it is doubtful if the Zakka-khels will have any dealings with us just yet At the same time, seeing us in possession, occupying their lands and devouring their stores; and noting our determination and our power to punish ; with the VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 109 winter, too, coming on while they are wanderers on the bleak mountain -sides ; they must see the hopelessness of prolonged resistance, and we may reasonably hope that, within a measurable period of time, we shall induce them to meet us and to agree to terms. The temper of these wild tribes is, how- ever, a factor varium et mutabile sempery and it is too early yet to forecast what line they will take. Meanwhile, the troops pass the days in frequent reconnaissances and in foraging. The former are always accompanied by officers of the Intelligence Branch, and of the Survey Department, and, under the superintendence of Colonel Sir Thomas Hol- dich, R.E., and Colonel More-Molyneux, A.Q.M.G. for Intelligence, the whole of the country we pass through or occupy is being rapidly mapped and exploited. The foraging parties are worked on a regular system, and with great success. Half the valley is allotted, for foraging purposes, to one division, half to the other. Each division then tells off particular sections to each brigade, and each brigade in turn points out particular lines to be worked by each regiment. Thus there is no con- fusion, and no waste of power or time. Strings of mules go out every day, with sufficient escorts, and return in the evening laden up with forage, which abounds, and with sacks of potatoes, wheat, Indian corn, pumpkins, walnuts, etc., of all of which enough is found to appreciably lessen the strain of supply on the commissariat. The fodder is taken straight no THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH. 1897-98 chap. to the transport lines and stacked ; the food stuffs are deposited in the brigade store depots of each brigade, whence the commissariat officer in charge reissues them as rations in due course. The foragers not infrequently find odds and ends of booty which they annex for themselves — to wit, oXdijezailSy swords and daggers, and Korans. These are retained by the finders as mementoes of the campaign. Of Korans there are two kinds — the one printed in Peshawar or Lahore, and of no par- ticular interest or value ; the other hand-written, and generally illustrated and illuminated. These are rare, and are very precious finds indeed. A few, however, have been taken. One expedition from camp, undertaken on the day after our arrival here, was of more than passing interest, and I will briefly refer to it. There is a place a short three miles west from this spot called Bagh. It is simply a mosque, or musjid, surrounded by a small grove of trees, but it is notorious as the place where the Afridis hatch most of their raids and forays ; it is the spot where the present uprising was originated and decided on ; and it has always been known as a centre of intrigue and fanaticism. Sir William Lockhart decided, therefore, to pay Bagh a visit, to demonstrate to the Afridis our power to reach them anywhere, and to punish their mal- practices how and when we please. A small column, consisting of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the I St Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles, and No. 8 viii THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS iii Mountain Battery R.A., the whole under the com- mand of Colonel Dixon, King's Own Scottish Borderers, the senior officer, was accordingly de- spatched to carry out Sir William s orders. A few of the enemy were on the hills on our right as the column marched out, and they managed to knock over four of the Gurkhas before a few well-directed shells from Major Shirres's battery cleared them out. The famous mosque was then approached. In appear- ance it is a mean building, little better than a cattle- shed. It is, however, a place of worship, and therefore, as a matter of course, respected. It was not touched ; but, as a permanent mark of the Sirkar s wrath and punishment, the trees surrounding it were all " ringed," which means that they will all be dead within the year. If the party had carried axes they might have been felled at once, but we had only the Gurkhas' kukris. These, however, served every purpose, and no doubt, now that the accursed Feringhi has made his mark on Bagh, the place will lose its importance and sanctity.^ ^ Captain T. G. Maclaren of the Borderers was slightly wounded in this reconnaissance. CHAPTER IX LIFE IN TIRAH — THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER Maidan, Tirah, 8/A November, We entered this valley on 31st October ; we are here still ; we may remain indefinitely. This is a situa- tion which raises reflections. It cannot be regarded as a satisfactory one, from the soldier's point of view. So long as we were on the move, advancing, attack- ing, gaining ground, defeating and driving off the enemy whenever encountered, it was all plain sailing, and every one was happy. What though we had to take some hard knocks, and to rough it not a little? You cannot make omelets without breaking eggs, and you cannot make war in kid gloves. Our losses and our fatigues were all in the day's work, and were cheerfully endured. But now has come the unsatisfactory part of the business, the halt while we try to negotiate, and consider ways and means, and we are conscious that the delay and inaction involved thereby are as mistaken as to the motive for them (by our enemies) as they are irk- some and unpleasant in their consequences to our- CHAP. IX LIFE IN TIRAH 113 selves. It is, however, unavoidable that we should rest here on our oars for a while, as there is a political as well as a military aspect of the campaign to be considered ; and a halt is necessary while knotty points are discussed in all their bearings — Simla and the Foreign Office taking part, no doubt, in the discussions. But a savage and untutored enemy does not always understand why we halt, so I may usefully state some of its immediate effects upon him, and some of the considerations to which they give rise. The first and immediate effect, then, of this pause in our active operations is that the Afridis recover their wind and their frightened senses, and bethink themselves to seek reprisals, and to get even with us as best they may for the defeats inflicted upon them, and for the insults and injury resulting from the invasion and occupation of their country. They are no simpletons, these Afridis. They know very well now that they cannot meet us in open fight. They recognise our superiority in organisation, in equip- ment, in leading, and above all in guns, and they give way as we advance, without attempting to offer an opposition which they feel would be fruitless. But when we halt and form big camps, and begin to think rather of feeding ourselves, and of maintaining safely our long line of communications, than of following and attacking them, then the Afridi sees his opportunity, and says softly to himself, ** It is my turn now ! There goes a convoy ; let us ambuscade I 114 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. it ! There, my brethren, starts a foraging party ; let us rush it ! There marches a reconnaissance ; let us harass it! There overhead is the wire on which these accursed infidels talk to each other ; let us cut it! And, finally, there is their huge camp, which is eating us up, with its fields of billowy canvas, and its long rows of thousands of baggage animals ; who wants a fairer mark for his rifle ? Come, let us fire into it!" And all these things they do, and have done, with more or less success, during the last ten days. Almost every night since we have been here the telegraph wire has bee^ cut, and a mile or two of it carried off. Convoys coming over the Arhanga have been raided; and recon- naissances and foraging parties are fired on when only a mile or two out of camp, and in some instances have even been rushed by swordsmen, and sustained serious loss. As to firing into camp by night, it has been a common occurrence, and it is miraculous that the casualties are not greater. It is extremely unpleasant, this whizz and spatter of bullets while you are at dinner, or trying to enjoy a pipe round a camp fire before turning in. If you have got to be shot leading your men in action, that is all right, and a proper and honourable way of being shot. You take, in fact, a legitimate risk which no soldier objects to. But to be potted in the dark is autre chose. There is neither glory for yourself, nor gain for your country, in achieving such an end to your career, and, as I said before, it The Picquets on the Northern Slopes of the Arhanga Pass. November. December 1897 From a Sketch by Major A Bemcke Copley, KK. Sif C 0A QM6 fill- loiBlligence 2'^0' r.£.F. A.B.C.O.E.r Might and Day picqatts. strongly intrtacheif b. c . d . a f Daji pic f nets. Z.Z. Points from which enemy aoaght to atttck conroys On the road. The arrows show the groom/ corered by the fire of the pie foot*. ix LIFE IN TIRAH 115 is extremely unpleasant to hear the ping of the shots, to see men knocked over (I was sitting opposite Captain Badcock when he was hit), and to feel that it may be your turn perhaps next. To those who have not soldiered in these wild mountains it may seem astounding that measures cannot be devised to stop this night firing, and to render camps perfectly secure during the hours of darkness. Something, of course, can be done, and you may be sure that such precautions as are pos- sible are not neglected. In a country like this it is, however, quite impracticable to put a camp down in a locality which is not commanded from at least two or three spots. These commanding spots are held by picquets, as a rule ; but their posts may be, in their turn, so completely under fire from some adjacent height as to be almost untenable. Again, these tribesmen, wily, bold, and active as they are, think nothing of getting in on dark nights between a picquet and the camp, and in such a position three or four men with Martini- Henry rifles can easily ** brown" the camp with forty or fifty shots before they can be dislodged. The whole country is a network of ravines, nullahs, and rugged hills, and is admirably adapted to the guerilla tactics which they profess and excel in, and so long as we are stationary we must put up with a certain amount of annoyance and loss from this night firing. On the night of the 6th it was unusually bad about dinner-time, 7 p.m., and amongst other casualties ii6 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^8 chap. Lieutenant Giffard, of the Northampton Regiment, was killed, and Captain Sullivan, 36th Sikhs, severely wounded by a shot through the left forearm. Poor Giffard had been sitting at the head of the table, and as the fire became hot, he shifted his seat to one which seemed a little more sheltered, saying, laughingly, **This isn't good enough; I'm going to move." He had hardly reached his new place when he was shot dead. It was very sad. His funeral the next day was attended by Sir William Lockhart, with the headquarters staff, and all the officers in camp not on duty. Captain Sullivan's luck in being hit was very bad. He was not long ago invalided to England from Suakin, but managed to pass the Board, and hurried out to India as soon as he knew his regiment was going to the front. He had succeeded in overtaking us this very day (the 6th) at about 11 A.M., and was shot, and of course placed hors de combat for the rest of the campaign, at six the same evening. Such is the fortune of war! On the next night but one, the 8th, Captain Watson, of the commissariat depart- ment, was shot dead by a stray bullet in the same way. He was a first-rate officer, and the best of comrades, and, I sorrow to say, leaves a widow and four children to lament his fate. War is indeed cruel ! But it is not any pleasanter to be shot when out foraging or reconnoitring. Yet our casualties incurred on these duties since we came here on 31st October are steadily mounting up. I explained IX LIFE IN TIRAH 117 in my last letter the system on which the collection of forage and supplies is conducted, and I might have added what is the fact, that these parties never go out without encountering marauding bands of Afridis, and becoming engaged with them more or less seriously. Success in one or two raids makes these men extremely bold, and they are as cunning and clever as they are audacious. They show much patience in watching and waiting for their prey, and great dash and impudence in their attacks when they make them. Nearly always they are beaten off, but sometimes drivers will get frightened, mules will stampede, and escorts will get separated. So that almost daily we lose a few men killed and wounded in these inglorious combats. It is doubtless true that we kill and wound some of them too, but we rarely have the satisfaction of being able to speak with any certainty on the point ; and, after all, they hold life very cheap, and think they have done well if at the cost of a few lives of their own they have slain some of us and have captured some of our mules and baggage. In any case, actions of this class are fought by us on the defensive. All the moral advantages and ela- tion pertaining to the attack are theirs ; all the dis- advantage and depression ours. The question, then, of the hour, is Qtiousgue tandem ? How long is this situation to last } When will it change ? In what direction will the next development be .^ It is understood that as ii8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. soon as representative jirgahs of the tribes can be assembled the terms of Government will be announced to them. But we must first catch our jirgahs. At present they show small sign of coming in to parley with us. Some of the Samil Orakzais certainly have arrived, and it is said that some of the Afridi clans are also on their way in. But the most important and powerful of all of them, the Zakka-khels, openly defy us to do our worst, and urge the others, many of whom have reason to fear them, not to yield. Accordingly, we are doing our worst to them. Sir William Lockhart has hitherto issued the strictest orders to spare the houses and villages in the country we have passed through and in the valley in which we are halted. But the Zakka-khels do not understand clemency of this kind. They put it down to weakness. It is known that they are the mainspring of the revolt. They were the leaders of the unprovoked attacks on our forts in the Khyber, and carried off from them the bulk of the loot; and they are the section which has principally opposed our advance, raided our convoys, attacked our foraging parties, and fired into our camps. For these very sufficient reasons Sir William Lockhart has decided not to allow the Zakka-khels any more law, and all their fortified houses in Maidan, from the loop-holed walls and towers of which we are fired on daily, are to be burned and levelled to the ground. Whether this measure will have the effect of making them yield IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER 119 their submission, or whether it will exasperate them into making a big attack on our camp, time alone can show. We should all prefer the latter ; but as to the justice of their punishment there cannot be two opinions. loth November. The events of the last two days have been such as to accentuate all that I have already written. I have, in fact, to record now an occurrence so unfor- tunate that the term disaster may almost be applied to it. An outline of what happened has, of course, been wired to you, but the fuller details one can give in a letter will not be without interest There is a mountain a short five miles north-east of this camp, named Saran Sar. Its height is about 8000 feet. A rough but evidently much used road leads over it into the Upper Bara Valley, and by this road when we first arrived, and almost daily since, Afridis have been seen going and coming — going, that is, on our approach, and coming, when they think they safely can, to remove from their villages and houses, at the eastern extremity of the valley, the grain, etc., left behind when they first hastily fled. Sir William Lockhart decided to pay Saran Sar a visit on the 9th inst., partly to look up these tribesmen, Zakka- khels all, and destroy their fortified houses and towers, and partly to have the adjacent country sur- veyed and mapped. Accordingly, Brigadier-General Westmacott was nominated to command the expe- dition, and the following troops placed under his 120 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. orders for the day : — The Northamptons and the 36th Sikhs, of his own brigade, and the Dorsets and the 15th Sikhs, of the 3rd (Brigadier-General Kempster*s) brigade ; also the following Divisional troops: — No. 8 British M.B. R.A., No. 5 Bombay M.B., and No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners. Sir William Lockhart himself rode out with his staff to witness the operations. The troops breakfasted early and started at about 7 A.M. Within about two miles of camp they en- countered opposition, and dispositions were made to attack. The artillery, escorted by the 15th Sikhs, climbed a steep hill on the right, and, coming into action against groups discernible on the lower slopes of the mountain, speedily dispersed them. The Dorsets were sent to the left to make that flank secure, the Northamptons and Sappers advanced in the centre, and the 36th Sikhs on their right. The enemy, as usual, gave way before this direct attack, and by II a.m. the summit of the mountain had been gained with only trifling casualties. The survey party at once got to work, and Sir William Lock- hart arrived later and joined Brigadier - General Westmacott on the crest of the ridge, whence a fine view was obtainable of the country beyond. So far so good. If only we could always advance and never retire! So long as we front our foes, and attack them, and press them, no matter what the odds, so long do they acknowledge our superiority and yield to the inevitable. But our first movement IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER 121 in retreat is the signal for them in turn to become the assailants. And so it was now. At 2 p.m. the retirement commenced. The Sappers and the 36th Sikhs were first sent back to a position in rear, fol- lowed later by three companies of the Northamptons. Thus five companies of this regiment were tem- porarily left on the crest by themselves, more than enough to hold their own against any number of Afridis, for there was still plenty of daylight, and support was close behind. At this time hardly an enemy was in sight, but as these companies were gradually withdrawn the tribesmen appeared as if by magic, and, pressing on their heels, delivered a hot fire at close range, causing at once many casualties in the rearmost company, commanded by Captain Parkin. The men, however, rallied bravely round their officer, and, with great courage and coolness, kept the foe at bay, while all the wounded were picked up and brought along. Sergeant Lennon of this company particularly distinguished himself by his deliberate shooting, and set an excellent example of steadiness in a trying situation, which had the best effect. The result was that the supports in rear were at last safely reached, and the casualties up to this time were only ten or twelve men wounded. The 36th Sikhs, well posted now, allowed the whole of the Northamptons at this point to pass through them, and, when they had given them time to reach the foot of the hill, followed them down, easily keep- ing the enemy at arm's length, and incurring no IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER 123 march. Shortly after 7 p.m. he reached camp with his regiment. In the meantime a tragedy had been enacted in the centre. A body of Afridis, who had from the slopes above marked the situation, swooped down on the Northamptons entangled in the ravine, and, firing from the high banks on the western side, they shot down the stretcher-parties who were nobly en- gaged in carrying off and protecting their wounded ; and though officers and men battled bravely for honour's cause, yet they were not fighting on equal terms, and the desperate struggle went heavily against them. At this juncture a company of the 36th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Van Someren (not one of those that had been with Colonel Haughton, but one that had previously been detached to support the guns), returned to their aid, and, taking the enemy in flank and rear, extricated the North- amptons from their perilous plight. On reaching camp, at about half-past seven, the roll was called, and it was found that Lieutenant Waddell and six men were killed, Lieutenant Trent and twenty-nine men wounded, and Lieutenant Macintire and eleven men missing. I may say here that these "missing" were all killed A search party found their bodies the next day in the ravine where the fight occurred. They had, of course, been stripped of clothing and arms, and some of them slashed with swords, but their bodies had not otherwise been mutilated. The further casualties incurred on the 9th were : IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER I2S known to them all, and was the most direct road back to camp ; and that with a number of wounded to protect, and believing probably that it was flanked on the right and left by other corps, it was natural perhaps that he should choose it to retire by. Also, in justice to the gallant Northamptons, it must be recorded that the way in which they stuck to their wounded, and brought them through that terrible nullah, was a display of heroism and devotion worthy of a regiment that fought at Albuhera. Surrounded by the enemy, exposed to a galling fire from the high banks to which they could not effectively reply, with dead and dying men on every side, and the horror of their desperate situation accentuated by the gathering darkness, they fought on resolutely and bravely, and sacrificed themselves without hesitation to protect and save if possible their wounded comrades who could not help them- selves. I cannot do better than conclude this chapter with some extracts from the Pioneer of Allahabad, which bear testimony to the noble conduct of officers and men on this memorable occasion. The following extracts (says the Pioneer) are from a private letter written by one who was in the thick of the fray : — Tirahy Maidan^ \oth November 1897 : . . . Yesterday we had a fearful day, had to attack a pass and got there without any loss, but in retiring to camp the enemy seemed to rise up from the ground, and gave G Company of the Northamptons, which was 126 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. the rear company, an awful basting. As luck would have it, there were C, D, F and K Companies close by, and they at once went to the assistance of their comrades. It was here that Lieutenant Waddell and Sergeant Goffey were killed Sergeant Litchfield was shot through the knee and will lose his leg : Sergeant Underdown slightly wounded. Colour-Sergeant Hull shot through the ankle; he must lose his foot Lieutenant Trent wounded in the thigh. It was too awfiiL The bullets rained about me like hailstones, and in retiring I had to keep covering the unfortunate wounded men so as to get them alive and if possible safely into camp. It was terrible to see their sufferings: they were bad enough when we could carry them comfortably, but when they had to be carried anyhow you can imagine what they went through. Sad to tell. Lieutenant Macintire, Sergeant Luck, and eleven men are missing. The battalion went out to look for them this morning, and I will not close this till to-morrow to wait for the battalion's return. . . . Sad news. The whole of the party missing are killed Total killed, twenty; wounded, twenty-eight They have brought in the bodies, which are to be buried to-night is fearfully cut up. I never saw any one so terribly affected as he was at the loss his regiment has sustained. . . . The only consolation their relations have is that they died protecting our wounded men. No one can say enough in praise of the men of the Northamptons who were in the engagement They were literally fired at from every side at once, but they were as cool and deliberate as if they were on an ordinary field day. General Westmacott in command of our brigade is fuU of praise of the Northamptons, and sajrs, *' I never could have believed a regiment could have under such cir- cumstances behaved with such pluck and coolness." Again : — Lieutenant Trent was hit; there were only three stretchers with the company and they were all full, but one man who was only slightly wounded said he could walk, and Lieutenant Trent, who was shot in the thigh with a Lee-Metford Dum-Dum bullet, was put in. Lieutenant Macintire, a sergeant, and eleven men, were now the last of all, and they were urgently ordered to retire, IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER 127 but Macintire said he could not leave the wounded, to whom he stuck, and he and all his men were killed. By this time the rest had reached the village, and there was not a man left to return the fire of the enemy, every man being either wounded or carrying a wounded man on his back or a stretcher. They therefore made a slight detour to avoid the village, and while doing so the stretcher in which Lieutenant Trent was being carried broke; the men carrying it put it down, and cooUy repaired it under a hail of bullets, one man having a button of his coat on his chest shot off, and the other two bullets through his clothes. The be- haviour of the Northamptons that night was truly magnificent, calmly returning over open ground, carrying their wounded men under a galling fire without being able to retaliate. CHAPTER X STILL IN TIRAH — THE TERMS TO THE ORAKZAIS — THE AFFAIR OF THE i6tH NOVEMBER Maidan, Tirah, I2th November. In order to get even with the Zakka-khels, to continue the destruction of their fortified houses, and to complete the survey of the eastern portion of this valley, Sir William Lockhart ordered Brigadier- General Gaselee's brigade,^ supported by artillery, to visit the Saran Sar again yesterday. Sir William again himself accompanied the troops. On this occasion there was no mishap of any kind. General Gaselee, long well known as the Colonel of the 5th Gurkhas, and an officer of vast experience in frontier fighting, directed the movements with great judg- ment, and though the Afridis again followed up the retirement, they never got a look in at all. The Queen's shot uncommonly straight, the artillery too; and the 3rd and 4th Gurkhas, with the 3rd 1 Scouts : 3rd and 5th Gurkhas, the Queen's R.W. Surrey Regiment, the Yorkshire Regiment, the 4th Gurkhas, and the 3rd Sikhs. The 3rd Gurkhas moved out in the afternoon to co-operate in the retirement. The batteries out were No. I, M.B. RA., and No. 2 (Derajat) M.B. I30 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. live in, picquets are placed over them for their pro- tection, and supplies are sent to them from our camp. The proceedings opened by Sir William Lock- hart rising, and requesting Sir Richard Udny to say that, now that we had established ourselves in the heart of their country, the terms offered by Government would be announced to them, and to explain that they must be fully complied with within fourteen days ; also, that in any event he intended to visit every part of their country, and that it would depend upon themselves whether he came as a friend or as an enemy. Sir Richard Udny, who is a most practised and fluent Pushtu scholar, fully explained all this to the jirgahs, and clearly and with emphasis announced the terms of Government to the expectant throng. These were : — I St. Full restoration of all arms and property, etc., looted from the Khyber forts, or taken from us on any subsequent occasion. 2nd. Surrender of 500 breech-loading rifles. 3rd. Payment of a fine of 30,000 rupees. 4th. Absolute forfeiture of all subsidies and allow- ances granted to the tribes in the past. 5th. Formal submission to be tendered in durbar. The Maliks listened with marked interest and attention while these terms were announced to them. But it was not to be gathered from their countenances, or from anything they said, whether they thought them severe or lenient There can be X THE TERMS TO THE ORAKZAIS 131 no question that, considering the unwarrantable and unprovoked nature of the outbreak, the loot carried off, and the damage done to life and property, and the enormous expense that Government has been put to in the effort to restore order and re-estab- lish its authority, the conditions imposed are ex- tremely easy. I shall be very much surprised if they are not promptly accepted. This was the whole of the ceremony. The jirgahs withdrew as they had come, and the pro- ceedings terminated. If the Orakzais submit now, as it may be reasonably hoped they will, it is improbable that the Afridis will continue the struggle much longer by themselves. There are indications, indeed, that they have already had enough of it. They cannot doubt our power, or that whatever petty successes they may here and there score, in the long run we must beat them and bring them to their bearings. For the last three nights not a shot has been fired into our camps, and even the telegraph wire has not been touched, so perhaps a little ray of light can be seen ahead, and the outlook is more hopeful than when I commenced this letter. 15/A November. The Orakzai jirgahs have come and gone. They are allowed until the 26th inst. to comply with the terms offered them. Opinion is a good deal divided as to whether they will accept and comply with them or not. Personally I have little doubt that their answer will be affirmative, and that they will do their 132 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. best to carry out the conditions imposed within the time fixed. There can be no question that they were all immensely relieved to find that their country is not to be permanently occupied or annexed by us ; and, assured of their independence, they are not disposed to haggle now over any minor point, their punishment being, as a matter of fact, an extremely lenient one. They have now asked our political officers to help them to divide fairly between their Gar and Samil factions the amount of the fine, and the number of the rifles demanded ; because, left to themselves (they say) they would certainly quarrel, and never come to an amicable agreement as to the share to be produced by each. Accordingly, Mr. White King, under whose special political charge the Orakzai clans are, aided by Messrs. Hastings, Donald, and Blakeway, having talked the matter over with the leading Maliks of each faction, a decision was speedily arrived at, that each should pay half, they being practically equal in numbers, in importance, and in wealth. They then dispersed to their homes, and it is to be sincerely hoped that within the next few days we shall receive from them some substantial proofs that they are earnest in their expressed desire to "kiss and be friends." Meantime, on our side. Sir William Lockhart, anxious to be conciliatory, and to show consideration to those evincing any disposition to yield or to treat, has let it be generally known that from this time, and until some definite answer is submitted by the X THE TERMS TO THE ORAKZAIS 133 jirgahs, payment will be made for all forage and supplies taken by the troops, or collected, or brought in for their use by the tribes. This is a wise and considerate measure, and should have a good effect. But, on the other hand, they have been given to understand that the supplies and forage we must have, and that if any obstruction is offered to the collection of it, or if our parties are fired on, swift and severe punishment will most assuredly follow. Although up to the present it is only the Orakzai jirgahs that have been admitted to an audience, yet the same method has been extended to those Afridi clans whose jirgahs are in waiting — viz., the Malik- din-khels, the Khambar-khels, and the Adam-khels ; and as " they are a most avaricious race, desperately fond of money" — vide "Official Gazetteer" — the hope of gain may for the time being keep them quiet and make them ready to help. But there is no reliance whatever to be placed on the word of an Afridi : — Ruthless, cowardly robbery, cold-blooded, treacherous murder, are to him the salt of life. Brought up from his earliest child- hood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless revenge, nothing can ever change him. As he has lived — a shameless, cruel savage — so he dies. And it would seem that, notwith- standing their long intercourse with the British, and the fiict that very large numbers of them are, or have been, in our service, and must have learnt in some poor way what £uth, and mercy, and justice are, yet the Afridi character is no better than it was in the days of his fathers. . . . Much has been said of their fidelity in fighting against their own people for us, but when it is remembered that an Afridi generally has a blood feud with nine out of ten of 134 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. his own people, the beauty of this attachment fedes. They have always been more noted in action for a readiness to plunder than to fight On the whole (says Elphinstone) they are the greatest robbers among Afghans, and have no faith or sense of honour whatever. A cheerful picture, is it not ? but not, I fancy, overdrawn. The boom of guns and the crack of rifles, showing that in some directions, at all events, our foraging parties are not finding it all plain sailing, are punctuating my sentences as I write. Still, there are indications that even the Afridis have had enough of it now, and would be glad to see our backs ; and motives of self-interest may prompt them to climb down at no very distant date. They know by this time that we do not mean to annex their country. That, no doubt, has been their great and haunting fear. Other considerations are of a secondary importance to them. The money fine, whatever it may be, the rendition of loot, and the surrender of arms, they will put up with without much fuss. The forfeiture of all subsidies will, of course, be a nasty pill to swallow, because the sum paid them by Government in the past, for maintain- ing order on the Khyber route, has been consider- able, about 100,000 rupees per annum ; and of this aggregate, the Zakka-khels, our present bitterest opponents, have been used to take the largest share. But, great as may be the sacrifice involved by giving up this grant, it is better than being kept indefinitely out of lands and homes, and seeing their X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 135 defences levelled, and their substance devoured, with the certainty that they must be beaten in the long run, and that their eventual punishment will be the severer the longer they resist. For these reasons, there is some room to hope that ere long we may see our way to some settle- ment which will enable us to withdraw from this inhospitable country. We cannot expect the present fine dry weather to last much longer, and a change to rain or snow will at once send large numbers of men and followers into hospital. Moreover, the strain on the Commissariat and Transport is daily becoming more severe, and the question of feeding this large assemblage of men and animals is con- stantly assuming a more serious aspect; so for every reason we shall be glad to cast out our shoes over Tirah, and bid the Afridi a long farewell. I Tth November, Since the above lines were penned an event has occurred which distinctly discounts the sanguine expectations expressed. The future, it is written, is always full of "precious possibilities," and no- where can this saying be more applicable than on this wild frontier amid these savage surroundings, where truly no man can say what the next twenty- four hours may not bring forth. I have already told you that when conveying to the jirgahs the terms on which Government would accept their submission and pardon their offences, Sir William 136 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. Lockhart informed them that, in any event, he intended to visit every part of the Afridi-Orakzai country, and that it would depend upon their own behaviour whether we came as friends or foes. Partly in pursuance of the policy thus declared, partly to carry out survey operations, and partly to continue the punishment of the Zakka-khels by destroying more of their fortified villages, and notably the residence of the Mullah Say id Akbar, Aka Khel, the principal leader of the revolt, Brigadier-General Kempster was sent on the 13th into the Waran Valley, vid the Tseri Kandao Pass, with a force which comprised the Gordon High- landers, the Dorset Raiment, the 15th Sikhs, the 2nd Gurkhas, No. 8 British Mountain Battery, No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, No. 4 Madras Sappers and Miners, and No. 4 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners. The 36th Sikhs, now well known to fame as the brave defenders of Forts Gulistan and Saragheri on the Samana range in September last, were also placed at General Kempster's disposal to hold the Tseri Kandao Pass during the two or three days during which he would be absent, and to preserve communication between him and the main column in Maidan. There was practically no opposition to the advance of this force. The tribesmen, as usual, allowed it to proceed to its destination without offering serious resistance, preferring to harass it when settled down in its camp, and to attack in X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 137 earnest whenever it should commence its return march. These are their invariable tactics. The point aimed at by General Kempster was only a short four miles down the valley east of the pass, and, as it was only about four miles from this camp (Maidan) to the summit (it is quite a low pass), the whole march was only some eight miles. Yet such are the extraordinary delays and difficulties attendant on moving with mule and pony transport on a single narrow hill road that, although a start had been made from Maidan at daylight, the last of the baggage and the rearguard were not in the new camp until half-past nine o'clock at night. The four miles of road on this the western side are'pretty fair going, because our Sappers and Pioneers have been at work on them, and have ramped the ravines and nullahs, and improved and widened the bad places. But on the far side the country was a terra incognita, and the track (for it was nothing more) was stony, steep, narrow, and difficult, dipping after the first mile suddenly down into a boulder-strewn, dry bed of a torrent between high, precipitous banks, beyond which on either side the hills towered up to a considerable altitude. These heights, of course, had to be held while the main body and baggage passed through the defile I have described, and thus the march was a difficult and trying one, though its actual length was insignificant However, it was safely accomplished, and that night, though one or two shots were fired into it. 138 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. the camp was practically unmolested. During the next two days, the 14th and 15 th, the survey of the adjacent country was completed, and recon- naissance and foraging operations were successfully carried out. Several Zakka-khel fortified houses were destroyed, also some belonging to a section known as Zia-ud-din-khels ; and the residence of the notorious Mullah Sayid Akbar, the chief in- stigator of the revolt and preacher of rebellion and sedition, was visited and levelled. The mosque attached to it was, however, let alone. Before destroying the Sayid s house it was searched to discover whether it contained anything of interest or value. Little was found, however, except a certain amount of correspondence, which was taken charge of by the political staff, ^ and a mimbar^ or kind of rude pulpit, from which, no doubt, the Mullah used to make his frenzied addresses to his rude audience. It is fitted with a staff on one side, on which is fixed an iron bracket intended, apparently, to hold a lamp or light of some kind. It was brought away, and will be kept as an interesting memento of the visit. To resume. On both these days, the 14th and 1 5th, there was some skirmishing when the troops were out On the latter date the enemy were numerous and vigorous in their movements, but the brigade was well handled, and all went well, ^ Some of the letters found are extremely interesting, and will repay perusal Translations have appeared in some of the Indian papers ; selections are given in an appendix to this chapter. • ^ ■ •. « X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 139 while the casualties were trifling. The camp was a good deal fired into on the nights of the 14th and 15th, and three or four casualties resulted. On the 1 6th the brigade returned to Maidan to rejoin the main column, and this was not a success- ful day. The whole of the baggage was fairly started by 9 a.m., the main body with it. The rearguard, under the command of Colonel Eaton Travers, of the 2nd Gurkhas, collected its outlying pickets at about half-past nine, and shortly after- wards commenced its movement in retreat. Colonel Travers had with him his own regiment, the 2nd Gurkhas, one company of the Gordon Highlanders, one company of the Dorsets, five guns of No. 8 British Mounted Battery, and the 3rd Gurkha Scouts — a sufficient and compact force for the purpose in hand. The enemy at this time were visible in groups here and there on the adjacent heights, but contented themselves with long shots, and the retirement proceeded without serious interruption for about a mile and a half, when, finding he was gaining ground too quickly, Colonel Travers took up a strong position across the valley, which he maintained until about one o'clock in the afternoon, when, noting that the main column was now well on its way up the final ascent, he resumed his retrograde march. The enemy now for the first time displayed some vigour in pursuit, and the left of Colonel Travers' line was severely pressed. The Gurkhas who were here, were, however, I40 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. thoroughly steady, and, though they were under a hot fire and had several casualties, they held the Afridis in check until the summit of the pass was gained safely by about 3 p.m. It was shortly before the summit was reached that poor young Wylie of the 2nd Gurkhas was killed. He was the brightest and best of boys, a great favourite in his regiment and out of it. Shortly before he was hit he had been exposing himself somewhat recklessly, but, in deference to a friendly suggestion from his colonel, had got under cover, lying flat behind a rock. In this position he in- cautiously raised himself on his elbow while he turned round to speak to his men a little in rear of him. His head must have shown above the rock, for he was instantly shot through the brain, and, of course, killed on the spot. Captain Macintyre, his great friend in the regiment, seeing him drop, at once went out under a heavy fire and brought in his body, which was carried into Camp Maidan the same evening. When the force under Colonel Travers reached the top of the Tseri Kandao Pass it was much exhausted, for, though the direct distance from camp was short, yet the ground was extraordinarily diffi- cult, and the necessity for continually occupying commanding heights to the right and left of the route, to say nothing of the watchfulness and vigour necessary to stave off the enemy's incessant attacks, had added immensely to the fatigues of the day. X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 141 All this had been foreseen by General Kempster, and it had been pre-arranged, therefore, that from this point the 15th Sikhs, under Colonel Abbott, should cover the retirement. They were, in fact, in position on the heights north and south of the pass when Colonel Travers and his troops arrived. These, accordingly, passed through now, and followed the main column to camp, and the 15th Sikhs took up the rearguard duties. These duties at once claimed their pressing atten- tion, for the Afridis now swarmed down from the heights of the Saran Sar, and, skilfully availing themselves of the screen provided by the timber which is thick on the northern side of the pass, closed round the 15th with a determination and boldness which compelled them to stand fast, and think rather of defending themselves and their numerous wounded with resolution, than of risking any movement in retreat until assured of some support. The fire of the mountain guns at this juncture would have been welcome music to this gallant regiment, but an order sent by the General for a battery to come into action at a particular spot, where it would certainly have rendered signal service to the hard-pressed infantry, was misunderstood, and no help came from this quarter. But the brave Sikhs, splendidly led, fought on with grand resolution. Their comrades, the 36th Sikhs, under Colonel Haughton, were already retracing their steps to support them, and, encouraged by the approach of this reinforce- 142 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. ment, they battled bravely against the hordes that assailed them ; and, inflicting on the enemy losses more than equal to those sustained themselves, they gradually withdrew from their advanced posi- tion. It was about this time, between 4 and 5 p.m., that, elated by the offensive rdle they were assuming, some hundred Afridis left the shelter of the trees and attempted to rush the retreating 15th. They were met by such a well-aimed and steady fire, and such a prompt counter-attack, that few of the hundred lived to regain the protection of the wood ; and prob- ably in no engagement since this expedition started have their losses been so severe as on this occasion. The 36th had now come up, half the battalion only, under Colonel Haughton, and with them a handful of the Dorsets under Lieutenant Cowie. The other half was still behind, under Major Des Vceux. Colonel Abbott had been severely wounded in the face and neck by gunshots in the fighting above described ; the command of the party, there- fore, devolved now on Colonel Haughton. It was rapidly getting dark, the ground was precipitous, broken, and difficult, the enemy thick on every side, and the camp still four miles distant. Moreover, the supply of ammunition was running short. The situa- tion was, therefore, distinctly serious, and its gravity was suddenly accentuated by a volley from a cluster of four houses ^ directly in the path of the retiring 1 These houses had been burned earlier in the day, and were still smouldering, their outline showing a dull red against the darkness. X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 143 column. There was only one solution of this difficulty. Colonel Haughton at once gave the order to fix bayonets and charge. This was promptly done, and, with loud shouts and cheers, the hamlet was bravely carried, the enemy in it shot, or bayon- eted, or driven out, and the place captured. It was in this operation that Captain Lewarne, of the 15th Sikhs, was killed, and Lieutenant Munn, of the 36th, wounded. Captain Custance, of the 36th, had been shot through the thigh some little time previously. As the wounded were now numerous, some five-and- twenty altogether, and as darkness had now set in. Colonel Haughton decided to stay where he was for the night. Under his orders all at once set to work to make their position as secure as possible, and to do what they could to render first aid to the wounded, and to make them comfortable for the night. Fortunately, from this time the enemy's fire became desultory, and by about 11 p.m. his attack died away, so that the night was passed in com- parative peace. This fact alone is sufficient proof that the Afridis had been very roughly handled, for otherwise they would never have let the troops alone. I must explain here that Major Des Vceux, with the rest of his own battalion, and a weak half-com- pany of the Dorsets, under Captain Hammond, who had come up in time to take part in the gallant charge above referred to, had seized a house across a nullah, about 400 yards away from Haughton*s party, and at once intrenched himself as well as he 144 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^ chap. could. Hardly were his rough preparations com- pleted, when the Afridis swarmed up out of the nullah, hoping to occupy this very house, from which they could have effectively enfiladed Colonel Haugh- ton's position. They met, however, with such an unexpected and hot reception that they soon drew off, shouting threats against Major Des Vceuxs Pathan servant, whom they apparently recognised, and promising to cut his throat when they got hold of him ! But there had, unhappily, been serious misfortune in another direction. When the 36th Sikhs had been sent back to help the 15th, two companies of the Dorset Regiment had been at the same time detached to support the 36th. One and a half of these companies were ordered by the senior officer. Captain Hammond, to take post in a house on the line on which the Sikhs were presumably falling back. The other half-company, with Captain Ham- mond and Lieutenant Cowie, went on and, as we have seen, joined, some Colonel Haughton, and some Major Des Vceux. These men thus got through the night safely. But the others were shortly after- wards attacked, and, considering their position untenable, they, unfortunately for themselves, left their post and attempted to retreat to camp. In the gathering darkness they missed the road, got entangled in ravines, very much as the Northamp- tons did on that fatal 9th, and, assailed on all sides by the Afridis, were soon broken up into little X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 145 knots and groups, which defended themselves indeed with courage and desperation against their savage assailants, but, as may be imagined, with small chance of success. On such ground, and in such circum- stances, the Pathan is probably a better man than the Britisher ; and the result of this deadly struggle in the dark was that in twos or threes during the night a poor remnant of these Dorsets struggled wounded and weary into camp, their blood-stained bayonets and battered gun-stocks attesting the desperate nature of the conflict in which they had been engaged. But eleven of them, including their two officers. Lieuten- ants Crooke and Hales, were left behind dead, and the rifles of these men fell, of course, into the hands of the Afridis, who by this time have got quite a good stock of our Lee-Metfords, and plenty of ammunition. It is only fair to say, when speaking of companies being detached, that I am informed on the best authority that the party with Lieutenants Crooke and Hales consisted of only twenty-eight men all told. The actual casualties on this i6th November were : — Dorsets. — Killed, Lieutenant Crooke (attached from Suffolk Regiment), Lieutenant Hales (attached from East York Regiment), and nine rank and file ; wounded, ten rank and file. 15th Sikhs. — Killed, Captain Lewarne, and seven men ; wounded, Colonel Abbott, three native officers, and fifteen men. L 146 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897.98 chaf. 36th Sikhs. — Killed, six men ; wounded, Captain Custance, Lieutenant Munn, and seven men. 2nd Gurkhas. — Killed, Lieutenant Wylie, and three men ; wounded, five men. At daybreak on the 17th Brigadier - General Gaselee's brigade went out to meet Colonel Haughton and his gallant Sikhs, and found them already on their way in, with all their wounded. In the evening the officers and men killed were buried on the outskirts of the camp. Sir William Lockhart, and every one off duty, attending. It was sad to see the long procession of stretchers carried past, but after all, to die in battle "facing fearful odds'* is a befitting death for a soldier, and events march too rapidly here, and casualties have been too frequent, to admit of much time being spent in vain regrets. Hardly, in fact, had the remains of our late comrades been committed to the grave when the usual firing into camp commenced, and each of us was reminded that their fate to-day might be ours to-morrow. I should mention that before the funeral (which did not take place until dusk). Sir William Lockhart saw the Dorsets and Northamptons on parade, and addressed them a few words of commendation for courage in most trying circumstances, and of en- couragement and advice for the future. ** We must remember," said Sir William, "that we are opposed to perhaps the best skirmishers, and the best natural shots, in the world, and that the country they inhabit X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 147 is the most difficult on the face of the globe. The enemy's strength lies in his thorough knowledge of the ground, which enables him to watch all our movements unperceived, and to take advantage of every height and every ravine. Our strength, on the other hand, lies in our discipline, controlled fire, and mutual support. Our weakness is our ignorance of the country, and the consequent tendency of small bodies to straggle and get detached. The moral of all this is that careful touch must be main- tained, and that if by mischance small parties do find themselves alone they should as much as possible stick to the open, and shun ravines and broken ground, where they must fight at a disadvantage, and run every risk of being ambuscaded and cut off. I trust," said Sir William in conclusion, " that we may soon meet the enemy and wipe out all old scores with him, and I am confident that when that time comes you will all behave with a steady courage worthy of the best traditions of your corps. In the meantime there is no occasion to be depressed because some of us have been surprised, outnumbered, and overwhelmed on bad ground." Afterwards addressing the Sikhs and Gurkhas, Sir William Lockhart praised them highly for their gallant conduct, and said he was proud to have such regiments under his command. He explained to them, too, with what interest and sympathy the Queen personally watches the progress of events in these wild regions (and, indeed, Her Majesty's 148 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. frequent and gracious inquiries are warmly appreci- ated by all ranks), and said to them, as he had said to the British regiments, that he hoped they would soon have an opportunity of meeting the enemy again on better terms, and paying off all old scores with interest. P.S. — The following extracts from a private note written for me by an officer who was present throughout this affair, will be read with deep interest : — Meanwhile darkness had come on, and it was exceedingly difficult to keep touch with each other. The ground was cut in high terraces, down which we clambered as best we could, the men tripping, sliding, and falling over each other, for no path existed, and it was too dark even to distinguish the drop from one terrace to the next The difficulty of bringing our wounded along, under such circumstances, may be imagined, but cannot be described. • ••••• The Afridis were completely taken aback by our sudden charge and onslaught, just when they thought they had got us on the run, and very few waited for the bayonet, but Munn, who was the first man to reach the centre house, got his sword through one of them, and several more were shot as they bolted. The scene of excitement and confusion at this moment was indescrib- able. The only light came from the smouldering houses, and it was almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe. When we had pulled ourselves together, and were able to look round, the situation was not very encouraging. There was practically no cover ; the enemy were still firing at us from three sides, and casualties continued to occur, and many of us had narrow escapes, bullets going through our helmets or clothes. However, it would have been madness to attempt any further move, so Colonel X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 149 Haughton made the best dispositions he could under the circum- stances. The men were made to lie down in groups round the house, and the wounded were placed in the only bit of cover available, between a high bank and the smouldering ruins of the house, the warmth from which undoubtedly helped to save some of their lives. Wherever it was possible we made rude stone breastworks, etc., but materials were sadly wanting, and many of the men were wholly unprotected on the eastern side, whence the enemy still kept up a desultory fire. Fortunately the darkness prevented their aim being good, and most of their bullets whizzed harmlessly overhead. About 11 p.m. they left us altogether, and we settled down to endure a long and bitter night as best we could. The cold was intense, and the men had no greatcoats with them ; and nothing to eat, for we had expected to reach camp that evening. The only way they could get any relief was by taking it in turns to huddle together on the still warm rubble which had fallen from the burning houses. It was an anxious time for the officers, for it was anticipated that the enemy might find courage to make another attack when the rising moon should reveal the weakness of our position. But the coolness and con- fident bearing of Colonel Haughton kept us all in good heart, and made us feel perfectly certain that we should come out right side uppermost Still it was with feelings of intense relief that we saw the pale gray dawn appear, and knew that we could soon be up and doing. Communication was at once opened with Des Voeux, across the nullah, and all the ground near by was carefully searched to see if any of our men had been left behind, killed or wounded, in the hurry and tumult of the events of the night. Then we commenced our movement on camp, sending on the wounded first under a strong escort The enemy opened fire on us from the surrounding hills at once, but in the uncertain light their aim was bad, and no one was hit We sent the wounded along the main nullah running past the camp, and covered them on one side with the 15th Sikhs, and on the other with a company of the 36th Sikhs and the few Dorsets who were with us. These latter, a mere handful of men, showed great gallantry and steadiness all through the affair, and although they ISO THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, x suffered much from the cold and exposure, responded cheerfully to every call made upon them. We had not gone far when we met a force coming out from camp to help us ; and right glad we were to be able to march straight in without any further trouble. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS (^From the ''Pioneer'' of Allahabad) The following are translations of letters found in Saiyid Akbar's house in the Waran Valley : — Translation of a letter from the Mullah of Adda to the Mullah of Sipak, the Mullah of Aha Khel, Badshah Sahib, Malih Amin Khan^ Malik Sher Muhammad Khan^ the Kamar Khel, Khambar Khel and Aha Khel MaUks, Maliks Yar Muhammad^ Feroz^ Walt Muhammad Khawas, Samandar and other people of Tirah^ dated the ith Rabie-us-Sani 1 3 1 5 /^ = $th September 1897. After compliments. — On the ist Rabie-us-Sani 13 15 H.= 30th August 1897, I detennined with a Ioshkar to go out for a holy war and defend the religion of the Holy Prophet When I reached Lashkar Killa, and was staying there for the night, I received a "firman" from " Zia-ul-millati-uddin," the King of Islam, in reply to my petition, and understood its contents, which were to the following effect : — " You should wait for a few days in your former place, so that I may hold a consultation with the Khans, Maliks, chiefs, and respectable men about ghata and decide what steps should be taken. I will then either come myself or send to you my son iox jehady with our victorious troops and supplies, such as rations and food, and will let you know again. I will, with the greatest 152 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. pleasure, make exertions in the way of jehad,^^ I therefore write to you people that I have postponed my intentions for the reasons given above, but that you should, on receipt of this letter, consult among yourselves and let me know faithfully of your decision, so that I may come to you with the Mohmand people, the Khan of Nawagai, and other Mussalmans. You should try your best to save the religion of the Prophet. I shall await your reply. Translation of a letter^ without date, from the Daulatzai and Sturi Khel Mullahs to the Aha Khel Mullah and other Afridi Mullahs, After compliments. — We attacked the Muhammadzai post on Thursday and destroyed it. We killed many Government servants and returned with success to Ublan. Our casualties were two wounded, who have not yet died. Please let us know whether we should stay on here committing raids on Kohat, or should dismiss the lashkar to their homes, because we have no supplies here. Please also let us know by the bearer if we are wanted there, or if you will send us reinforcement here. The Shia Sipahs are afraid lest their property may be looted. We have stood surety to them that none of the Afridis or Zia-uddins will cause them any injury. We have made peace with the Sipahs in order that they may join us in the ghaza, and you should see that none of the Sipah property or animals are inter- fered with. Translation of a letter, without date, from the Mullah of Adda to all the Mullahs and elders of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes. After compliments. — The Kafirs have taken possession of all Mussulman countries, and, owing to the lack of spirit on the part of the people, are conquering every region. They have now reached the countries of Bajaur and Swat, but, though the people of these places showed want of courage in the beginning, they have now realised their mistake, and having repented and become ashamed (of their former deeds), they attack them (the Kafirs) day and night, and have quite confounded them. I have myself informed the people of Lughman, and Kunar, and the X THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS 153 Mohmands, Ningraharis, and Shinwaris, and they are all prepared to take part in the fighting. They are simply waiting for the summer to pass, as the country of Bajaur is without water and shade, and common folk cannot afford to arrange for the necessaries oi jehad. It is difficult for them to fight in summer. I inform you also that you may try your best to further the cause oijehad^ which is the best of all devotions, and the truest of all submissions, so that we may not be ashamed before God on the day of judgment, and be glorious before His Prophet. Though these men have no means, yet as the holy verse runs that " victory and triumph rest with God," it is possible that God may give us victory and power to recover the country of Mussalmans from the hands of Kafirs, but, if we fail, we shall have done our best, and can bring a reasonable excuse before God on the day of judgment, because God does not expect a thing from a man which is beyond his power. I have deputed Mullah Abdulla Akhundzada of the Mohmand country, to attend on you, and, God willing, he will reach you. Please let me know whatever decision you may unanimously arrive at, so that it may be acted upon. If you decide to send for me there, I am willing to come ; but, if you wish to come here, I also agree. If you choose to commence fighting there, and desire me to fight in this direction, I am ready to do so ; but it is necessary to fix the time and day of fighting, so that, by the grace of God, the work be accom- plished. And as it is said that the only thing a man can do in a matter is to try his best, and that the accomplishment of the matter rests with God, so to leave everything in the hands of God is the best thing of all, and all Mumins (true believers) must trust in God. May God, the Almighty, lead us all to the path of virtue at our last moment, and save us from the punishment of the next world. And may He enable us to do an act which may be acceptable to Him. Peace be upon all believers 1 Translation of a Utter from Sufi Sahib to the Mullah Sahib of Sipah, the Mullah of Aha Khd {Saiyid Ahbar), Badshah Sahibf Malik Amin Khan^ Malik Sher Muhammad Khan^ Maliks Yar Muhammad Khan^ Ftrot^ Wall Muhammad Khan^ Klutwas Khan^ Samandar^ and the Maliks of 154 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897.98 chap. Kamar Khel^ Khambar Khel^ Aka Khel and other MaUks and people of Tirah, dated the ith Rabi-us-Sani 1315/^ = 15M September 1897. After compliments. — I started with the people of the Kot Valley, of Mohmandarra, of the Hisarak Valley and of the whole of Ningrahar, for jehad in that direction, but on reaching the limits of Batikot with the lashkar^ I received a letter from my spiritual leader, the Akhundzada Sahib (of Adda), the perusal of which gave me pleasure, and I understood its contents. He wrote to say that I should return to my residence, with the Ningrahar iashkar, and should wait for a few days, when, he said, he could let me know again. In compliance therefore with his instructions I returned to my place. I now write to say that on receipt of this letter you should assemble together, exert yourselves in the way oijehad^ and let me know faithfully of the result (of your meeting), so that I may understand it. God willing, the " Pir Sahib " (Adda Mullah) with his lashkar of Bajauris, the Khan of Nawagai, and the people of the Nigrahar, and myself too, will start at once in that direction and will try our best to save the religion of the Prophet. Consider it an urgent matter. Translation of a letter from Fakir Shah (f probably some Afghan official in Ningrahar) to the (Aka Khel) Mullah (Saiyid Akbar\ dated the i^th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 If, ^ 12th September 1897. After compliments. — I received your letter and understood its contents. I hope you will write daily the news of that side and send it to Mullah Idris, who will forward it to me, so that I may remain informed of the state of affairs in that direction, and sympathise with the Prophet Rest assured in every way from this side, and always send us news of that side. Translation of a letter from Adam Khan {Khambar Khet) to his brother Muhammad Zaman Khan (sent from Kabul)^ dated the iSth Jamadi-tU-Awal 1315 If,-i$th October 1897. After compliments. — I also joined the Afridi and Orakzai jirga^ which was well received by the Amir. His Highness X THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS 155 asked us about the causes which led to the quarrels between the Afridis and the British Government We stated that the British Government were day by day violating the former agreements, were forcibly encroaching upon our limits, and were realising fines and compensations from us for the arms which were stolen in the Khyber by their own servants, and that these naturally led to the disturbances. His Highness said that if he could he would try to make peace between us and the British Government. We stated that, if the British Government agreed to give up all frontier territories forcibly taken possession of by them, and did not ask for the return of arms looted by us in fair fight, we would make peace. The Amir then communicated our statement to the British Government, and a reply to that is awaited. We are staying here, and every consideration is paid to us by the Amir. Rest assured. Till the result (of our mission) is known, take care that you are not deceived by the English, whom you should not believe. Translation of a letter from Kazi Mira Khan^ and other Adam Khels composing the Afridijirga at Kabuly to Mullah Saiyid Akbar^ Aka Khel^ dated the 2S th Jamadi-td-Awal 131 5 ff. = 2$th October 1897. After compliments. — Let it be known to you that having been appointed by you and other Mussalman brethren as a jirga to attend on His Highness the Amir, we arrived here, and held an interview with His Highness, who advised us not to fight with the British Government, and this was, and has been his advice ever since. We said we accepted his advice, but that our wishes ought to be met by the British Government. We were ordered to record them in detail, when His Highness said he would, after consideration, submit them to the British Government, and see what reply they would give. We put down our wishes in detail, and presented them to His Highness, who submitted them to the British Government, but no reply has yet been received. We shall see what reply comes. There is a British Agent at Kabul who has on his establish- ment many Hindustani Mussalmans. One of these became our acquaintance. This roan is a good Mussalman and a well-wisher 156 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. of his co-religionists. He has given us a piece of good and correct news, which is to the following effect : — "You, Mahommedans, must take care lest you be deceived by the British, who are at present in distressed circumstances. For instance, Aden, a seaport, which was in possession of the British, has been taken from them by the Sultan. The Suez Canal, through which the British forces could easily reach India in twenty days, has also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and has now been granted on lease to Russia. The British forces now require six months to reach India. The friendly alliance between the British and the Germans has also been disturbed, on account of some disagreement about trade, which must result in the two nations rising in arms against each other. The Sultan, the Germans, the Russians, and the French are all in arms against the British at all seaports, and fighting is going on in Egypt too against them. In short, the British are disheartened nowadays. The Viceroy, and the Generals who are to advance against you, have received distinct orders from London that the operations in the Khyber and Tirah must be brought to an end in two weeks' time, as the troops are required in Egypt and at other seaports. In the case of the Mohmands, and people of Gandab, who had killed ten thousand British troops, and had inflicted a heavy loss of rifles and property on them, the British, in their great dismay, concluded a settlement with them for twenty-four rifles only, whereas thousands of rifles and lakhs of rupees should have been demanded. This peace with the Mohmands is by way of deceit, and when the British get rid of their other difficulties they will turn back and demand from the Mohmands the remaining rifles, and compensation for their losses. They will say that, as the Mohmands have become British subjects by surrendering twenty- four rifles, they must make good the remaining loss too. The British are always giving out that their troops will enter Khyber and Tirah on such and such dates, but they do not march on those dates and remain where they are. This is deceitful on the part of the English, who wish to mislead Mussalmans by a payment of 5 rupees and seek for an opportunity to make an attack by surprise. I have thus informed you of the deeds and perplexities of the English." X THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS 157 We, the jirga people, consider it necessary to inform you of this, so that you may be aware of the distress, confusion, and deceitfulness of the British, and may communicate the informa- tion to all the Mussalmans of the lashkar^ in order that they may be on the alert against being cheated by the British in any way. You should also send us daily news for our information, and see that no attacks are made on you by surprise. Also appoint a few clever men as messengers to bring us daily news and letters from you and vice versa. Send us by the bearers all news of that side, and in future, too, send us fresh news daily by other messengers, as it is important that we should know about each other. Translation of a letter from Sherdil Khan and Abdul Rahim^ son of Malik Sinjab Khan Orakzai (of Barki)^ to Malik Sinjab Khany dated the 2%th Jatnadi-ul-Awal 1315 -^ = 25 M October 1897. The Amir received our jirga of the Orakzais and Afridis with great honour and respect. He asked the causes which led to the commencement of the hostilities between the Orakzais and Afridis on the one side, and the British on the other. In reply to his inquiry we stated that the British had encroached upon our frontier limits by taking forcible possession of the Samana and other like places, and that they (the British) were demanding compensation and fines from us for the arms stolen in the Khyber by their own troops from the middle of their own army, and that these were the causes which naturally led to the quarrels between the two parties. The Amir then said that if he could he would try to effect peace between us and the British Govern- ment Upon this we said that, if the English gave up our frontier territories, and abandoned the idea of re-occupying them, and would not demand the restoration of arms taken by us in action from British troops, we would make peace. After this the Amir, for the welfare of Mussalmans, communicated all that we had stated to the British Government, and a reply to this is expected. We are now staying here, and the Amir treats us with great consideration. You must therefore rest assured for us. Do not negotiate with the British, and take care that you are not taken in by them. Do not believe them. For the rest all is well CHAPTER XI THE MOVE TO BAGH — TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS — THE RECONNAISSANCE TO DWATOI Bagh, Tirah, 26M November, Still in the Maidan Valley, but at last, we are thankful to be able to say, on the move. It was a weary wait of nearly three weeks in the last camp, Maidan. But our halts and our marches are dictated not so much by the military exigencies of the situa- tion as by political considerations. It is for "the powers that be " in Simla and at the India Office to order, for us to obey ; and it is to be presumed that the long halt in Maidan was arranged, partly, to allow Government to make up its mind as to what terms should be exacted, and what policy pursued ; and partly, in the hope that, seeing us in possession, the Afridis would throw up the sponge, and come in. We know now that anything like annexation is not, and probably never was, contemplated ; and we also know now that to wait for our friends the Zakka-khels to climb down was a mistaken and vain idea. So far they have not only defied us, and CHAP. XI THE MOVE TO BAGH 159 held their own against us with quite a fair measure of success, but also they have had influence enough with other sections of the tribes, notably with the Kuki-khels, the clan next to themselves the most numerous, and the most powerful, to prevent them up to date from even offering to make any terms with us. At the same time, our prolonged sojourn in one spot has been their opportunity. It has resulted in daily skirmishes and rearguard affairs in which they have often got the best of it. They have absolutely nothing to learn from us, these Afridis, in irregular methods of fighting. Contrariwise, their dashing and bold attack, the skill with which they take advantage of ground, the patience with which they watch for a favourable moment, and their perfect marksmanship — all these qualities have again and again won our admiration, and made a sensible impression upon our men. And as the proof of a pudding is in the eating, so if we go through the record of our three weeks at Maidan, and total up our gains and losses, moral as well as physical, and estimate what theirs have been, and then strike a balance, I fancy it will not be very much in our favour. Our actual casual- ties in battle up to the present time, including those sustained by the Peshawar and Kurram columns (an insignificant percentage), are well over 650, and if an equal number of the enemy have been put hars de combat by us, we have not the satisfaction of knowing it. And when we consider, in addition, the i6o THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. rifles and ammunition we have lost, the baggage that has been raided, and the transport animals, etc., that have been carried off, then it becomes obvious, and outside argument, that in the class of warfare involved by sitting down in a stationary camp, and trying to keep open a long and difficult line of com- munications, and to live (to a great extent) by forage, we are at a great disadvantage compared with our savage foe. Let us be glad, then, that that trying period is past. The force broke up from its old bivouac on the 1 8th. On that, and the next three days, the whole of the troops, and an enormous accumulation of stores were moved to this present spot, Bagh, mentioned by me in my letter of 5th November (Chap. VIII.), and described as the place famed for its musjid and sacred grove, in which the Afridi rebellion and the Khyber raid were planned, and in which fanaticism, intrigue, and sedition have always been hot-bedded and nourished. Bagh is rather in Khambar-khel and Malikdin-khel country than in Zakka-khel territory, and only a short four miles west of our late camp. But short though the march, and notwithstanding that the jirgahs of the two sections named came in recently, the flanks of the route had to be strongly guarded during the move- ment, and the new camp was laid out under a per- fect mitraille from sharpshooters ensconced under cover in every adjacent house. There were numer- ous casualties, of course, but fortunately no officer i62 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. hausted, or after seven or eight casualties have occurred on either side, the quarrel is generally settled by an interchange of marriages ! These fortified houses have, therefore, been a standing danger to us, and as the troops have been repeatedly fired on from them, and serious losses sustained, Sir William Lockhart reluctantly ordered them — that is, all those groups of them adjacent to our camp, or to our main communications with the Mastura Valley, vid the Arhanga Pass — to be de- stroyed. The houses have accordingly been burned, and the towers blown up by the Engineers, and if the consequence be to punish some innocent with the guilty, it must be borne in mind that the measure was not prompted by anger or malice, but dictated by stern necessity, and the instinct of self-preservation. Just before leaving camp Maidan, Sir William Lockhart once more specially addressed the 15th Sikhs to bid them good-bye, and to assure them that he sent them back only in their own interests. The regiment is sadly reduced in strength in officers and men, as it has been in the forefront of all the fighting in this part of the world since August last, and has suffered many casualties. Its companies were barely twenty files strong as it stood on parade now. Sir William, speaking in Hindustani, again referred to the splendid endurance and pluck shown by all ranks on the i6th inst. (fully described in my last letter), and told the men they were worthy XI TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS 163 representatives of the great Sikh Khalsa, and that in placing them temporarily on the line of com- munications he was only giving them a well-earned rest, but that should occasion require it he would gladly send for them again. The gallant 15 th were visibly gratified by the Chief's appreciation and soldierly praise, and cheered loudly as he concluded. The 30th P. I., who have all this time been hold- ing the twice-captured Dargai heights, are coming up in their place. The 2nd P.I. are also on their way to the front, and the Royal Scots Fusiliers too, their places being taken on the line of communica- tions by regiments from the reserve at Rawal Pindi. On the 2 1 St Sir William Lockhart received the jirgahs of four Afridi clans — the Malikdin-khels, the Khambar-khels, the Adam-khels, and the Aka- khels. The Zakka-khels and the Kuki-khels were, of course, conspicuous by their absence ; but news travels quickly in the East, and it would not be many hours after the dismissal of the four jirgahs named before the terms imposed by Government would be known to all the absentees. These terms, as announced by Sir Richard Udny, were : — 1. Restoration of all arms, property, etc., plun- dered at the sack of the Khyber forts, or on any other occasion. 2. Surrender of 800 breech-loading rifles. 3. Payment of a fine of 50,000 rupees. i64 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. (The foregoing terms to be fully complied with in seven days.) 4. Formal tender of submission in open durbar. Further, the jirgahs were told that Government reserved the right to decide hereafter the question of the management and administration of the Khyber Pass route, but that whatever order they might give in the matter the tribes would be re- quired to comply with it. Sir Richard Udny, who is a fluent and forcible speaker, then went on to say that amongst the letters found in the Mullah Sayid Akbar s house in Waran was one foolish one from their own deputation in Kabul informing them that the English were in a bad way, that they had lost Aden and the Suez Canal (!), that their trade was ruined, and that they were threatened by complica- tions at home and abroad which required the speedy presence of their troops elsewhere.^ The Afridis, therefore, might continue to fight against the Eng- lish confident that they could not do them much harm, and that they would very soon have to evacuate their country, willy-nilly. Sir Richard begged them, if they had ever placed any reliance on this precious effusion, to believe now that it was an utterly mendacious statement. We had come into their country with deliberation and purpose, and they might rest assured that we had the power and the intention to remain in it until our just demands were complied with. With this exhorta- ^ See Appendix to Chap. X. XI TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS 165 tion the proceedings came to an end, and the members of the jirgahs dispersed to their homes. Amongst them were men who had seen service in our own ranks, and one old fellow had no less than four medals on his breast — Afghanistan, 1878-80; North- West Frontier, India, 1887 ; and the Egyp- tian and Khedive's medals, 1882. Although the political officers are not very sanguine in their present estimate of the situation, I cannot help thinking there is room to hope for an early and amicable settlement. It may be true that the Zakka-khels, thanks chiefly to their geographical situation in relation to the other sections, are the most powerful of all the Afridi clans, and that they still defy us and continue recalcitrant. Also, that the Kuki-khels, another strong division, have not '*come in "yet. But these Khambars and Malik- dins, who have come in, are almost as important, and numerically very nearly equal to the two first- named, and there can be no doubt that they are sincere in their desire to make terms with us, and to see us depart. We have no final answer from them yet — there has not been time for that ; but I quite expect that when received it will be a friendly one, though doubtless they may ask for a little more time for compliance with the conditions imposed : and that will not be unreasonable, as the looted arms and property, for example, must be scattered over a wide area, and will take time to collect. In the thorough destruction of the Zakka-khels' towers i66 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. and defences, and of many of their own too, they have received now a stern object-lesson, and they are convinced of our power to give further illustra- tions if they drive us to it. Moreover, we daily receive fresh evidence that in the memorable fight on the 1 6th inst., described in my last letter, the losses inflicted were very severe indeed. Reliable reports place them at 293 killed and wounded ; and independent testimony from the Peshawar side has reached us fully corroborating this estimate, and speaking of the engagement as the most costly in life to them that they have yet been engaged in. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that ere long submission will be generally tendered, particularly as the tribesmen note the steady deter- mination with which Sir William Lockhart is carry- ing out his publicly-announced plan to visit every part of their country in turn, it resting with them- selves whether he comes as a friend or an enemy. We were no sooner established here (Bagh) than a three days' expedition was arranged to visit the Rajgul Valley and look up the Kuki-khels. Sir William himself accompanied this party, the com- mand of which was intrusted to Brigadier-General Westmacott, whose troops included the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the 3rd Gurkhas, 36th Sikhs, 28th Bombay Pioneers, No. 4 Company Madras Sappers, No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers, the Gurkha Scouts, and No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery. The idea was to march to Dwatoi (lit, the two rivers) XI THE RECONNAISSANCE TO DWATOI 167 on the 22nd, reconnoitre and map on the 23rd, and return to Bagh on the 24th. The district to be visited was absolutely unknown, but it had been ascertained that the road to Dwatoi lay through a long, dangerous, and difficult defile, and it was fairly certain that the Kuki-khels, who chiefly inhabit Rajgul, would oppose the movement. The troops therefore moved on the lightest possible scale, taking nothing but their great-coats, water-proof sheets, and a couple of blankets, one day's rations in their haversacks, and two more carried for them on mules ; officers ditto ; while Sir William Lock- hart was attended by only one A.D.C. ; and of his staff only Brigadier -General Nicholson, Captain Haldane, Sir Richard Udny, and Lord Methuen accompanied him. The distance to Dwatoi proved to be about seven miles, but it is almost impossible in words to adequately describe the difficulties of the road to it. Within a couple of miles of Bagh it suddenly plunges, following the stream which drains the Maidan basin, into a deep gorge formed by precipices which in places rise up sheer several hundred feet on either side, and are topped by rugged heights which, on the day of the movement, were crowned by the Yorkshire Regiment on one hand, and by the 2nd Gurkhas on the other. To call it a road now is only a fofon de parler. It is a mere stony track scrambling along the river bed, sometimes on the right bank, sometimes on the left, and as often as not in mid -stream in ice-cold J ki Wt^^^^^mxr k ^^ ''^ 1 1 1* : ... i^^l^SC^^I r m^vot^^^hhI^^^ ' '^H ^ ^^P .-: >v/ - 1 9^^^ , ' .^ "^^ ■ iW , ■'. w. ii^y^^^ '^.y ..^ ^iw*v«4v^* ■lonel Maisey. No opposition was encountered by the way. When Sur William Lockhart marched for Bagh^this column returned to Khangarbur, with the exception of the 2nd P. I., which now joined Brigadier-General Gaselee*s brigade. XII PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE TIRAH 183 decided, therefore, to move to a milder clime while the weather continues fine, and by sending off well beforehand, vid Shinauri and Kohat, all heavy baggage and surplus stores, all sick and weakly men, and even all Staff and departmental officers, and officers not absolutely required on the march with the headquarters of the army, or of divisions, it was arranged that everything should be ready for a start the day after Sir William Lockhart's return from his excursion into the Chamkani-Massozai country. The troops remaining would then move on the lightest possible scale, without tents, as the success of the impending manoeuvres must depend largely upon the mobility of the columns engaged in them. The scheme is, briefly, to change the base of operations from Kohat to Peshawar. The 2nd Division, General Yeatman- Biggs command- ing, and Sir William Lockhart and Staff accom- panying, will march, vid Dwatoi, down the Bara Valley, to Barkai. General Symons, with General Gaselee's and General Hart s Brigades, will start from the latter s camp in the Mastura Valley, and move down the Mastura, destroying on the way the defences of the Aka Khel villages, in the Waran Valley : thence they will cross the Sapri Pass, and join the 2nd Division near Barkai or B§ra Fort. Here the whole force will link up with General Hammond s " Peshawar column," and be within easy reach by a good road of Peshawar itself ; and at Bara, also, we should pick up again all our heavy i84 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap. baggage, etc., and be rejoined by all those who are now travelling round by Shinauri-Kohat-Pindi to Peshawar. Finally, the Peshawar column, which hitherto has remained in the vicinity of Peshawar, has been directed to advance as far as Barkai by the 8th December, and there to select camping-grounds and store supplies, for the main column, and to improve the roads between Barkai and Bara fort^ By thus sweeping down the Mastura and BSra Valleys (Waran being visited en route) the whole of the Afridi-Orakzai highlands will be explored from end to end : and, on the completion of the march, the force will be concentrated about Barkai -Bara- Jamrud, conveniently close to Peshawar, in a posi- tion to operate with effect against the Afridi settle- ments in the lower Bara and Bazar Valleys, and to reoccupy the Khyber. Seeing us thus established in positions dominat- ing their country, and within striking distance of those lower valleys into which they themselves are driven by the approach of winter, the Zakka-khels, the most implacable of our foes, must see the futility of prolonging a struggle so disastrous to themselves, and which, if persevered in, will in all probability result in a permanent weakening of their power by depriving them of the premier position which un- ^ *onfires lighted, stretching four miles, from^ the summit of the pass right into camp. By the cheery blaze of these beacons the tired animals were safely guided through the dark forest, and not a load was lost. It was a sight that will not be easily forgotten by those who saw it — the lurid leaping flames, the black dancing shadows, the endless procession of pack-animals and drivers, and the groups of armed men keeping watch and ward. Fortunately the enemy made no serious attack during the night. Only a few shots were firc »> »» F. R. M*Butts No. 5 (Bom.) M.B. 29th „ Lieutenant . C. L. C.iffard Northampton Regt. 6th Nov. 1897 Captain E. Y. Watson D.A. Com.-Genl. . 8th ,; Lieutenant . J. T. Waddcll Northampton Regt. 9th 2nd Lieut. . A. H. Macintire >) >> >» Lieutenant . G. D. Crooke Attached to Dorsets Suffolk Regt. i6th „ )» R. E. A. Hales . East York Regt. »* »> »i G. M. Wylie ' I /2nd Gurkhas » »• • » N. A. I-,ewarne 1 15th Sikhs . >> »• >» D. E. O. Jones Yorkshire Regt. 22nd „ »» R. M. Battye ' 6th Bengal Cavalry , 1st Dec. 1897 >i G.W. M. West i i/3rd Gurkhas 13th »♦ C. R. Tonge . ' Royal Engineers . 28th „ Major D. W. Hickman 34th Pioneers. 3rd Jan. 1898 Lieutenant . M. R. Walker York Lt. Infantry ■ 29th „ ft T. P. Dowdall >> »t f» 2nd Lieut. . E. S. G. Hughes ft t$ u Lieut. -Col. . J. Haughton . 36th Sikhs . »> 99 Lieutenant . A. H. Turing »i »» ft LIST B TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE Nominal Roll of British Officers Wounded during the Expedition Rank. Lieutenant Captain 2nd Lieut. Captain »> Lieutenant Major . Lieutenant LieuL-Col. Captain Lieutenant Captain Lieutenant Lieut. -Col. »» Major . Captain Lieutenant Captain f I Lieutenant 2n(l Lieut, (."aptain Major . Captain Lieutenant Lieut. -Col. Names. ^L L. Pears . D. R. Sladen T. H. Keycs. W. R. Arnold J. G. Robinson (;. E. White . F. Macbean . K. Dingwall . II. H. Mathias, C. H. P. Uniacke M. F. Meiklejohn G. S. G. Crauford F. F. Badcock, D. G. D. Crocker R. C. Hadow C. A. P. Sage R. Ilanford-Flood C. T. A. Searle E. G. Caffin . T. G. MacLaren E. L. Sullivan O. P. S. Ingham .'\. A. Mercer G. A. Trent . G. E. G. Cameron W. D. Wright J. H. Ik)wman G. A. Money 11. L. Custancc R. G. Munn . II. A. Abbott B. S.O. Corps. Scottish Rifles (attached to (tordon Highlander>) K. O. Scot. Borderers I) Dorsetshire Regt. . I /2nd Gurkhas 3rd Sikhs Gordon Highlanders >t i» If (Staff) i/5th Gurkhas Slunstcr Fusiliers 1 5th Sikhs 2/ 1st Gurkhas West Surrey Regt. 36th Sikhs Yorkshire Regt. K. O. Scot. Borderers 36th Sikhs . Dorsetshire Regt. ft Northampton Regt. (jordon Highlanders West Surrey Regt. Derbyshire Regt. iSth Bengal Lancers 36th Sikhs . »i ISth Sikhs Date. 1 8th Oct. 1897 f* )f 20th It f> It I) II II II II 25th II 26th 28th 29th 31st 1st Nov. 11 6th 9th ti tt loth nth 13th 1 6th If II 1897 250 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 LIST ^^Continued Rank. Names. Corps. Date. 2nd Lieut. . 0. C. S. WaUon . Yorkshire Rcgt. 22Qd Nov. 1897 Captain W. E. Venour 5th Punj. Infantry . (attached to 36th Sikhs) 24th f» Lieutenant . B. C. W. WiUiams Yorkshire Regt 29th •> f » F. 0. Wyatt . lx.A,« ■ • . »» f» »f W. H. Pennington 6th Bengal Cavalry . 1st Dec. 1897 1 >f W. D. ViUiersStuart . i/5th Gurkhas II Major . E. Vansittart • i» • It Lieutenant . R. Fowke . Dorsetshire Regt. . loth Captain C. E. None . I /2nd Gurkhas nth Lieutenant . W. de L. Williams Assistant Transport Officer I* Captain A. Bateman-Champain . I /3rd Gurkhas 13th f» F. de Sausmarez-Shortt . Scots Fusiliers II Lieutenant . S. de V. A. Julius . Sussex R^t . 27th Lieut. -Col. . F. Plowden . Oxford Lt. Infantry 30th Captain C. Parr >» II Lieutenant . R. Owen »» •1 »» • H. D. Hammond . K. n.iv. . • . 1st Jan. 1898 1 {since dead) Captain F. G. Bond . H. £<. ... II Major . H. Earle, D.S.O. . York Lt. Infantry . 29th Captain A. G. Marrable >i 1 II 2nd Lieut. . G. C. W. G. Hall . i» II f » D. S. Browne 36th Sikhs . 31st Surg. -Lieut. M. Dick »» II 2nd Lieut . H. J. de la Condaminc . D. of C. Lt. Infantry nth Mar. 1898 | Captain E. W. Margesson . Norfolk Regt. 26th >* THE END Printed Ay R. & R- CLiOtK, Limited, Edinnurgk v^ Hi\R\ hOKCt;. I • \/es to It ir i3 M tfAftMr — - ^ - r -T— T — . NEW AND CHEAPER EDITION IN ONE VOL. THIRTIETH EDITION FORTY-ONE YEARS IN INDIA FBOM SUBALTERN TO COMMANDER-IN-OHIEF BY Field-Marshal lord ROBERTS, V.C. WITH NUMEROUS PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND PLANS Extra Crown 8vo, los. 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